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1 Theoretical Framework 
 
Introduction 
This book analyzes frame building and framing effects in three direct-democratic campaigns 
in Switzerland. Under contemporary conditions, the chain of communication from the politi-
cal actors to the voters is – essentially – a multi-step process, which includes the flow of 
frames from the political actors to the journalists, and from the journalists to the voters. A 
frame is a central organizing idea “that provide[s] coherence to a designated set of idea ele-
ments” (Ferree et al. 2002: 105). It is like a “spotlight” that attracts our attention to certain as-
pects of an issue, and directs it away from other aspects (Gamson 2004: 245). By selectively 
emphasizing/evaluating certain aspects of a perceived reality and by making them salient in a 
communicating text, frames also “promote a particular problem definition, causal interpreta-
tion, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman 
1993: 52). Figure 1.1 illustrates the flow of frames linking each actor of the multi-step 
process: the political actors, the journalists and the voters. 
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The step between the political actors to the journalists is called frame building and will be in-
vestigated first. It is illustrated on the left-hand side of Figure 1.1. Frame building (Scheufele 
1999) uses media frames as dependent variable and investigates the processes and factors that 
influence the creation or changes of frames applied by journalists (frames in news media or 
media frames). Media frames refer to the arguments, words, or images that journalists use 
when relaying information about an issue to an audience. They are defined as working rou-
tines for journalists, which “organize the world both for journalists who report it and, in some 
important degree, for us who rely on their reports” 1 (Gitlin 2003(1980): 7). A news media 
frame “organizes everyday reality” (Tuchman 1978: 193) by providing “meaning to an un-
folding strip of events” (Gamson and Modigliani 1987: 143, 1989). The processes which in-
fluence media frames have been neglected so far. “To turn the concept into a viable research 
avenue, future research should specify the conditions under which frames emerge” (De 
Vreese 2005: 60). In this regard, Ferree at al. (2002: 296) state that “the relative roles of par-
ties and movements in taking leadership roles in framing issues in the media is an important 
and understudied aspect”. By exclusively focusing on framing and the effects of framing on 
public opinion or on voters, the whole question of how frames originate is side-stepped.  
Figure 1.1 suggests that media frames originate in three processes. First, political ac-
tors construct the message, and second they promote it. Political actors are collective actors 
involved in the campaign, such as political parties, authorities, economic interest groups, citi-
zens’ interest groups or ad hoc committees. The frames which result from the construction 
and promotion processes are called the frames in media input, i.e. the frames found in docu-
ments written for the media such as press releases or documents from media conferences. 
Third, the journalists contribute to frame building in the mediation process. Although the 
journalists of different media outlets or the journalists and editor from the same outlet some-
times differ in their reporting and commentary on an issue, more striking is their broad simi-
                                                 
1
 See also Hall (1973). 
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larity in reporting. As a consequence, I define the news media actors as more or less homo-
genous actors – as the journalists – while noting significant variation where it occurs. I will 
explain each of the processes in greater detail below. Since the media frames result from the 
construction, promotion and mediation processes, frame building should actually be called 
media frame building. However, since I apply the term exclusively for the investigation of 
how media frames originate, it is unambiguous and I will thus employ the commonly used 
term of frame building. Some factors are particularly influential in leading a frame to become 
a news media frame. These are called the key factors in frame building and are analyzed sepa-
rately. These factors might be traced back to one or more of the three processes – the con-
struction, the promotion or the mediation process. 
Since it has been largely neglected so far, the main emphasis of the book is placed on 
frame building. Nevertheless, the whole process of frame building would be irrelevant if the 
media frames remained without influence on the citizens. In order to gauge the impact of 
frame building in direct-democratic campaigns, I also evaluate the effects of the media 
frames. In Figure 1.1, they are illustrated on the right-hand side of the graph. Framing effects 
have been defined as effects from frames in communication on frames in thought (Druckman 
2001). Frames in thought (or individual frames or audience frames (Entman 1993: 53)) are 
“internal structures of the mind” (Kinder and Sanders 1990: 74). For instance, a voter who 
reads a specific frame in the media might add some personal experience, forge links not made 
explicitly in the text or use another individual cognitive device to make sense of the political 
news. In other words, a frame in thought is the individual’s cognitive understanding of a given 
situation (Goffman 1974). By contrast, a frame in communication is “the key consideration 
emphasized in a speech act” (Chong and Druckman 2007c: 106). A media frame is a particu-
lar frame in communication, which is characterized by the fact that the information is pro-
vided by the media. Frames in communication are more comprehensive: They can also in-
clude information presented by other speakers such as campaigners, politicians or friends. For 
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this study, I define the frames in the news media together with the frames in the media input 
as the frames in communication. The graph does not show feedback mechanisms. However, 
one could think of feedback in the form of anticipated or perceived reactions of citizens, jour-
nalists or other political actors. These reactions can affect what political actors or journalists 
say and do. 
 
Supply-Side View of Democracy 
By investigating frame building and framing effects, I adopt a supply-side view of democracy. 
From this perspective, the citizens’ votes appear as a reaction of the voters to the terms pro-
posed by the political actors. The proposition of the terms is most important because it can 
have an effect on public opinion and/or policy-making. This was shown, for instance, by 
Baumgartner et al. (2008), who revealed that the rise of the innocence frame has led to shifts 
in public opinion and to a sharp decline in the use of the death penalty by juries across the 
country. Previously dominant morality and constitutionality frames have not been forgotten, 
but they have been relegated to the background in media discussions due to the rise of the in-
nocence frame. The attention shift caused by the discovery of innocence prompted public opi-
nion to consider the issue in new ways – the result was a decrease in public support for the 
death penalty. More importantly even, it led to one of the most dramatic and unlikely policy 
reversals in modern times – the steep decline of death sentences in the U.S. 
By adopting a supply-side view of democracy, I conceive the “responsive leadership 
model”, presented by Kriesi (2010a), as the model for the democratic process. In this model, 
the chance that the democratic process produces “largely not a genuine but a manufactured 
will”, as Schumpeter (1976 (1942): 263) suggested, is small. It acknowledges that political 
leaders use rhetoric, i.e. the art of persuasion, to sway public opinion, but they “use it in a 
way, which facilitates public discussion, and they are held in check by a public that is capable 
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of assessing the validity of their talk” (Kriesi 2010a: 14). Kriesi suggests that this model re-
quires the combination of three preconditions. First, it depends on the competitiveness of the 
political process, which implies the presence of competing frames. Second, it requires an at-
tentive public. Third, the news media needs to be independent, resourceful and pluralistic.  
 
Frame Building 
Frame building allows research that analyzes the supply-side view of democracy. In frame 
building, the political actors struggle regarding the understanding and definition of a political 
issue by emphasizing a “subset of potentially relevant considerations” (Druckman and Nelson 
2003: 739). This process is highly important. The “definition of the alternatives is the su-
preme instrument of power” (Schattschneider (1988 (1960): 66; see also Bachrach and Baratz 
1970). From the point of view of my book, it is the frames that stand for alternatives which fi-
nally represent the supply. Certain issues or frames are organized into politics, while others 
are organized out. My general approach for conceptualizing the relationship between political 
actors and the media is an actor-centered political process model, as introduced by Wolfsfeld 
(1997). Thus, in contrast to Scheufele (1999, 2000), I conceive the political actors as the first 
source of influence in frame building, whereas Scheufele seems to adopt a more journalistic-
centered view. Following Wolfsfeld’s (1997) lead, I believe that the best way to understand 
the role of the news media is to view it as part of a larger contest among political antagonists 
for the control of the public agenda and the public’s interpretation of specific policy issues. 
Given the crucial role of the news media for reaching out to the citizen public, the struggle for 
attention and for the meaning of political issues becomes a struggle for the control of the news 
agenda and for the framing of the news. The relationship between the political actors and the 
news media is one of mutual dependence: the political actors need the media to reach the pub-
lic, while the media need the input from the political actors for their news production. As 
Theoretical Framework  7 
 
Wolfsfeld (1997: 13) puts it, their relationship is one of a “competitive symbiosis”, “in which 
each side of the relationship attempts to exploit the other while expending a minimum amount 
of costs”. Or, as Gans (1979: 116) pointed out in an often cited quote: “the relationship be-
tween sources and journalists resembles a dance, for sources seek access to journalists, and 
journalists seek access to sources”. But, significantly, Gans went on to stress that this relation-
ship was likely to be an asymmetrical one, too: “Although it takes two to tango, either sources 
or journalists can lead, but more often than not, sources do the leading”. Wolfsfeld’s (1997: 3) 
key hypothesis makes the same point: the political process is likely to be the driving force in 
this relationship. The reasons he provides for this hypothesis are numerous, but, most impor-
tantly, he suggests that the news media are much more likely to react to political events than 
to initiate them.  
The term frame building is borrowed from the concept “agenda building”, which was 
introduced by Cobb and Elder (1971: 905) and is concerned with “how issues are created and 
why some controversies or incipient issues come to command the attention and concern of 
decision makers, while others fail” (see also Scheufele 2000: 303f). Whereas agenda building 
(e.g. Brandenburg 2002) is concerned with the issue level, frame building looks at the differ-
ent dimensions or aspects of the same issue. In communication science, frame building is also 
called “second-level agenda building” (e.g. Kiousis et al. 2006) and is concerned with the sa-
lience of issue-specific attributes in the media. Most studies have been concerned with the 
production and selection of news (e.g., Gans 1979, Shoemaker and Reese 1996, Tuchman 
1978), whereas the study of news media frames as dependent variable has been largely neg-
lected. Nevertheless, there are some qualitative approaches to this aspect of framing. Edelman 
(1993) concludes that authorities and pressure groups use their societal influence to establish 
certain frames. The indexing approach (Bennett (1993), Bennett et al. (2007), Mermin (1999)) 
documents the relationship between elite dissent and frame contestation and basically argues 
that the media tend to “index” the range of elite views. Entman’s (2004) “cascade model” 
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then helps to explain whether elite dissent arises and therefore predicts whether and how 
much the indexing that occurs yields contesting of the elite’s frame. 
 
Framing Effects 
Political actors finally try to reach a framing effect, i.e. an effect from a frame in communica-
tion on a frame in thought (Druckman 2001). The most commonly encountered framing ef-
fects in political contexts are emphasis framing effects (or issue or value framing effects) 
(Druckman 2001). A speaker involved in emphasis framing offers alternative frames, which 
focus on different aspects of the same policy problem. An emphasis framing effect occurs 
when he or she alters the salience and perceived strength of an accessible consideration about 
this issue (Iyengar and Kinder: 1987, Zaller 2005 (1992), Druckman 2001) and influences cit-
izens’ preferences or attitudes (e.g., O’Keefe 2002, Druckman and Holmes 2004, Chong and 
Druckman 2007c). A second class of framing effects involves the use of different, but logical-
ly equivalent, frames to alter individuals’ preferences: Equivalency framing effects (or valence 
or message framing effects) typically occur when a frame casts the same information in a pos-
itive or negative light (Druckman 2001: 228). For the study at hand, equivalency framing ef-
fects are irrelevant. With framing effects, I exclusively refer to emphasis framing effects. 
 Studies about framing effects have built on studies about agenda-setting and priming. 
Agenda-setting was first examined empirically by McCombs and Shaw (1972) and was 
guided by the famous conclusion of an early study that “the press may not be successful much 
of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers 
what to think about” (Cohen 1963) (also see Kinder 2003: 361ff). Priming has been defined as 
salient issues or news stories which influence “the standards by which governments, presi-
dents, policies and candidates for public office are judged” (Iyengar and Kinder 1987: 63). 
For Scheufele (2000: 306), priming (dependent variable) is the outcome of agenda setting (in-
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dependent variable). Framing studies then expanded beyond the interest of agenda-setting and 
priming studies in what people talk or think about, and began to investigate also how they 
think and talk about political issues (Pan and Kosicki 1993: 70). Scheufele (2000) distin-
guishes between frame setting and individual-level effects. For him, frame-setting is the im-
pact from the media frames on the frames in thought, whereas the individual-level effect is the 
impact from the frames in thought on the individual behaviors or attitudes. Since I am ulti-
mately interested in the voters’ attitudes toward the issue and not only in their frames in 
thoughts, I define the second step in my study as framing effects and not as frame setting. In 
addition, it seems unnecessary to distinguish between these two processes. 
 Chong and Druckman (2007c) question the utility of the distinctions between framing, 
priming and agenda-setting. Even if the distinction between these concepts should be shown 
as helpful, the approach adopted here of framing analysis seems to be highly suitable. First of 
all, it is essential to study contexts in which we find combinations of frames because in actual 
public policy debates, people are generally exposed to different perspectives on a issue (e.g., 
Sniderman and Theriault 2004, Nelson 2004, Brewer and Gross 2005, Chong and Druckman 
2007a, Jerit 2009). Framing studies have explored the role of multiple competing frames, 
whereas priming and agenda setting have paid little attention to competitive situations (Chong 
and Druckman 2007b: 101). Second, framing analysis not only refers to the salience of an is-
sue attribute, but it expands beyond the analysis of salience and tackles the way in which ac-
tors understand a political issue and attempt to influence the public’s interpretation of it. “By 
appropriately framing an issue, political actors attempt to construct the meaning of the reality 
in question in a sense that supports their own point of view” (Kriesi 2010a: 8). Third, from a 
supply-based point of view, I am concerned with the speakers’ (or senders’) view, which is 
well suited to the framing approach (Selb 2003: 22), whereas agenda setting or priming are 
more concerned with the receivers’ perspective. 
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Frame Construction (Substantive Emphasis Choice, Oppositional Emphasis Choice, and 
Contest Emphasis Choice) 
In order to win a campaign, political actors frame the issue at stake strategically and “cam-
paign on behalf of competing ways of understanding what is at issue” (Sniderman and The-
riault 2004: 158). By competing and framing the issue strategically, political actors face at 
least three strategic framing choices (Figure 1.1). First, the strategic actors are expected to 
search for a frame they think has the capacity to become a strong substantive frame. They 
might additionally provide a second or third main frame, to which they can switch if their core 
frame is not resonating well. At the same time, they do not want to overload the processing 
capacity of the media (Shoemaker and Reese 1996: 104) and might not promote too many 
frames. The number of frames with which they will ultimately campaign is an empirical ques-
tion. I call this choice the “Substantive Emphasis Choice”. A strong frame is a frame that pro-
vokes a defensive reaction by the opponents and/or that resonates in the media. This concep-
tualization of strength is based on Koopmans’ idea that resonant messages (i.e. messages 
which provoke reactions) travel further (Koopmans 2004: 374). It means that a frame dis-
cussed by the opponent is a strong frame. In Chong and Druckman’s (2007a) experiments, the 
relative strength of a frame turned out to be the most important dimension of influence, under 
both one-sided and competitive conditions. However, the study was concerned with the ef-
fects of frames on voters, and not on the media. The relative strength of the frame is issue- 
and context-specific and difficult to determine in general.  
 Chong and Druckman (2007b: 100) argue that we have little knowledge about what 
determines the strength of a frame. They suggest that it depends on two sets of factors: the 
credibility of its source, and its congruence with central cultural themes.  
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Table 1.1: Constructing the Frame – the Three Strategic Framing Choices (Chapter 4) 
strategic framing 
choices the political actors… central concepts 
Substantive  
Emphasis  
Choice 
…search for a frame they think has 
the capacity to become a strong subs-
tantive frame 
strong frame in communication:  
a frame that provokes a defensive 
reaction by the opponents and/or that 
resonates in the media 
Oppositional  
Emphasis  
Choice 
…decide about the amount of atten-
tion they want to pay to the oppo-
nents’ substantive frame(s) as com-
pared to their own frames and wheth-
er they want to use their opponents’ 
frames offensively or defensively 
trespassing:  
offensive use of opponents’ frames 
 
counter-framing:  
defensive use of opponents’ frames 
Contest  
Emphasis  
Choice 
…decide about how much priority 
they want to give to their own subs-
tantive frame(s) as compared to the 
campaign contest  
substantive frames:  
a frame with a focus on the substan-
tive content of the debate – on policy 
 
contest frames:  
a frame which does not address the 
issue(s) at stake, but focuses on the 
actors involved or on the contest per 
se – on politics 
 
Second, political actors have to decide about the amount of attention they want to pay to the 
opponents’ substantive frame(s) as compared to their own frames and whether they want to 
use their opponents’ frames offensively or defensively (“Oppositional Emphasis Choice”). 
The offensive use of the opponents’ frames corresponds to what Sides (2006) has called 
“trespassing”: political actors may use strong images, issues or issue attributes of their oppo-
nents in order to appear responsive to the general public. Even more widespread, however, 
may be the defensive use of the opponents’ frames: political actors may feel forced to react to 
the successful frames of their opponents and to adopt counter-frames to offer rebuttals, and to 
counter-attack their adversaries. 
Yes and no campaigners fighting against each other are expected to primarily rely on 
different frames (Riker 1996, Petrocik 1996). However, under some conditions, there are rea-
sons to expect dialogue (Kaplan et al. 2006). Frame dialogue investigates the extent to which 
two camps converge with regard to one certain frame in a campaign, whereas campaign di-
alogue looks at all main frames in a campaign and investigates how far the two camps con-
Chapter 1 
 
12 
verge on these frames. Of course, “dialogue” has many more connotations and denotations, 
which extend beyond paying attention to the same campaign frames. In this study, however, I 
will use these two.  
Third, political actors have to decide about how much priority they want to give to 
their own substantive frame(s) as compared to the campaign contest (“Contest Emphasis 
Choice”). In this respect, I propose to distinguish between two types of frames – contest 
frames and substantive frames2. The peculiarity of the former is that they do not address the 
issue(s) at stake, but focus on the actors involved or on the contest per se – on politics – while 
the latter focus on the substantive contents of the debate – on policy. Examples of the former 
include “strategic frames” (analyzing the rationale and strategy underlying the candidate’s 
rhetoric and positions), “horse race frames” (framing the campaign not as a contest of ideas or 
policy platforms, but as a race between two teams, each bent on getting more votes than the 
other), conflict frames (emphasizing conflict between individuals, groups, or institutions), or 
personalized frames (emphasizing personal characteristics of the actors involved or attacking 
another person). Contest frames are typically without content. Substantive frames, by contrast, 
are variable in scope: they can either be issue-specific or transcend a single issue (Gamson et 
al. 1992: 385, Matthes 2009). The substantive frames mainly focus on the aspect of the prob-
lem definition in terms of Entman’s frame definition3. The distinction between substantive 
and contest frames is relevant since it helps us to ascertain how much substance and dialogue 
we find in a debate. In the light of increasing media-centered politics, it is important to inves-
tigate the degree of substance in a debate. For deliberative theorists, the public debate that 
                                                 
2
 De Vreese (2005) makes a distinction between “issue-specific” and “generic” frames. This distinction suffers 
from the difficulty that it mixes up thematic and contest frames in both the generic and the issue-specific cate-
gory. In addition, Chong and Druckman (2007c: 107) find it difficult to specify a frame as generic or general. I 
agree. However, I do not follow these authors when they suggest calling “script” a “feature in the communica-
tion such as a conflict” (ditto). Finally, Entman (2004: 5f.) explores two classes of frames, substantive and pro-
cedural frames. My distinction is similar, also in terms of meaning. 
3
 Framing devices, as opposed to frames, are condensing symbols that suggest the frame in shorthand (Gamson 
and Modigliani 1989: 3). They include metaphors, illustrative examples (from which lessons are drawn), catch-
phrases, descriptions, and visual images (icons).What Iyengar (1991) calls “episodic” frames, I would call a 
framing device. 
Theoretical Framework  13 
 
precedes the democratic decision, its inclusiveness, and its deliberative quality are essential 
for the quality of a democracy (e.g. Habermas 1996).  
The three framing choices are by no means exhaustive. In strategic framing, just as in 
any kind of strategic action, there are, as Jasper (2006: 171) points out, “few rules… but many 
choices”. However, I do suggest that all actors involved in strategic framing are implicitly or 
explicitly confronted with at least these three choices.  
 
Frame Promotion 
The political actors vary their choices depending on the communication channel. The study of 
social movements has shown the usefulness of the concept of the action repertoire of challen-
gers because social movements in a given context tend to use more or less standardized reper-
toires of action (Tilly 1978, 1986, 1995). In an analogous way, Kriesi et al. (2009) propose the 
concept of the communication repertoire to characterize the channels that are used in direct-
democratic campaigns. Campaigners have learnt how to use a well-defined set of communica-
tion routines, which they apply in a standardized way. Such routines may be legally pre-
scribed, but more often they are the result of informal rules that have been established over 
the course of the years. While fairly institutionalized, such routines are also subject to change 
as new channels become available thanks to technological change, or as new actors enter the 
fray, who experiment with new techniques and who, if successful, are imitated by their com-
petitors. I use a slightly different typology than Kriesi et al. (2009) because I am not interested 
in the way in which they reach the public but rather how they communicate differently de-
pending on the target group. 
 In general, campaigners first vary their framing choices depending on whether they 
target the general public and citizens or their members. With regard to the communication 
with the general public, they secondly vary their framing choices depending on whether the 
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channel is mediated or unmediated. In the mediated channels, they promote messages which 
have to pass the selection by journalists. Campaigners must cater to the needs and values of 
journalists. They try to provide newsworthy messages (Shoemaker and Reese 1996). The 
news values theory states that news values determine how much prominence a message or 
frame is given by a media outlet. In the original theory (Galtung and Ruge 1965), news deci-
sions are traced back to specific properties of events and actors – so-called news factors – that 
make them newsworthy and increase their chances of making news. Such news factors in-
clude, among other things, importance of the message (measured according to its impact: how 
many lives it affects), conflict or controversy, resonance with well-understood story themes, 
the involvement of personalization, proximity of an event, or the status and relevance of an 
actor (Galtung and Ruge 1965, Schulz 1976, Price and Tewksbury 1997). These characteris-
tics of the news can be seen as endemic to newsgathering, stemming in one way or another 
from time pressures faced by journalists and from the challenge of relaying complex informa-
tion in highly condensed formats (Tuchman 1978). The campaigners can rely on two me-
diated channels to reach out to the public: First and most important, political actors try to get 
news media coverage by producing media input. The organization of media conferences and 
the editing of news releases are among the most common forms of media input in Swiss di-
rect-democratic campaigns. News coverage is also referred to as free media (Iyengar and 
McGrady 2007: 9), even though it is not always cost-free. Sometimes public relations or ad-
vertising professionals are hired in order to maximize the visibility of a campaign in the me-
dia. Second, campaigners also organize the writing of letters to the editor.  
Unmediated channels guarantee campaigns control over the content and form of the 
message. They are a way to get the message to the public unfiltered by media gatekeepers 
(Shoemaker and Reese 1996: 174). In Norris et al.’s terms, unmediated channels offer the po-
litical actors the opportunity to use their “ideal” message. “Ideal” means that the political ac-
tors are in the “sole control of the content” (Norris et al. 1999: 62). “There is a significant 
Theoretical Framework  15 
 
trade-off, however: advertising is unmediated, but it is also a much less credible messenger 
than news reports are” (Iyengar and McGrady 2007: 137). By comparing the media input with 
the unmediated channels, we can evaluate the ways in which the findings of the media input 
can be taken as the political actors’ true framing intention. Two channels provide campaigners 
with an unmediated route to the minds of voters: First, they can pay for political ads in the 
media and spend their money on posters in the public sphere. I will refer to this as the politi-
cal ads channel. It is the largest expenditure incurred by campaigns. This channel is also 
called paid media (Iyengar and McGrady 2007: 9). Note that paid political advertising is pro-
hibited on television and radio in Switzerland. Second, political actors also can target the citi-
zens directly. For this form of political communication, direct mails, or flyers are particularly 
suitable. I call this the direct mail channel.  
Table 1.2: Communication Channels in Swiss Direct-Democratic Campaigns (Chapter 5) 
target members citizens or general public  
characteristic internal unmediated mediated 
channel info for 
members 
direct mail political ads letters to the 
editor 
media input 
examples newsletter 
magazine for 
members 
e-mail 
direct mail 
flyer 
demonstration 
leaflet 
newspaper 
ad 
poster 
letters to the 
editor 
media release 
media confe-
rence 
 
Finally, political actors can address their members instead of addressing the general public or 
the citizens. They can target their members using such means as their own newspapers and 
magazines, newsletters, or e-mail actions. I call this channel the info for members channel. 
This channel also enables the campaigners to use their “ideal” or unmediated message. How-
ever, in this channel, the campaigners primarily want to tie and inform their members. Thus, 
as summarized in Table 1.2, I will investigate one internal channel, two unmediated channels 
(direct mail and political ads), and two mediated channels (letters to the editor and media in-
put). 
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 I consider the media input as the most important communication channel in direct-
democratic campaigns. First, it is the channel which highly influences free media coverage 
because journalists rely on it in a routine way (Sigal 1973, Shoemaker and Reese 1996). In 
addition, direct-democratic campaigns generally enjoy high news coverage, making the other 
channels a small trickle in the cumulative message stream. Letters to the editor also can gain 
free publicity. Since these two free media channels entail considerably less costs than the paid 
media channel, all organizations should strive for newsworthy media input and letters to the 
editor.  
 By promoting their message, political actors also have to find a way in which they can 
garner media attention during the whole campaign. By promoting their message, political ac-
tors can use inductions and adaptations (Bentele et al. 1997: 240). In their “Intereffikation” 
model, Bentele et al. (1997) investigate the relationship between journalists and political ac-
tors and describe it as a complex relation of a mutually existing influence and a reciprocal de-
pendency of relatively autonomous systems. Inductions are intended, directed communication 
suggestions or communication impulses which – were they noticed or absorbed – become 
communication influences. Adaptations are communicative actions which are geared to the 
social facts of the respective other side, often to optimize the communication success of one’s 
own side (Bentele 2005: 211).  
 
Frame Mediation: Contribution by Journalists 
The communication between the political actors and the voters is typically not direct, but ra-
ther mediated by the journalists. Research has demonstrated that the public does form its im-
pressions about the political world from the news media (Graber 2001, Zaller 2003). Follow-
ing Strömbäck and Nord (2006), the journalists mediate either at the content level or process 
level of framing. At the content level, the journalists and the political actors negotiate and bat-
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tle over how the issue is framed. At the process level of frame building, the journalists and the 
political actors negotiate and battle over when and where the frames are reported. Even 
though the journalists generally respect the lead of the political actors with regard to the con-
tent of the debate, the journalists decide to which degree they want to balance out the messag-
es (“Balancing Choice”), to whom they give standing (“Standing Choice”) and how much di-
alogue they want (“Dialogue Choice”). With regard to the process level, the journalists decide 
how much effort they want to put into the coverage of a campaign (“Effort Choice”) and de-
termine when they want to report (“Timing Choice”). 
 
Key Factors in Frame Building 
In direct-democratic campaigns, the political actors take the lead by framing the issue strateg-
ically. The three strategic framing choices and the promoting activities are intended to influ-
ence the creation or changes of frames applied by journalists. Those characteristics of the 
frame or its speaker that are relevant for a frame appearing in the media are called key factors 
in frame building. In addition to these factors, external events taking place during the cam-
paign can also be relevant in the frame-building process. Lawrence (2000) argues that high-
profile media coverage of unplanned events provides a special opportunity for reframing. The 
importance of external events has also been shown by Baumgartner et al. (2008), when unex-
pected and scandalous events in and around the death penalty debate have triggered a shift in 
the existing debate towards the innocence frame. Moreover, banalities such as summer or 
Christmas holidays also structure the frame-building process. The journalists generally respect 
the lead of the powerful political actors and contribute to the debate by clarifying the oppos-
ing positions (which Bennett et al. 2004 call “recognition”) and by eliciting mutual reactions 
from the opposing political actors (which they call “responsiveness”).  
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Framing Effects 
The influential theory by Zaller (2005 (1992)) regarding the nature and origin of mass opinion 
showed that the elites play a major role for the construction of individual opinion. However, 
the conventional view on the effect of mass communication on public opinion is highly skep-
tical about the extent of possible effects. Although the classic “minimal effect” verdict no 
longer constitutes the received wisdom, the conventional view is nevertheless that the effects 
of frames on public opinion are rather limited and contingent (Kinder 1998, 2003). Most stri-
kingly, for citizens who discuss politics informally with others, the framing effects seem to 
disappear. In an experimental setting, Druckman and Nelson (2003) found that counter-
framing and heterogeneous discussions limit framing effects by prompting deliberative 
processing and offering reformulations of the problems. 
However, when distinguishing the quality of a frame, framing effects seem to be less 
limited. Jerit (2009: 423) finds that “predictive appeals can have a significant effect on public 
opinion”. Chong and Druckman (2007a: 651) show that “strong frames have a significant ef-
fect in both competitive and noncompetitive contexts”. Because scholars have only recently 
started to examine competitive framing conditions, there is much to learn about how different 
framing strategies influence public opinion (e.g., Druckman and Nelson (2003), Chong and 
Druckman (2007a), Jerit (2009)). In particular, the strength of the frames seems to be most 
relevant. The definition of a strong frame introduced above applies to the frames in communi-
cation (=frames in media input and news media). Thus, a strong frame in communication is a 
frame which provokes a defensive reaction by the opponents and/or resonates in the media. 
As we already know, credibility of source and cultural congruence of frame content have 
proved to be important in influencing strength (Chong and Druckman 2007b: 100). By con-
trast, a strong frame in thought is defined as persuasive or applicable (Druckman 2009: 25). 
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The precondition for a frame in thought to become strong (=applicable) is that it is accessible 
(= one is exposed to this frame) and available (=understandable) (Druckman 2009). 
Table 1.3: Strength of the Frames in Communication and in Thought (Chapter 8) 
 frames in communication 
(= frames in media input  
    + media frames) 
frames in thought 
strong frame a strong frame in communication is a 
frame that provokes a defensive 
reaction by the opponents and/or 
that resonates in the media 
a strong frame in thought is a frame that is 
applicable (=persuadable) 
precondition - credible source 
- cultural congruence 
- accessibility (one is exposed to a frame) 
- availability (the frame is understandable) 
 
 
Direct-Democratic Approach of Frame Building and Framing Effects 
Frame building and its effects will be studied in the framework of three direct-democratic 
campaigns in Switzerland. Such institutionalized political campaigns have several advantages 
(Kriesi 2010a): First, direct democratic campaigns are chosen due to their explicit start and 
end, which helps to restrict the effects on such a campaign. Second, they typically involve an 
important intensification of communication, which makes an impact more likely. Third, their 
coming is known in advance, which makes it possible to obtain a baseline of public opinion 
before they start. Fourth, direct-democratic campaigns typically give rise to the confrontation 
between two opposing camps. The presence of two competing camps guarantees competing 
information flows, and the bipolar character of the competition keeps the information flows 
within manageable proportions. Fifth, direct-democratic campaigns are issue-specific, which 
allows issue salience to be controlled for. During direct-democratic campaigns, the issue stays 
at the top of the political and media agenda and it enables a focus on the framing strategies of 
the political actors and their impact on the journalists and voters. However, the choice of di-
rect-democratic campaigns also comes with a price attached. The institutional specificity of 
such campaigns may limit the generalizability of the findings. For this reason, I will outline in 
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which regard the findings might vary depending on the campaign type (Chapter 9). Further-
more, the problem is compounded by the fact that we will study frame building and its effects 
only in one single country – Switzerland – and that we will examine only a limited selection 
of three campaigns.  
 
Outline of the Argument and Plan of the Book 
In chapter 2, I will introduce the institutional context of the empirical studies, and the three 
selected campaigns. Chapter 3 will present methods. Methods that are employed only in one 
chapter will be presented in the individual chapters. 
The main part of the book is empirical. As briefly outlined above, the existing research 
is lacking in terms of the identification and exploration of processes and factors that influence 
media frames. I suggest that there are three relevant processes in frame building in direct-
democratic campaigns: frame construction and frame promotion by the political actors, and 
the frame mediation by the journalists. In chapter 4, I will look at how political actors craft 
their messages for the media input in terms of framing. By constructing their message, I will 
argue that political actors strategically decide about at least three framing choices (“Substan-
tive Emphasis Choice”, “Oppositional Emphasis Choice”, and “Contest Emphasis Choice”). 
The fifth chapter will investigate the frame promotion process. In this process, I sug-
gest that the political actors are concerned about how they can spread their message the fur-
thest and maximize the impact of their campaign. The promotion effort can include both the 
variations of the strategic framing choices in the different communication channels and over 
time. The media input is the baseline channel because, as I will argue in chapter 5, it is the 
most important channel in frame building. The variation in different communication channels 
also tells us to which extent the political actors adapt their strategies to the media logic. 
Moreover, by promoting their message, the political actors think about how they can conti-
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nuously garner media attention and bring their message into the media during the whole cam-
paign. Instruments of direct democracy are well developed in Switzerland (Kriesi and Trech-
sel 2008: 49) and all actors involved know exactly how it works. Thus, it is routine action, 
and commonly, resources constrain the political actors to largely change their strategy during 
a campaign. By discussing the variation of the framing choices over time, I will argue that 
promoting practices used in direct-democratic campaign are used such that a frame finds me-
dia attention during the whole campaign.  
The contribution of the journalists is analyzed separately in the final process of frame 
building, called the frame mediation process (chapter 6). This process could also have been 
called “contribution by the journalists” or “mediatization”. I prefer frame mediation because it 
is more similar to the terms of the other processes than “contribution by the journalists”, and 
more neutral than mediatization. Mediatization denotes a problematic consequence of the de-
velopment of the modern mass media (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999: 249). I consider the jour-
nalists and the media as an active element in society. In such a way, journalists have to select, 
process and interpret stimuli from the environment (Schulz 1989: 142). As already observed, I 
will suggest five choices which journalists decide upon (“Effort Choice”, “Balancing Choice”, 
“Standing Choice”, “Timing Choice”, “Dialogue Choice”).   
The frame construction, promotion and mediation processes deal with the emergence 
of frames. As a final chapter of the whole frame building process, chapter 7 shall identify key 
factors which are relevant for a frame ultimately becoming a news media frame. In a first 
step, I will argue that the frame-building process is highly asymmetrical. Frames promoted by 
political actors in the media input influence media frames more strongly than vice versa. In a 
second step, I will then look at the factors in more detail. I will suggest that the power of a po-
litical actor, the role of the minister and the salience of the frames in the media input are key 
factors in frame building. This two-step procedure allows us to clarify causality question first 
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and then to increase the complexity of the model in a second step and look at the factors in 
greater detail. I cannot investigate all of these factors in one model and I do not want to take it 
as given that the political actors or the media input are the crucial actor and channel. By mi-
nister, I am referring to a Federal Councilor. The Federal Council is the Swiss government, 
which has seven members. Federal Councilors are faced with a dual task: they are a member 
of the governing college, and they direct one of the seven federal ministries (Kriesi and 
Trechsel 2008).  
The eighth chapter will investigate framing effects and introduce the measure of 
strength of frames in communication. I will compare the new measure of a strong frame in 
communication to the commonly used measure of a strong frame in thought and will argue 
that the frames in communication are strong and have an effect on frames in thought. I will al-
so explore the relative importance of the framing-based (=systematic) path of opinion forma-
tion process in comparison to the partisan heuristic path. I will develop specific hypotheses in 
the specific chapters. The final chapter summarizes the results. After pointing out the implica-
tions of my analysis, I will conclude the study with a discussion of the generalizability. 
 
Empirically, I will explore the frame-building process and framing effects by analyz-
ing three direct-democratic campaigns in Switzerland. I will analyze two campaigns related to 
optional referendums and one for a popular initiative. One of the referendum campaigns and 
the initiative concern the domain of immigration policy: the referendum by the left against the 
revised asylum law, which was voted on September 24, 2006, and the initiative ‘for democrat-
ic naturalizations’, launched by the populist right and submitted to the voters on June 1, 2008. 
The third campaign concerns fiscal matters. It also relates to an optional referendum launched 
by the left – the referendum against the revision of the corporation tax, on which the Swiss 
voted on February 24, 2008. The three campaign issues will be characterized with regard to 
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two criteria – their familiarity and complexity. The corporation tax constitutes a complex is-
sue. In addition, the corporate tax and the naturalization initiative are highly unfamiliar issues 
whereas the asylum law as familiar. External events which are occurring independently of the 
campaign can also become relevant for frame building or framing effects. I will argue that 
summer holidays, the first 100 days of Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf in office as a minister, 
Christmas break and the subprime crisis of the UBS were relevant external events.  
 
Theoretical Contributions 
This research theoretically contributes to framing studies in different ways. First, it provides 
an important contribution to the literature on political communication and provides theory de-
velopment by defining central processes and key factors in frame building. Although there are 
many other studies that analyze various aspects of frame building (although they do not use 
the term “frame building”), the understanding of frame building, its processes and key factors 
is still incomplete (De Vreese 2005: 60). To my knowledge, this is the first time that a frame-
work for frame building has been outlined. The framework incorporates elements from re-
search in agenda-setting and building (e.g., Kiousis et al. 2006, Lang and Lang 1981, Bran-
denburg 2002), media attention (e.g., Galtung and Ruge 1965, Schulz 1989, Gans 1979, Sigal 
1973), political communication (e.g., Entman 2004, Bennett 1990) and framing (e.g., Snider-
man and Theriault 2004, Chong and Druckman 2007c, Baumgartner et al. 2008). The model 
can identify the following key factors in frame building: the political actor as driving force 
and the media input channel as the relevant communication channel. In greater detail, we will 
see that the power of political actors, the minister as the most important individual actor, and 
the salience of a frame in the media input are key factors in a frame becoming a news media 
frame. 
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With regard to constructing the messages, the study defines three strategic framing 
choices as most important (“Substantive Emphasis Choice”, “Oppositional Emphasis Choice”, 
“Contest Emphasis Choice”). With regard to the “Oppositional Emphasis Choice”, a concep-
tual distinction between offensive and defensive use of the opponents’ frames is introduced. 
The offensive use of the opponents’ frame is defined as trespassing, whereas the defensive use 
is called counter-framing. Furthermore, with regard to the “Contest Emphasis Choice”, I dis-
tinguish between substantive and contest frames. Substantive frames focus on the substantive 
contents of the debate – on policy – while contest frames do not address the issue(s) at stake, 
but focus on the actors involved or on the contest per se – on politics. With regard to the con-
tribution of the journalists, the book defines choices of journalists as central for frame build-
ing (“Effort Choice”, “Balancing Choice”, “Standing Choice”, “Timing Choice” and “Dialo-
gue Choice”). 
 
Empirical and Methodological Contributions 
Empirically, I analyze the causal relationship between the frames promoted by the political 
actors and the news media frames. This simultaneous framing analysis at the levels of politi-
cal actors and journalists allows a quantitative test of the indexing hypothesis. To date, this 
has only been conducted in qualitative terms (e.g., Entman 2004, Bennett et al. 2007). As a 
second empirical contribution, this research applies the indexing hypothesis to a European 
context and to the study of domestic policies. In the U.S. context, indexing is used most often 
for analyses about public debates on foreign policy. This appears to me to be a rather atypical 
case (see chapter 9). Researchers should explore how the processes work in different types of 
campaigns, in different countries and in different policies in order to draw generalizable con-
clusions. A third contribution in methodological terms is an innovative operationalization of 
the strength of frames in communication (chapter 8). A strong frame in communication is de-
Theoretical Framework  25 
 
fined as a frame that provokes a defensive reaction by the opponents and/or that resonates in 
the media. It is operationalized by the opponents’ defensive reactions with respect to a given 
frame, i.e. by the shares of the opponents’ counter-frames, averaged over the frames in the 
media input and the news media frames.  
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2 Context 
 
Nowhere else are direct-democratic instruments more developed than in Switzerland (Kriesi 
and Trechsel 2008: 49). Between 1960 and 2009, a total of 365 referendums and initiatives 
were held at the national level in Switzerland. The Swiss Constitution creates different types 
of direct-democratic instruments. My study consists of two optional referendums and one in-
itiative. The two instruments have in common the fact that they need to be called for by the 
citizens. By contrast, the two instruments differ according to the source of proposition. Refe-
rendums concern propositions from government, while initiatives are usually put forward by 
the people (Table 2.1). Accordingly, referendums and initiatives follow entirely different log-
ics. The optional referendum intervenes at the end of the decision-making process. It requires 
50,000 signatures, gathered within 100 days after its adoption by parliament. It can also be in-
itiated at the request of eight cantons – which has happened only once since 1874. If an op-
tional referendum is required, the legislative act has to be submitted to a popular vote. This ef-
fectively grants the electorate a veto on government legislation. The initiative, by contrast, 
generally occurs at the beginning of the decision-making process and has an agenda-
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setting function. It can be forced if 100,000 signatures of citizens are gathered within 18 
months. The proposed changes can relate to individual items in the constitution or even the 
constitution as a whole. Before a people's initiative is put to a popular vote, parliament will is-
sue a recommendation to accept or reject it. In contrast to the practice in the U.S., in Switzer-
land, the government and the parliament discuss the text of the initiative before it is submitted 
to the popular vote, and provide it with a voting recommendation that almost always recom-
mends its rejection (Kriesi and Bernhard 2010). 
Table 2.1: Two Types of Swiss Direct-Democratic Institutions 
 optional referendum popular initiative 
source of proposition government citizens 
campaigns Asylum, Corporation Tax Naturalization 
 
Direct-democratic instruments are not only frequently used; they also exert a profound impact 
on the political system. The most important impact is derived from the optional referendum 
and is of an indirect nature. The optional referendum hangs like a sword of Damocles over the 
legislative process (Neidhardt 1970) because the actors involved always have to fear that any 
political actor may submit the bill to the optional referendum, thus potentially ruining the en-
tire bill. As a consequence, formal and informal institutional mechanisms have been devel-
oped in order to avoid this risk of veto. These mechanisms transformed Swiss democracy into 
a negotiation democracy. In the pre-parliamentary and parliamentary phase, negotiations take 
place in which political actors try to find a compromise that is sufficiently strong to avoid a 
popular vote. Along with federalism, it leads to the establishment of “concordance” or “con-
sensus democracy” (Linder 1999: 24).  
Swiss citizens are strongly attached to these direct-democratic instruments. Ninety 
percent of the electorate consider them as important or very important and are proud to very 
proud of them (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008: 66). Their attachment is probably linked to the fact 
that a majority of the electorate at least occasionally participate. Participation is selective and 
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depends above all on the expected effects of the bill, as well as the voter’s personal interest 
and competence (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008: 62). In his “realist theory of direct democracy”, 
Kriesi (2005) shows that citizens are able to efficiently make direct-democratic choices at the 
polls. They can either systematically consider the frames and arguments exchanged by two 
opposing camps (frame-based path of opinion formation) or form their opinion based on sim-
plifying strategies (heuristic path of opinion formation). Of course, in reality, these two paths 
are not totally distinct from each other. Nevertheless, for the purpose of analysis, it is useful 
to separate them because it is relevant to gauge the importance of the frame-based path. With 
regard to the heuristic path, voters employ four different simplifying strategies (Kriesi 2005). 
First, they tend to abstain if they are uninformed about the proposal. Those who participate 
and rely on a cognitive shortcut mostly use the partisan heuristic. When using this simplifica-
tion tool, voters rely on the voting recommendation of the party to which they feel closest and 
vote accordingly. Third, voters can trust the government and follow its recommendations. 
Fourth, they use the status quo heuristic and vote such that the status quo is preserved. 
In the following, I will outline three relevant characteristics of direct-democratic cam-
paigns for the study at hand. I will then present the types of political actors that are involved 
in campaigns and look at the Swiss media system. Finally, I will turn to the three cases and 
their selection. 
 
Characteristics of Direct-Democratic Campaigns 
Three institutional characteristics of direct-democratic campaigns (Kriesi and Bernhard: 2010) 
are particularly relevant for frame building: First, direct-democratic campaigns typically give 
rise to confrontation between two opposing camps. This is a consequence of the binary 
choice: Direct-democratic campaigns confront voters with a binary choice – either in favor 
(pro) or against (con) the issue-specific proposition at stake. Generally, one camp claims the 
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position of the government and the majority of Parliament, and the other argues in favor of 
the position of some challengers and the minority of Parliament. Pro and contra camp have 
different meanings for the optional referendum and the initiative. The pro camp in an optional 
referendum is always the government’s camp, whereas the pro camp in an initiative is often 
the camp challenging the position of the government. The presence of two competing camps 
is most important for opinion formation because it guarantees competing information flows. 
Second, direct-democratic campaigns are of limited duration, with a clear beginning and a 
clear ending. This implies the intensification of flow in frame communication and allows 
causal inferences to be drawn about direct-democratic campaign effects: one can start to col-
lect data before the direct-democratic campaign takes off and one can investigate the variation 
in the strategies of the political actors, in the content of the campaign material and news me-
dia and in the voters’ political attitudes. In addition, direct-democratic campaigns are relative-
ly short. This means that only few external events are likely to intrude into the campaign and 
intervene with the observed changes. Third, direct-democratic campaigns imply an issue-
specific choice. This allows for a detailed study of the framing strategies and their impact on 
the voters with regard to one specific issue.  
 
Involved Political Actor Types  
In direct-democratic campaigns, different actor types are involved: large political parties 
(“large pol. parties”), small political parties (“small pol. parties”), economic interest groups 
and unions (“econ. interest groups”), citizens’ interest groups, church organizations and 
SMOs (“citizens’ int. group”), the minister in charge of the campaign issue and the public 
administration (“authorities”), and finally ad-hoc campaign committees (“ad hoc”). Even 
though Swiss political parties have traditionally been weak because they are lacking in re-
sources (money and staff), they are key players in direct-democratic campaigns. It is their task 
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to articulate interests and mobilize their electorate in votes (Linder 1999). In addition, it ap-
pears that direct-democratic instruments allow political parties an advantage in terms of media 
attention and as such compensate their institutionally weak position (Höglinger 2008, Tresch 
2007). With “large political parties”, I am referring to the five strongest parties in the Swiss 
multi-party system. The largest party is the Swiss People’s Party (SVP), which accumulated 
28.9 percent of votes in the last election (2007) for the national parliament. The Social Demo-
crats (SP) received 19.5 percent of votes, followed by the Liberal Party (FDP) with 15.7 per-
cent and the Christian Democratic Party (CVP) with 14.4 percent of votes. These four parties 
form the coalition government. The Green Party (GPS) has not been part of the government 
coalition so far, but nevertheless received 9.6 percent of votes.  
Even though parties might be key players in the mediated form of direct-democratic 
campaigns, they are not the only actors involved. Since Swiss political parties are poor organ-
izations in financial terms, they rely heavily on the financial and logistical support from eco-
nomic interest associations for the organization of direct-democratic campaigns (Brändle 
2001: 182). The configuration of interest associations and citizens groups is determined by the 
interests related to the issue at stake. Economic and social policies typically mobilize the eco-
nomic interest associations and the unions, while policies more related to the cultural dimen-
sion of the political space (immigration, or questions related to cultural liberalism) bring in 
organizations connected to the citizens’ interests, religious organizations, or professional as-
sociations. The relative importance of parties and interest groups in direct-democratic cam-
paigns varies according to policy-specific conditions. (Kriesi and Bernhard: 2010).  
In contrast to parties and interest associations, the authorities are expected to accom-
plish their campaign involvement with a certain restraint. According to this traditional view, 
which is derived from the specific informal rules of concordance and collegiality (Kriesi 
2009), the role of the authorities consists in informing the citizens about the issues at stake ra-
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ther than in engaging in propaganda maneuvers. In order to fulfill this task, the government is 
allowed to defend its standpoint on radio and TV during prime time and to present its argu-
ments in a ballot pamphlet which is sent to every citizen. With respect to the authorities, the 
minister, i.e. the Federal Councilor responsible for the issue at stake, is particularly important. 
The Federal Council is the highest governing and executive body of the Swiss Federal State 
and contains seven members. Federal Councilors are faced with a double task: they govern 
and lead one of the seven federal ministries (Kriesi and Trechsel 2008). Since there are no in-
stitutional leaders in direct-democratic campaigns, ad hoc committees on either side also 
usually become involved in the campaign. They are set up for the purpose of coordinating the 
various actors and perform the function of meta-organizations that regroup a wide range of 
actor types. Alternatively, important actors may take it upon themselves to coordinate the al-
liance partners on their side of the campaign.  
 
The Swiss Media System 
The Swiss media system belongs to the democratic corporatist model, which prevails in 
Northern continental Europe (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 67f.). This model was initially cha-
racterized by relatively strong ties between the media and the political world (political paral-
lelism). In Switzerland, the process of “disembedding” of the press, i.e. of its increasing au-
tonomy from politics, did indeed begin late, and it is now largely completed (Blum 2003: 369, 
2005: 124, Imhof et al. 2008). Nevertheless, there are still some ties between political actors 
and journalists. This is also related to the small size of the country. In a small country like 
Switzerland, the political actors and journalists have probably known each other from sports 
clubs, their university days, or an activity at the cantonal level, or at least have mutual friends. 
Moreover, it is almost certain that they will meet again. This leads to the fact that even though 
the news media is critical, journalists ultimately show solidarity with powerful actors rather 
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than aggression towards them. As Blum stated, news media is at a smooth distance (Blum 
2005: 125f.) from the political system. Journalists respect the powerful actors and the political 
institutions such as concordance, direct democracy or minority protection (Blum 2006).  
Second, the democratic corporatist model is characterized by a limited development of 
the media markets and a considerable degree of state intervention. In the last 20 years, the 
number of newspaper readers has been declining in Switzerland, and the number of media 
outlets has been shrinking as a consequence of both media concentration and increasing mar-
ket orientation (Künzler 2005). In addition, we can observe an increase in “infotainment” 
(Imhof et al. 2008): a small number of free newspapers with a high coverage have come to 
play an increasingly important role within the media systems. In this respect, the most dramat-
ic change on the newspaper market occurred in 1999, when the two free newspapers “20 Mi-
nuten” and “Le Matin bleu” were launched. Nevertheless, the newspapers still remain strong, 
which is related to the importance of the press. In the context of direct-democratic political 
campaigns, and of politics in general, the press is still the most important source of informa-
tion for citizens (Marcinkowski 2006: 398). Swiss citizens spend on average about half an 
hour per day reading print media (Siegfried 2009). In 2000, there were 453 newspapers sold 
for every 1000 Swiss adults (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 23). Such a comparatively high rate is 
only topped by the Scandinavian countries. The high subscription rates (80 percent) form the 
financial foundation of the press, while advertising provides another 60–80 percent of sub-
scription newspaper revenue (Meier 2004: 251). In addition, the press is still constitutionally 
protected, but there is no legal obligation for the Swiss press to fulfill a public service 
mandate (Meier 2004). Newspapers act as private enterprises. In contrast to the print media, 
the broadcast media has been under greater control of the government. The Swiss Broadcast-
ing Corporation (SRG SSR idée Suisse) has a strong position in the audiovisual media land-
scape because it is charged with the production and broadcast of radio and television pro-
grams. It still operates as a non-profit-making enterprise and has the mandate to provide all 
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linguistic regions with a TV schedule that reflects and maintains the linguistic and cultural di-
versity of the country. SRG SSR studios are distributed throughout the various language re-
gions, and the programs also have to contribute to formation of opinion. Swiss public broad-
casting is less dependent on market orientation because it is mainly funded by license fee re-
sources and co-financed by non-political advertising (Meier 2004). The TV advertisements 
are non-political since, as already mentioned in chapter 1, paid political advertising is prohi-
bited on television and radio in Switzerland. The third characteristic of the democratic corpo-
ratist model is a strong journalistic professionalism. Professional norms support standards 
such as proportionality, detachment, civility, elite domination and closure (Ferree et al. 2002: 
284). In Switzerland, more than 90 percent of Swiss journalists identify with the profile of the 
neutral intermediary or analyst (Marr et al. 2000: 124, Jarren and Donges 2002: 199–228). At 
the same time, they consider themselves neither as critical journalists who monitor the power-
ful and stand up for the weak, nor as market-oriented journalists who sell information to spe-
cific target groups. 
Furthermore, it is characteristic of the Swiss media system that there are no newspa-
pers and no private television stations on a national level. The Swiss media landscape is lin-
guistically segmented. Following the borders of language regions, the Swiss media market is 
divided into three smaller markets, the German-speaking, French-speaking, and Italian-
speaking part. In these regions, not only are domestic media from the market’s own linguistic 
region used, but we see a spill-over from the major neighboring countries (Germany, Austria, 
France, and Italy) (Künzler 2005). We leave out media outlets from the Italian-speaking part 
of Switzerland, because Italian is the mother tongue of only seven percent of the Swiss popu-
lation4 and there are no indications that the campaign or public debate in this region were of 
importance for the national public debate in the three campaigns. Historically, Switzerland 
has had a larger number of newspaper titles published in proportion to its population and size 
                                                 
4
 <http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Schweiz>, December 2009. 
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(Dahinden and Trappel 2005: 397), which stems from both the linguistic and the cultural di-
versity of the country.  
Swiss newspapers are represented in all major categories of media publication. In 
terms of circulation, the most important media publication categories are high-quality elite 
newspapers (“elite”), regional newspapers (“regional”), tabloid newspapers (“tabloid”), free 
newspapers (“free”), and Public Service TV news (“TV”). Elite newspapers emphasize poli-
tics, economics, culture and science. The two daily elite newspapers (“Le Temps” in the 
French-speaking part, and the “Neue Zürcher Zeitung” in the German-speaking part of the 
country) continue to belong to the most influential Swiss newspapers (Siegfried 2009). Re-
gional newspapers focus most on the regional part of the paper. The most influential among 
the regional newspapers is “Tages-Anzeiger” (Siegfried 2009). However, there are several 
other large regional papers such as “Berner Zeitung”, “Neue Luzerner Zeitung”, “Aargauer 
Zeitung”, “Basler Zeitung”, and “St. Galler Tagblatt” in the German part and “24 Heures” and 
“Tribune de Genève” in the French part. Tabloid newspapers are dominated by topics such as 
crime, society, entertainment, sport and sex (Blum 2003: 373). There are two large Swiss tab-
loid newspapers, “Blick” and “Le Matin”. “Blick” has the second highest circulation rate. The 
most widely read newspaper, however, is one of the free newspapers (“20 minutes”) which is 
distributed on public transportation. It has 490,000 and 1,370,000 readers in the two major 
language regions, respectively. Finally, 80 percent of all households have access to cable TV 
(Meier 2004). 
 
The Three Campaigns5 
Let us now turn to the specific cases, the two optional referendums and the popular initiative 
investigated in this study. One of the referendum campaigns and the initiative concern the 
                                                 
5
 This part stems to a large extent from Kriesi and Bernhard 2010. 
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domain of immigration policy: the referendum by the left against the revised asylum law, 
which was voted on September 24, 2006, and the initiative “for democratic naturalizations”, 
launched by the populist right and submitted to the voters on June 1, 2008. The third cam-
paign concerns fiscal matters. It also relates to an optional referendum launched by the left – 
the referendum against the revision of the corporation tax, on which the Swiss voted on Feb-
ruary 24, 2008.  
 
The Case of the Asylum Law 2006 
The referendum that led to the vote in September 2006 was launched by the left against the 
tightening of the law adopted by the government and the center-right Parliamentary majority. 
On September 24, 2006, the voters accepted the tough new asylum law with a two-thirds ma-
jority of 67.7 percent. This result did not really come as a surprise. It was almost identical to 
that of the two related previous votes in April 1987 and June 1999. The vote on the asylum 
law was accompanied by a vote on the reform of the Immigration Law, which was also ac-
cepted by a similarly impressive majority. Both reforms had been discussed in Parliament in 
spring 2004. Compared to the government’s proposal, both bills had been toughened during 
the parliamentary debates, under the pressure of the populist right (SVP), with the support of 
the moderate right. The latter’s support was mainly motivated by the close outcome of the 
vote on the SVP’s radical asylum initiative in 2002: although the initiative had been rejected, 
it had obtained no less than 49.5 percent of the popular vote and the support of 12.5 cantons, 
which made the moderate right receptive to the far-reaching demands of the SVP.  
Among other elements, the new asylum law stipulated that asylum requests from refu-
gees who were already accepted by another state would not be dealt with. It also included the 
prohibition of social assistance for refugees whose requests had been legally rejected. The 
Council of States had even gone a step further and had abolished the emergency assistance for 
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rejected refugees. However, the National Council reintroduced this form of assistance after 
the Federal Court declared its suppression unconstitutional. In addition, the new law intro-
duced more restrictive rules for considering the question of refugees without proper identifi-
cation; it adopted a so called “airport procedure” allowing for rapid decisions at the refugees’ 
point of entry, and it enabled the possibility to exchange information with the refugees’ home 
country. Finally, more drastic coercive measures (various forms of detention of asylum seek-
ers) were adopted, and the duration of the existing measures was extended. Since these coer-
cive measures concerned not only refugees, but all immigrants without a residence permit, 
they were included in the reform of the immigration law. It is worth mentioning that the 
UNHCR and the Council of Europe voiced concern about this reform.  
 The frames used in this debate had already existed in the public discourse in the pre-
vious votes (1987, 1999) and in the parliamentary debate concerning this bill. I will discuss 
the promoted frames in chapter 4 but, nevertheless, would like to provide an overview of the 
main frames here. The contra camp maintained that the new asylum law was contrary to the 
Swiss humanitarian tradition (“human. trad.”) and that the provisions of the new law under-
mined the rule of law (“rule-of-law”). The pro camp argued that that Switzerland needed in-
struments to fight the abuse of its asylum legislation (“abuse”) and that the new law provided 
a more efficient implementation of the asylum legislation (“efficacy”).  
Table 2.2: Main Frames of Each Campaign 
Asylum Naturalization Corporation Tax 
human. trad. rule-of-law tax equity  
rule-of-law   tax loss 
abuse people final say SME 
efficacy mass naturalization competitiveness 
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The Case of the Naturalization Initiative 2008 
On June 1, 2008, the naturalization initiative of the Swiss people’s party (SVP) was voted 
down by 63.6 percent of the voters. Contrary to the outcome of the vote of our first case, the 
clarity of this verdict came as a big surprise and constituted a conspicuous defeat for the SVP, 
for whom this vote had been the most important test of its new opposition politics. The party 
had won the federal elections in Fall 2007, but it had lost the fight for the composition of the 
governmental coalition in December 2007: its coalition partners had respected its claim for 
two out of the total of seven governmental seats, but they had not complied with the party’s 
demand to re-elect both of its incumbent ministers. Instead of the party’s charismatic leader 
Christoph Blocher – the incumbent Minister of Justice, Parliament had chosen another mem-
ber of the party – Evelyne Widmer-Schlumpf – to replace him. It was essentially a coalition 
of Social Democrats and Christian Democrats that had unseated the SVP leader. As a reaction 
to the ousting of its leader, the SVP proceeded to exclude its two newly elected ministers 
from the party, and decided to adopt a systematic oppositional stance. The exclusion proce-
dure preoccupied the SVP and the Swiss public right up to the vote on the naturalization initi-
ative, which explains why the campaign for the initiative began rather late, just five weeks be-
fore the vote. This vote provided the first important test for the party’s new overall strategy. 
 To understand the thrust of the SVP’s initiative for “democratic naturalizations”, one 
needs to be aware that local municipalities play a key role in the naturalization process in 
Switzerland. Moreover, it is important to keep in mind that naturalization has never been a 
completely administrative procedure in this country, but has always involved political ele-
ments as well. In fact, the procedure varies greatly from canton to canton, and even within 
cantons, from one locality to the other (Helbling and Kriesi 2004, Helbling 2008): individual 
naturalization decisions can be taken by general assemblies of local citizens, by local parlia-
ments, local executives or local naturalization committees. Prior to a decree by the Federal 
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Court in 2003, such a decision could even have been taken by popular votes at the ballot box. 
In reaction to an infamous vote in the city of Emmen, where a series of applicants for Swiss 
citizenship from the former Yugoslavia had been denied Swiss citizenship in a popular vote, 
the Federal Judges decided to outlaw such popular votes on naturalizations. They argued that 
the rejection of naturalization requests required a justification, and that such a justification 
was not possible in a direct-democratic vote. The popular vote had only been used in a limited 
number of places, but it could be shown that, in these places, the rejection rate of naturaliza-
tion applicants was much higher than in the rest of Switzerland (Helbling and Kriesi 2004). 
 It was in reaction to this decision by the Federal Court that the SVP had launched its 
popular initiative in 2004. The initiative proposed that the voters in a given municipality 
should be able to decide which kind of procedure they wanted for naturalizations – in particu-
lar whether they wanted to vote at the ballot box on individual naturalizations. Moreover, the 
initiative stipulated that it should not be possible to appeal against local rejections of naturali-
zation requests. The initiative, in fact, demanded that the act of naturalization should become 
an exclusively political act of the citizens as sovereign. It was submitted in November 2005 
with the required number of signatures. 
 The government rejected the initiative, arguing above all that it violated international 
law, in particular the European Convention on Human Rights, the UN Pact II, and the UN 
Convention against racism. The debate in Parliament on the initiative was rather controver-
sial, since several members of the moderate right felt a good deal of sympathy for the propos-
al. Eventually, the Parliament decided by a clear majority to reject the initiative. However, it 
provided the populist right with a substantial concession by elaborating an indirect counter-
proposal to the initiative in the form of a modification of the law on civic rights: this proposal 
stipulated that naturalizations in general local assemblies should still be possible. A rejection 
of a naturalization request should, however, only be possible on the basis of a request provid-
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ing explicit justifications, which was to be introduced during the assembly and which could 
serve as the basis of a possible later appeal. In the event that the initiative should be rejected, 
this counter-proposal was to enter into force. In this case, the parliamentary and the direct-
democratic debate slightly varied. In the parliament, they were mainly concerned about the 
procedure they wanted for naturalization. The pro camp asked for fair procedures that com-
plied with basic rights (“rule of law”), whereas the pro side conceived naturalizations as po-
litical acts and not as administrative ones and claimed that people should have the final say 
(“people final say”). In the direct-democratic phase, the pro camp additionally argued that 
“mass naturalizations” had to be stopped (Table 2.2). 
 
The Case of the Corporation Tax 2008 
The outcome of the third vote was also unexpected. Given the generally favorable attitude of 
the Swiss voters with respect to the neo-liberal tax reforms, it came as quite a surprise that, on 
February 24, 2008, the revised corporation tax was accepted in a popular vote with only the 
barest possible majority of 50.5 percent. The reform had three components. Its core element 
was a reduction of the tax on dividends for large shareholders – a measure to alleviate the 
double imposition of dividends, which Switzerland practices as one of the last member states 
of the OECD. The second component referred to the possibility of introducing an alleviation 
of the cantonal tax on capital, while the third component provided special measures for own-
ership succession in private, non-incorporated companies. 
 The reform constituted a political compromise between the business community, the 
cantons, and the parties of the right. The business community wanted to do away with the 
double imposition of dividends altogether, in order to improve the competitiveness of the 
Swiss economy, but it had to take into account the needs of the cantons, who had proven to be 
such a formidable adversary in the previous vote on the tax package of 2004. Thus, with re-
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spect to the double imposition of dividends, the reform did not go all the way to suppress the 
tax on dividends entirely, but proposed to reduce the tax to 50 or 60 percent for investors 
holding at least 10 percent of the shares in company property or private property, respectively. 
The government had proposed to reduce the tax for all shareholders, but Parliament had intro-
duced the qualification of the 10 percent, which was already in force in several cantons, in or-
der to limit the loss of tax revenue for the cantons. Restricting the measure to large sharehold-
ers allowed the cantons to be won over to support the new law. Seventeen (out of the 26) can-
tons had already introduced such a reduction for their own taxation. Restricting the measure 
to large shareholders meant that the reduction mainly favored the owners of the myriad of 
small and medium-sized companies who had invested their money in their own firms. The 
whole package was designed to strengthen these small and middle-sized firms, which are of-
ten considered to constitute the backbone of the Swiss economy.  
 The second component of the law also carefully took into account the tax autonomy of 
the cantons. It introduced the possibility (but not the obligation) for those cantons that also 
levy a tax on profits to suppress their tax on capital, leaving the details of the procedure up to 
the cantons. Finally, the law introduced alleviations for personal companies in a period of 
transition. This series of measures was intended to facilitate the transfer of a company from 
one generation of owners to the next, or to alleviate the fiscal burden for the self-employed 
who wanted to close down their business. 
 Regarding the corporation tax reform, the frames have also been part of the parliamen-
tary and public discourse in the past. The adversaries of the corporation tax reform focused on 
matters of “tax equity” and warned that the reform would lead to a shortfall of several hun-
dreds of million Swiss francs with respect to both direct and indirect taxes (“tax loss”). The 
proponents of the new law framed the reform in terms of a necessary fostering of small and 
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medium enterprises (“SME”) and maintained that the new law would boost the economy by 
encouraging investments (“competitiveness”). 
 
Campaign Selection 
The case selection is based on the idea that the cases should help to find processes behind 
frame building: They are exploratory case studies. The suggested explanations of my book 
should provide a basis for further theory development and empirical tests. 
”Researchers initially may observe only one or a few cases of that phenomenon. 
Careful observation of a small number of cases may suggest possible general ex-
planations for the behavior or attributes that are observed. These explanations 
(…) can then be tested more systematically by observing more cases” (Johnson 
and Joslyn 1991: 121). 
In exploratory case studies, a “focused comparison” (King et al. 1994: 43ff) can help to gen-
erate explanations. I am able to compare the campaigns with regard to five criteria – their 
complexity, familiarity, imbalance in terms of financial resources, expected closeness, and in-
tensity. The corporation tax constitutes a complex object. Complexity is measured by the 
share of voters who had difficulties in making a decision on a given proposal (Kriesi and 
Bernhard: 2010). Almost two thirds of the voters had difficulties in making a decision on the 
corporate tax (Table 2.3), whereas in the other two cases, only around a third of voters were 
unable to make a decision. In addition, the corporate tax and the naturalization initiative were 
highly unfamiliar issues, as is indicated by the rather large shares of voters who were still un-
decided at the beginning of the campaign (Kriesi and Bernhard: 2010). The lack of familiarity 
of the corporation tax and of the naturalization initiative suggests that, in these two cases, the 
campaigners enjoyed a greater amount of latitude than for the asylum issue. 
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Table 2.3: Complexity and Familiarity of the Three Proposals: Indicators Based on VOX Sur-
veys 
  complexity familiarity 
Asylum 38.0 14.3 
Naturalization 27.0 35.7 
Corporation Tax 61.1 28.7 
 
The indicators for the imbalance in financial resources of the campaigns are provided by the 
difference of pro to contra advertisements in a selected number of six major newspapers – 
three each in German- and French-speaking Switzerland – over the final four weeks preceding 
the vote. This indicator is a proxy of campaign budget, but given that the campaigners mainly 
use newspaper ads to sway the public, it provides a rather good idea of one-sidedness in mon-
etary terms of a given campaign (Kriesi 2005). Table 2.4 shows that the pro camp was far 
ahead of the contra camp in terms of financial resources in the corporation tax reform. Advan-
tages such as this one have been extremely rare in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns (Kriesi 
and Bernhard: 2010). The resources for the pro camp came mainly from the business interest 
associations, and the amount invested by them signals the singular importance the business 
community attributed to this particular reform. By contrast, in the asylum law campaign, the 
two camps were able to rely on almost the same budget. As far as the expected closeness is 
concerned, I draw on the evaluation of the key campaign managers. In the interviews before 
the vote took place, they were asked to predict the vote outcome. Expected outcomes between 
45 to 55 percent of yes votes were coded as signifying a close race. Table 2.4 shows that the 
naturalization initiative was evaluated as the closest race, whereas only 40 percent of cam-
paigners predicted that the corporation tax would become close. For intensity6, I rely on the 
number of news media articles in all content-analyzed newspapers during the whole cam-
                                                 
6
 Kriesi (2005) uses the number of political ads as a proxy for the intensity of a campaign. I can rely on the num-
ber of newspaper articles here. This seems to be an even better proxy because it comes closer to the intensity of 
the public debate.  
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paign. The asylum law gave rise to more intensive campaigns than the other two cases (Table 
2.4). 
Table 2.4: Imbalance in Financial Resources, Expected Closeness, and Intensity of the Three 
Proposals 
  Asylum Naturalization Corporation Tax 
imbalance in financial resources 
(advantage pro in number of ads) -2 73 362 
closeness 
(percentage of campaigners who expect a close race) 60 80 40 
intensity  
(number of arguments in news media) 2455 1909 2066 
 
Table 2.5 summarizes the general preconditions for the three campaigns. I summarize unfami-
liarity and complexity as the difficulty of an issue, whereas the imbalance in financial re-
sources and expected closeness are taken together for imbalance of a campaign. As the table 
suggests, the immigration issues share rather similar contextual preconditions, which are op-
posed to the preconditions of the corporation tax. The only difference between the two immi-
gration cases is that the public debate of the asylum law was somewhat more intense than that 
of the naturalization initiative. Five criteria are too many for a systematic comparison of three 
cases. Based on theoretical considerations, I will thus focus on familiarity and complexity as 
the two main comparison criteria in all empirical chapters. Imbalance of financial resources 
and expected closeness are relevant for crafting the frame, whereas intensity plays a role only 
for framing effects. 
Table 2.5: Overall Preconditions for the Three Proposals, in Terms of Difficulty (Unfamiliarity + 
Complexity), Imbalance (Imbalance in Financial Resources + Expected Closeness) and Intensi-
ty 
imbalance intensity difficulty   
    high low 
 high average Corporation Tax   
middle-low high   Asylum 
  average   Naturalization 
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Conclusion 
This chapter provided an introduction to one of the most crucial institutions of the Swiss po-
litical system: direct democracy. It explained the difference between optional referendum and 
initiative and introduced the involved political actor types. In addition, in order to be able to 
understand frame building, it was also necessary to give an overview of the Swiss media land-
scape. Finally, I turned to the three selected campaigns and discussed case selection. 
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3 Methods 
 
Data Collection 
My research findings are based on data about the campaign behavior of political actors, the 
journalists, and the public7. To explore the framing strategies of the political actors, I will rely 
mainly on data from a content analysis of the campaign material of all key collective actors, 
and occasionally also on data collected in interviews with these actors. The relevant organiza-
tions were identified on the basis of various sources: the parliamentary debates, the campaign 
for the collection of signatures, voting recommendations, the press and websites more gener-
ally. We used cross-checks with the persons we interviewed in order to complete the set of re-
levant actors. Data concerning the news media were collected by analyzing the media content 
of the most important news media in Switzerland. Public opinion was captured by means of 
two (three in the asylum law) panel surveys in the French- and German-speaking parts of 
Switzerland. In all surveys, the first panel wave was fielded before the campaign started and
                                                 
7
 A group of researchers from mass communication and political science together collected these data. These re-
searchers belonged to a national center of competence in research (<http://www.nccr-
democracy.uzh.ch/research/research-phase-1/module4/module-4>, January 2010), which was financed by the 
Swiss National Science Foundation (for the design of the study, see Hänggli et al. 2010). 
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the final survey took place after the date of vote. The computer-assisted telephone interviews 
(CATI interviews) were conducted by a single company.  
 
Content Analysis of Campaign Material and Media Content 
The content analysis is most important for my study. In all three campaigns, we conducted a 
content analysis of the media input, political advertisements, letters to the editor, and of the 
media’s news reporting. Additionally, direct mails and information for members were coded 
in the asylum law campaign. All material was coded with the same codebook8, which consists 
of three levels – the levels of the article, the political actor or journalist, and the argument. 
 The first level of the codebook refers to the article. By article, we mean a document 
such as a press release or an article in a newspaper. At the article level, we coded formal in-
formation such as the date, name of the newspaper, title, position, length, section, article type, 
the use of an image, and information about the content such as the cause for the report, inter-
media agenda-setting, relevance, source, number of points of view, difficulty of terminology, 
presence or absence of a lead, degree of objectivity and emotionality and emotion. The second 
level refers to a political actor who uses an argument. At this level, we coded information 
such as organization, institution or party with which the political actor is associated, his/her 
name or regional provenance, or his/her position.  
 The third level of the codebook refers to the argument. An argument is defined as a 
verbalization of a specific point of view. In each document – press release, newspaper article, 
TV news program etc. – we coded all of the arguments provided by/reported for each one of 
the relevant actors (organizations or their individual representatives) in our study in great de-
tail. Note that, for each argument, we introduce two different codes, one for the pro and one 
for the contra position on the issue (see Appendix: Table A1). The arguments allow for the 
                                                 
8
 The codebook is available upon request. 
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linking together of the different actors – politicians, journalists and the voters – and constitute 
the unit of analysis in this study almost exclusively. I will make clear when the article or 
speaker level is the relevant level of analysis. 
 
The arguments which the two camps produced to support their own position or to undermine 
the position of their adversaries were used for the operationalization of the substantive frames. 
After coding the arguments, we summarized them in a limited number (<10) of abstract cate-
gories (=frames), which we created on the basis of our reading of the controversy in a given 
campaign. The arguments mainly focus on the aspect of the problem definition. While this 
procedure does not address all of the possible aspects of a frame (Entman 1993), it does at 
least deal with the most important one. After grouping the arguments according to frames, we 
defined the main frames (=most important frames) for each side on the basis of the relative 
frequency in the media input. The camp which used a main frame more frequently than the 
other camp in the media input is said to own the frame. The use of a main frame by the oppo-
nent is called “offensive” (=trespassing), if the opponent uses the frame approvingly. By con-
trast, if the opponents reject the frame, it is called “defensive” (=counter-framing) use. Beside 
the substantive frames, there is another frame type: Contest frames consist of personal attacks 
and conflicts. A conflict refers to a dispute without a specific substantive content. For in-
stance, a general statement of the type “our organization rejects the accusation of our adversa-
ries” is a conflict. 
 
Coding Procedures for Arguments 
For the interviews with the political actors, we needed to know the important arguments in 
advance. On the one hand, we used the parliamentary debate, and newspaper articles of pre-
vious debates about the same issue to find these arguments. On the other hand, we relied on 
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interviews with experts, such as the person responsible for the ballot pamphlet, which is sent 
to every citizen (Oswald Sigg), a researcher who is very experienced with direct-democratic 
campaigns and has an astonishing memory (Hans Hirter), a lawyer with excellent knowledge 
about the asylum law (Maja Gehrig), and experts from the administration (Brigitte Hauser-
Süss, Niklaus Sommerer). The arguments used in the interviews with the political actors were 
also used for the codebook of the content analysis. In addition, we extended the codebook by 
complementing arguments from the news media. This inductive approach (manual holistic 
approach, see Matthes and Kohring 2008) was combined with a deductive procedure (Matthes 
and Kohring 2008). We had the five (conflict, human interest, economic consequences, mo-
rality, and responsibility) generic frames (Semetko and Valkenburg 2000) in mind when de-
veloping the codebook and were also looking for arguments representing these generic 
frames. In this way, we used what Matthes calls (2009: 357) a “deductive quantitative proce-
dure”. 
 Let us illustrate the coding with one example, the abuse frame. We coded the follow-
ing pro arguments (in favor of the new law): “the abuse of asylum policy must be stopped”, 
“there are already too many (bogus) asylum seekers in Switzerland”, and “Switzerland is too 
attractive for asylum seekers”. The contra arguments (against the new law) were the follow-
ing: “preventing abuse is impossible”, “the new law is not needed, since the number of asy-
lum seekers is low/ declining”, and “tightening the asylum law hits the wrong/real refugees”. 
As already pointed out, we summarized these (and other) related arguments in a single frame, 
the abuse frame. Since the pro camp used the abuse frame most often in the media input, it 
was said to own this frame, and its position on this frame was defined as the offensive use. 
Thus, if the contra camp uses pro arguments of the abuse frame, they are called offensive ar-
guments, and the contra arguments of this frame are the defensive arguments.  
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 It is important to note that frames and arguments are not the same. Framing is the 
process by which political actors define the issue for their audience (e.g., Nelson et al. 1997a, 
1997b). A frame highlights some aspects of a perceived reality, and enhances a certain inter-
pretation or evaluation of reality (Entman 1993). In this respect, a frame is more than an ar-
gument because it also provides a specific understanding of the world. When I am referring to 
this defining function of a frame, I will use the term “frame”. By contrast, I will rely on the 
term “arguments” when I am concerned with the specific statement or with the number of ar-
guments an article contains. In the other cases, I use the terms interchangeably. 
 Eighteen newspapers and two TV news programs were included in the study of the 
news media. We selected the most important elite newspapers (which we call “elite”), free 
newspapers (“free”), regional newspapers (“regional”), tabloid newspapers (“tabloid”), and 
Public Service TV news (“TV”) both in the German-speaking and in the French-speaking part 
of the country9 (see Appendix: Table A2 for the list). We made sure that the selected media 
covered all relevant media types. For the asylum law, the coverage of the media was analyzed 
over a period of 16 calendar weeks. This campaign started earlier than the other two cam-
paigns because the issue was important to many organizations on the contra side and they 
tried to frame the issue before the summer holiday had started. The other two campaigns were 
shorter; thirteen calendar weeks before the respective vote were analyzed in both. In the case 
of the naturalization initiative, the attention paid to the first 100 days of a newly elected 
member of the Federal Council delayed the beginning of the campaign. Only when the event 
punctuating the end of these first 100 days had passed did the campaign and the media cover-
age begin in earnest. The vote about the tax reform took place in February. February votes 
                                                 
9
 The daily newspapers selected were those with the highest total audience for German-speaking as well as 
French-speaking Switzerland. Concerning TV, we concentrated on Public Service TV, as commercial and pri-
vately owned TV plays only a marginal role in Switzerland. We did not analyze media from the small Italian-
speaking part of the country. 
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usually imply shorter campaigns because they start not until after the Christmas break. In all 
three campaigns, we covered the direct-democratic campaign from the start to the end. 
Table 3.1 shows the total number of articles and arguments which were coded. Most 
newspaper articles and documents directed towards the media (media input) were found in the 
asylum law campaign. The average media article contains about five arguments whereas 
around twelve arguments are found in a media input. In the corporation tax reform, we find 
most political ads and letters to the editor. 
Table 3.1: Total Number of Articles and Arguments Coded by Campaign and Channel 
 Asylum Naturalization Corporation Tax 
number of articles 
   
 news media 559 380 327 
 media input 92 69 88 
 political ads 371 327 434 
 letters to the editor 223 257 272 
 direct mail 19 - - 
 info for members 106 - - 
number of arguments 
   
 news media 2455 1909 2066 
 media input 1061 782 1056 
 political ads 1818 1625 1110 
 letters to the editor 597 989 1057 
 direct mail 324 - - 
 info for members 2099 - - 
 
In the asylum law campaign, eight different students coded the material. At the argument lev-
el, Cohen’s Kappa for intercoder reliability is 0.61, which is not high, although acceptable. 
We consider it acceptable because we checked all of the arguments after the coding and cor-
rected for coding errors. In addition, for the analysis, we summarized the detailed codes for 
arguments into broader categories (frames), which are less error-prone. In the other two cam-
paigns, the coding was carried out by ten students. The reliability of the coding in the natura-
lization initiative and the tax reform is assumed to be the same or even slightly better because 
the instructions, support and coding scheme were improved and four of the coders stayed 
within the coding team. 
Chapter 3 
 
52
Expert Interviews with Political Actors 
To a minor extent, I will also rely on data collected in interviews. The conversations consider-
ing the strategies of the political actors were conducted with the campaign managers of all re-
levant political organizations having taken part in the campaign under scrutiny. Table 3.2 
gives an overview of the number and type of organizations interviewed. We distinguish be-
tween five types of actors: the ministers (=Swiss Federal Councilor responsible for the issue) 
and their administration, the political parties, the economic interest groups including unions, 
the ad hoc campaign committees, and finally, citizens’ interest groups including church or-
ganizations. In the case of the asylum law, we had 46 different interlocutors. Thirty-three or-
ganizations belonged to the challengers’ camp, which illustrates that the campaign against the 
asylum law mobilized a large number of collective actors, especially parties and citizens’ in-
terest groups. In the naturalization case, we interviewed 33 organizations, again a much larger 
number from the contra camp (25) than from the pro camp (8). Half of the conversations were 
held with parties and citizens’ interest groups from the contra camp. In the tax reform cam-
paign, the economic interest groups were particularly active. Overall, we interviewed 30 or-
ganizations in this case, 17 on the pro-side, of which 10 were economic interest groups. The 
number of actors varies in each campaign since the organizations do not have sufficient re-
sources to campaign every time. The involvement of an organization depends not only on the 
importance of the issue for the organization, but also on the number of important issues on the 
agenda in a given year. 
Table 3.2: Number and Type of Political Organizations Interviewed, by Campaign 
 Asylum Naturalization Corporation Tax 
 contra pro contra pro contra pro 
parties (large parties) 10 (2) 6 (3) 10 (4) 3 (1) 7 (2) 5 (3) 
citizens’ interest groups 14   2   7   3   3   0 
economic interest group   4   3   4   1   3 10 
ad hoc committees   5   0   1   1   0   0 
minister   0   2   3   0   0   2 
n per camp 33 13 25 8 13 17 
n total  46  33  30 
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Note: The numbers of large parties are indicated in brackets. 
Our research team deliberately did not focus on the leaders of the organizations. Rather, the 
campaign manager – i.e. the person acting in the background and responsible for the direct-
democratic campaign – was better suited to answer our questions about the campaign strate-
gies. We conducted two face-to-face interviews with each campaign manager – one at the out-
set of the campaign, and one after the citizens’ vote. This design is motivated by the fact that 
questions relating to expectations are preferably asked prior to the vote, whereas evaluation 
questions only make sense after the end of the campaign. The Swiss campaign managers were 
very cooperative. With one exception, we had no problem obtaining interview partners. In the 
one exception, the campaign manager was one of the most powerful politicians at the time, 
and he did not give a reason for refusing the interview. However, we were still able to inter-
view another key campaign manager of the same party and obtained all of the necessary in-
formation. Thus, we can conclude that in Switzerland, conducting interviews with the cam-
paign managers is unproblematic. It was, however, difficult to garner information about the 
campaign budget. In Switzerland, people only speak about money confidentially. We did re-
ceive some honest answers considering the monetary aspect of the campaign, but some cam-
paign managers refused to mention any amount at all, some spoke only in vague terms about 
the budget, and several even lied about the amounts they spent, as our checks based on sec-
ondary material indicate. In order to gain some more reliable information about the financial 
aspect, we measured the size and numbers of political advertisements – one of the key budge-
tary items in a Swiss direct-democratic campaign. Based on the total size of political adver-
tisements, we calculated estimators for the money the political actors spent on advertisements.  
We recorded the interviews and took notes. Immediately after the interviews, we wrote 
minutes, in which we summarized the main statements. The detailed record was used only for 
clarification. We did not transcribe the interviews and accepted that the minutes already in-
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clude some interpretation of the two interviewers (Laurent Bernhard and the author). This 
pragmatic way of using the minutes is sufficient to answer our research questions and allowed 
us to conduct and analyze a total of no less than 218 interviews. The modal duration of an in-
terview was about 60 minutes. The interviews relied on two structured questionnaires contain-
ing more than 200 closed-ended and open-ended questions (see Hänggli et al. 2011 for a more 
detailed description).  
 
Panel Study 
For each campaign, we conducted a panel study. The structure of the questionnaire remained 
comparable across the three campaigns and differed only in terms of their thematic focus. 
Cognitive pre-tests preceded the main studies to ensure that the questionnaires were not too 
long and were respondent-friendly in terms of comprehension. An independent sample was 
recruited by random quota for each campaign. In order to minimize drop-out, the interviewees 
received an incentive for their participation. Table 3.3 lists the relevant information pertaining 
to the panel studies. As can be seen in this table, in the study about the asylum law campaign, 
participants were interviewed three times, while there were only two waves of interviews in 
the other two studies. The first interviews always took place before the campaign started. The 
final wave was started after the vote. 
Table 3.3: Details of Three Panel Studies 
study details 
(issues, panel waves, date of interviews) N % female mean age (sd) 
panel study I: Asylum    
 wave I (7/4–7/20/2006) 1725 52.2 48.5 (17.1) 
 wave II (8/28–9/2/2006) 1415 53.7 49.3 (17.0) 
 wave III (9/25–9/30/2006) 1094 54.6 50.4 (17.1) 
panel study III: Naturalization    
 wave I (4/7–4/25/2008) 1251 51.3 48.5 (16.8) 
 wave II (6/2–6/20/2008) 999 50.2 49.6 (16.7) 
panel study II: Corporation Tax    
 wave I (1/9–1/23/2008) 1251 50.3 50.2 (16.3) 
 wave II (2/25–3/7/2008) 1001 50.4 50.2 (16.4) 
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Although our samples are representative in terms of participants’ sex, age, and residence, 
three aspects impair the representativeness of our results. First and most problematic is the bi-
as in terms of education, as the lowest educational levels are underrepresented in our data. 
Second, there is also systematic panel attrition. For instance, less-educated and younger 
people are more likely to drop out of our samples. These biases, along with a leniency bias, 
may have produced over-reporting in voting turnout (see Table 3.4). This bias is not proble-
matic for the study at hand because participation as a dependent variable is not analyzed. The 
panel studies come close to the official outcomes of the vote. Apart from parameter estimates 
at the population level, there are no indicators that would prevent us from drawing conclu-
sions about structural relations between variables even if these are affected by panel non-
random missingness or panel mortality attrition. 
Table 3.4: Results and Participation Rates: Comparison of Official Outcomes with Outcomes of 
our Study 
 results (percent in favor) participation rate 
 official our study official our study 
Asylum 67.8 61.3 49.2 87.5 
Naturalization 36.0 27.7 45.1 79.9 
Corporation Tax 50.4 52.6 39.0 86.2 
Note: Official results without Ticino (Italian-speaking part of the country), which was not covered by our surveys. 
Most of the constructs in the questionnaire were assessed repeatedly. The first part of the 
questionnaire captured participants’ interest in the campaign, interpersonal communication, 
and information processing strategies. Subsequently, we asked for the knowledge or salience 
and the approval of the arguments. The knowledge and approval of arguments are of pivotal 
interest in the present study. For each panel wave in the three studies, respondents were asked 
whether they knew the specific arguments and the extent to which they agreed or disagreed 
with the arguments. Table 3.5 shows the most important arguments proposed by the pro and 
contra side by each campaign and reports to which frame the argument belongs. 
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Table 3.5: The Most Important Arguments by Camp and Campaign 
Asylum 
pro arguments frame 
  The abuse of asylum policy must be stopped abuse 
 Switzerland is too attractive for asylum seekers  
  There are already too many foreigners in Switzerland   
  The execution of asylum politics must be more efficient efficacy 
contra arguments  
 The humanitarian tradition of Switzerland must be maintained human. trad. 
 Foreign people contribute to the social and cultural quality of Switzerland   
 The rights of asylum seekers have to be protected rule-of-law 
Naturalization 
pro arguments frame 
  Mass naturalization has to be stopped mass naturalization 
  There are too many foreigners in Switzerland   
  
Each municipality should decide by itself which authority is responsible for 
naturalization 
people final say 
  Civil servants should not be allowed to decide about naturalizations   
  The people should decide about naturalizations   
contra arguments   
  This initiative brings discriminatory and arbitrary naturalization decisions rule-of-law 
  Naturalizations have to be in accordance with the rule of law   
  The rights of the foreigners have to be protected   
  Naturalization candidates are well integrated in general mass naturalization 
(defensive use) 
  This poll damages the image of Switzerland others 
Corporation Tax 
pro arguments frame 
  This tax reform advances SMEs SME 
  This tax reform advances the competitiveness of the Swiss economy competitiveness 
  This tax reform advances investments and creates new jobs   
  
Double taxation is unfair tax equity  
(defensive use) 
contra arguments   
  A tax relief for major shareholders is unfair tax equity 
  A clear signal against excessive manager salaries is needed   
  All shareholders should get a tax discount   
  This tax reform harms the old age and survivors insurance (AHV) tax loss 
  
This tax reform brings unacceptable tax loss for the federal government 
and the cantons   
  This tax reform makes the tax system even more complicated others 
 
After the argument block in the questionnaire, respondents were asked to report their emo-
tional reactions toward asylum seekers in the first study, toward foreigners in general in the 
second study, and their affective reactions in the context of the corporate tax debate in the 
third study. Subsequently, the attitudes about the specific issue, people’s voting intentions and 
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the intended (or actual) participation were gauged. In all three surveys, issue-specific predic-
tors were assessed, such as values, authoritarianism, and threat perceptions. A next measure 
was the use of different communication channels and news media and the reliance on other 
sources (e.g., radio, web sites, or campaign advertising). Finally, we asked for general politi-
cal interest, party identification, ideological left-right self-positioning, trust in government, 
and demographics (e.g., religion, occupation). Questions about sex, age, education, and resi-
dence were asked right at the beginning of the interview. These questions ensured that our 
quota would be completed. The time to complete the CATI interviews was approximately 20 
to 30 minutes. 
 
Arguments Were Linked Between the Data Collection Instruments 
The questions concerning the arguments were linked between all relevant actors in the politi-
cal campaign. In all of our instruments, we included questions about the very same arguments 
(Table 3.5). First, we asked the politicians about the importance of each argument in their 
campaign and their position on these arguments. For instance, they were asked about the im-
portance of the argument “the abuse of asylum policy must be stopped” and about how much 
they agreed with it. In the content analysis, we coded how often the argument “the abuse of 
asylum policy must be stopped” was mentioned in the campaign material and in the news me-
dia and whether or not it was used offensively or defensively. Finally, in the panel survey, we 
asked the survey respondents whether they were aware of the most important arguments and 
whether they agreed with them. For instance, our interviewees were asked whether they had 
heard the argument “the abuse of asylum policy must be stopped” and how much they agreed 
with it. Such an integrated approach in data collection enables us to trace the flow of argu-
ments from political actors via mass media reporting to the public. 
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Operationalization 
I will discuss the operationalization of key concepts – campaign and frame dialogue, as well 
as power – which are used in several chapters. Concepts which are chapter-specific shall be 
introduced in the corresponding chapters. 
 
Dialogue 
For the operationalization of dialogue (convergence), I rely on two indicators. I use a formula 
developed by Sigelmann & Buell (2004) in order to calculate the level of campaign dialogue 
(campaign-level convergence): 
100 - (Σ│Ppf  - Pcf│/ 2) 
Ppf and Pcf are the percentage of total emphasis that the pro and contra camp put on a certain 
frame, f, respectively. This measure is derived from the total of the absolute differences be-
tween the two camps in the share of attention each camp devotes to a certain frame. For ex-
ample, assume that there were three frames for the two camps to address, and that the sides 
distributed their attention as follows: 
 Frame 1 Frame 2 Frame 3 
Pro camp 100% 0% 0% 
Contra camp 0% 100% 0% 
 
In this example, the pro camp concentrated exclusively on one frame, the contra camp fo-
cused exclusively on a different frame, and both sides ignored the third frame. Obviously, no 
campaign dialogue occurred during this campaign. Summing together the absolute differences 
between the camps would produce a difference of 200 – that is, |100-0| + |0-100| + |0-0|=200. 
These differences add up to 200 rather than to 100 because we double-counted them. Thus, 
we need to divide the sum by 2 in order to calibrate the measure to the range between 0 and 
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100. In addition, subtracting from 100 converts the measure to one of similarity rather than 
dissimilarity. Thus, the closer the measure is to 100, the more campaign dialogue we have. A 
score of, say, 40 for a campaign would indicate a 40% overlap in the two sides’ attention pro-
files. 
In addition, to determine the extent of frame dialogue (frame-level convergence), we 
use the following measure proposed by Kaplan et al. (2006), where Ppf and Pcf again represent 
the percentages of emphasis that the pro and contra camps put on a certain frame f.  
(1 - |(Ppf - Pcf )/(Ppf + Pcf )|) ∗ 100 
Frame dialogue is less important because we are more interested in the overall dialogue than 
in the dialogue about a certain frame. Thus, I will use frame dialogue only in chapter 4. 
 
Power 
Finally, there is a measure for the power, which allows us to specify the influence of the ac-
tors involved. Power is operationalized by a reputational indicator and is based on a set of 
questions referring to the list of all organizations involved (Kriesi et al. 2006). In the second 
interviews, the campaigners were first asked to name the organizations on the list which, from 
their point of view, had been particularly influential during the campaign. Next, they were 
asked to name the three most influential organizations, and, finally, the most influential one. 
For each organization, a summary indicator reflects the number of times it was mentioned by 
the other respondents in reaction to these questions: mentions as “most influential” are coded 
as “3”, mentions among the “three most influential” as “2”, and mentions as “influential” as 
“1”. The values of the indicator range from 0, for an organization that was never mentioned as 
influential, to 3 times the number of respondents, for an organization that would have been 
considered to be the most influential actor by all of them.  
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Conclusion 
I presented the instruments used for data collection and the operationalization of concepts 
which will be used in several chapters. The unique set of data consists of data about the cam-
paign behavior of political actors, the journalists, and the public. It enables us to trace the 
flow of arguments from political actors via mass media reporting to the public. To explore the 
framing strategies of the political actors, the book relies mainly on data from content analysis 
of the campaign material of all key actors, and occasionally also on data collected in inter-
views with these actors. Data concerning the news media were collected by analyzing the me-
dia content of important (18 newspapers and 2 TV news programs) news media in Switzer-
land. Public opinion was captured by means of two (three) panel surveys in the French- and 
German-speaking parts of Switzerland. The integrated approach in data collection allow fol-
lowing the framing process from the construction and promotion of the frames by the politi-
cians, to their mediation by the journalists, and their reception and acceptance by the citizen 
public.  
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4 Frame Construction for the Media Input 
(Strategic Framing Choices) 
 
 
Introduction10 
In order to win a political campaign, political actors try to achieve an emphasis effect 
(Druckman 2001, 2004), i.e. to lead the media or individuals to focus on certain aspects of an 
issue instead of others when constructing their opinions (Druckman 2001: 230). They frame 
the issue at stake strategically, and “campaign on behalf of competing ways of understanding 
what is at issue” (Sniderman and Theriault 2004: 158). I argue that political actors face at 
least three strategic framing choices. In this chapter, I start by discussing these three choices. 
In addition, I shall present the main frames of both camps in each campaign and present the 
empirical analysis structured according to the choices. This chapter focuses exclusively on the 
frames in the media input because it is the crucial channel for the frame building process. The 
first aim of the campaigners is to bring their frames into the earned media coverage, because 
the news media transport their message the furthest and for free. 
                                                 
10
 An earlier version of this chapter is going to be published in: Hänggli et al. (2011) and a paper summarizing 
the most important aspects of frame construction and frame promotion in the naturalization initiative has been 
submitted to ABS. 
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The Three Strategic Choices 
In order to win a campaign, the political actors face three strategic choices (Hänggli and 
Kriesi 2010). First, the strategic actors are expected to search for a frame which they believe 
has the capacity to become a strong substantive frame. I call this choice the “Substantive Em-
phasis Choice”. Second, the political actors have to decide how much importance they attach 
to the frames of the opponents compared to their own frames. This choice is labeled the “Op-
positional Emphasis Choice”. According to well-known advice, political actors should focus 
on the issue or issue attributes where they enjoy an advantage. Riker’s (1996) “dominance 
principle” formulates this type of strategy: “when one side has an advantage on an issue, the 
other side ignores it”. Issue-ownership theory (Petrocik 1996) suggests that political parties 
tend to follow this recipe, which means that they essentially talk past each other in political 
campaigns.  
As a consequence, yes and no campaigners fighting against each other are expected to 
essentially rely on different frames. However, under some conditions, there are reasons to ex-
pect dialogue (Kaplan et al. 2006). As introduced in chapter 1, I distinguish between cam-
paign and frame dialogue. The first looks at the similarity with which the main frames are 
discussed whereas the latter is concerned about how much the two camps converge on one 
particular frame. Issue familiarity is expected to facilitate campaign dialogue because the ar-
guments are already known. This helps the political actors to anticipate the frames their oppo-
nents will campaign on and therefore make it easier to counterattack. In contrast, issue com-
plexity handicaps campaign dialogue because the topic is more difficult. Political actors might 
first have to explain what the issue at stake is about and to build frame ownership before they 
can discuss among each other. Furthermore, according to Kahn and Kenney (1999: 81–86), 
the expected closeness of a vote or an election increases campaign dialogue. They find that 
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candidates involved in close races tackle the opponent’s policy agenda and issue position 
more often than is the case in noncompetitive counterparts. Basinger and Lavine (2005) con-
firm this pattern. They explain the mechanism behind this result as follows: in more competi-
tive campaigns, more voters rely on issue or ideological voting than on partisan cues. This 
tendency to rely more on issue voting increases the pressure for the political actors to discuss 
the same frames. No political actor can allow his or her opponent to dominate the information 
flow and will thus address the frames. In addition, an imbalance in financial resources be-
tween the two camps is expected to decrease campaign dialogue. Kaplan et al. (2006: 730) ar-
gue that the camps are unable to talk about everything they might wish to talk about. Money 
helps them to address more aspects. Thus, if the difference in financial terms increases, the 
possibilities to engage in dialogue become more unequal.  
At the frame level, I hypothesize that salience (Damore 2005) of the frame in the me-
dia increases frame dialogue. When a frame receives attention in the media, it might become 
more important to the voters too, and the political actors might be forced to take a position on 
it. Thus, the political actors are expected to more often use a salient frame. 
If political actors refer to the frames of their opponents, they can do so either offen-
sively or defensively. As introduced in chapter 1, the offensive use of the opponents’ frames 
corresponds to what Sides (2006) has called “trespassing”: political actors may use strong 
images, issues or issue attributes of their opponents in order to appear responsive to the gen-
eral public. Sides also refers to this strategy as “riding the wave”, and shows in his analysis of 
the 1998 American presidential campaign that it is widely used. Even more widespread, how-
ever, may be the defensive use of the opponents’ frames: political actors may feel forced to 
react to the successful frames of their opponents and to adopt counter-frames to offer rebut-
tals, and to counter-attack their adversaries. A full-fledged framing strategy of a political actor 
should not only mobilize her own constituency and the bystanders, but also try to “neutralize 
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and discredit the framing efforts of adversaries and rivals, keeping their potential supporters 
passive” (Gamson 2004: 250). I expect political actors to prefer their own substantive frames, 
and to rely on defensive strategies only insofar as their opponents’ framing is successful, or 
they anticipate their opponents’ framing to be successful. 
Concerning the third choice, the political actors have to decide how much importance 
they attach to the campaign contest compared to the substantive content of the campaign. This 
is the “Contest Emphasis Choice”. In this respect, I distinguish between two types of frames – 
contest frames and substantive frames11. The unique feature of the contest frames is that they 
do not address the issue(s) at stake, but focus on the actors involved or on the contest per se – 
on politics – while substantive frames focus on the substantive contents of the debate – on 
policy. In general, I expect that the political actors would like to get their substantive message 
across and place a high priority on their chosen substantive frame(s).  
 In addition, I investigate whether the use of contest frames is dependent on the power 
of the political actor. Numerous empirical studies have shown that the media mostly turn to 
powerful actors when writing their stories (e.g., Bonfadelli 2000, Gans 1979, Sigal 1973, 
Tresch 2009). The powerful actors benefit from an “inherent” news value and get more access 
to the media. The weak political actors might use more contest frames as an attempt to com-
pensate and attract more news value. They have a valence disadvantage (Groseclose 2001), 
i.e. a disadvantage of non-policy factors such as incumbency, better name recognition, or pos-
sibly also regarding access to the political system. Groseclose examines a situation in which a 
candidate has a potential valence advantage. He shows that in an attempt to counter the va-
lence advantage, a challenger will take relatively extreme policy positions (e.g. diverge from 
                                                 
11
 De Vreese (2005) makes a distinction between “issue-specific” and “generic” frames. This distinction suffers 
from the difficulty that it mixes up thematic and contest frames in both the generic and the issue-specific cate-
gory. In addition, Chong and Druckman (2007c: 107) find it difficult to specify a frame as generic or general. I 
agree. However, I do not follow these authors when they suggest calling “script” a “feature in the communica-
tion such as a conflict” (p. 107). Finally, Entman (2004: 5f.) explores two classes of frames, substantive and pro-
cedural frames. My distinction is similar, also in terms of the meaning. 
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the median), because this minimizes the salience of the valence advantage (see Groseclose 
2001: 864–865). Druckman et al. (2009) suggest that the model should be extended further. I 
support the idea of broadening the model and hypothesize that the weak political actors might 
emphasize conflicts or personal attacks in order to overcome valence disadvantage. This 
might especially be the case in direct-democratic campaigns because the choice is binary. The 
political actors cannot diverge from the median. However, they can resort to the contest 
frames. 
 Finally, the extreme actors might also use more contest frames, based on the following 
idea: Extreme actors might pursue a different goal than moderate actors. The latter might pur-
sue the goal of influencing the issue at stake or winning the next election. By contrast, ex-
treme actors often do not have sufficient power to win a direct-democratic campaign or an 
election, and must have another reason for their participation. For instance, they might aim at 
maintaining grassroots participation and limiting leadership control. Harmel and Janda (1994: 
275) called this goal the “intraparty democracy” goal. I call it the “grassroots participation” 
goal. Organizations that pursue this “grassroots participation” goal seek to continue the activi-
ties after a direct-democratic campaign. This constitutes an aim in itself. A direct-democratic 
campaign can help to reach this goal by strengthening the group identity. One way to streng-
then this identity is to distinguish between ingroup and outgroup, and to denounce the others 
or to point out the conflicts. Thus, the extreme actors are expected to use more contest frames. 
In addition, members of extreme organizations are found to use a different style of political 
engagement (McClosky and Chong 1985). They are more likely to attribute personal failings 
to those who are far from their own political ideals. In other words, they are again expected to 
use more contest frames.  
Before turning to the methodology, I will summarize the hypotheses: First, the strateg-
ic actors are expected to search for a frame which they believe has the capacity to become a 
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strong substantive frame (“Substantive Emphasis Choice”). Second, yes and no campaigners 
fighting against each other are expected to essentially rely on different frames. If the political 
actors refer to the frames of their opponents, they are expected to do so defensively insofar as 
their opponents’ framing is successful or they anticipate their opponents’ framing to be suc-
cessful (“Oppositional Emphasis Choice”). In addition, at the campaign level, issue familiari-
ty and the expected closeness are expected to increase campaign dialogue, whereas it probably 
is handicapped by issue complexity and an imbalance in financial resources. At the frame 
level, I hypothesize that the salience of the frame in the media increases dialogue. Third, I ex-
pect that the political actors would like to get their substantive message across and put a high 
priority on their chosen substantive frame(s) (“Contest Emphasis Choice”). The weak and the 
extreme political actors might use more contest frames. 
 
Operationalization 
Based on a block-model analysis by Bernhard (2010), I define extreme and moderate actors. 
Block-model analysis allows for distinguishing between structurally equivalent groups of ac-
tors on the basis of an analysis of the cooperative relationships. A block model consists of two 
elements (Wasserman and Faust 1999: 395): (1) a partition of actors in the network into dis-
crete subsets called positions, and (2) for each pair of positions, a statement of the presence or 
absence of a tie within or between the positions. The CONCOR algorithm was used, which 
applies successive splits to the network. The first split is expected to generate the two oppos-
ing camps, the second split reveals, if existing, two blocks on each camp. In order to arrive at 
two extreme blocks, I pool together the two center blocks of the asylum law and the corpora-
tion tax reform, and call them the moderate block. In the naturalization initiative, there was 
only one block in the center. The more extreme blocks (left, populist right or conservative 
right) are labeled extreme left-wing and extreme right-wing blocks. These extreme blocks are 
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not necessarily extreme in absolute terms, but rather in relative terms: they are more extreme 
than the moderate block. 
 I will use a rare event logistic regression (relogit) in order to investigate the factors in-
fluencing the contest frames. Relogit is used in the case of binary dependent variables, with 
dozens to thousands fewer “ones” (events, such as contest frames) than “zeros” (“non-
events”, such as substantive frames) (King and Zeng 2001). 
 
Results 
Substantive Emphasis Choice: Main Frames 
We begin this section by identifying and describing the main frames of the three campaigns 
under scrutiny. The corresponding relative frequencies are typed in bold. We arrive at one to 
two main frames for each camp in each campaign. As becomes clear from Table 4.1, the cam-
paigners predominantly address their own frame. On average, the most important frame of the 
contra camp makes up 45 percent of the arguments, whereas the pro camp focused on its most 
important frame in one third of cases. In the case of the asylum law, each side used two main 
substantive frames. On the contra-side, the humanitarian tradition frame (=“human. trad.”) 
was used most often (=core frame). This frame maintained that the new asylum law violated 
human dignity and human rights, endangered religious norms, and that it was contrary to the 
Swiss humanitarian tradition. The second important frame of the no camp can be labeled the 
“rule-of-law“ frame. This frame maintained that that the provisions of the new law under-
mined the rule of law, that they violated international law (e.g. the Geneva Convention), that 
the principle of proportionality was violated by certain provisions of the new law, and that the 
risk of judicial errors would increase. On the pro-side, the “abuse” frame constituted the core 
substantive frame. This argued that there were too many false asylum-seekers in the country, 
and that Switzerland needed instruments to fight the abuse of its asylum legislation. The 
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second most important substantive frame of the pro-side is a positive frame, which promises a 
more efficient implementation of the asylum legislation. It does so in general terms, but also 
by pointing to specific improvements such as greater flexibility for the Swiss member-states 
(the “Cantons”), especially with respect to returning illegal asylum-seekers to their home 
countries. I call this the “efficacy” frame. Both sides used additional frames, which are sum-
marized under “other” frames in Table 4.1. 
 The analysis identifies only one main frame for the adversaries of the naturalization 
initiative. In order to avoid arbitrary decisions, the “rule-of-law” frame asks for fair proce-
dures that comply with basic rights. By contrast, the pro-side conceived naturalizations as po-
litical acts and not as administrative ones. Therefore, it is not surprising that its key frame is 
concerned with the claim that people should have the final say (“people final say”). Aside 
from procedural aspects, the proponents adopted a rather xenophobic discourse. They stated 
that “mass naturalizations” had to be stopped and also alluded to crimes that occurred during 
the campaign, especially to those committed by recently naturalized persons. 
 Regarding the corporation tax reform, each side again used two main substantive 
frames. The adversaries of the corporation tax reform mainly focused on matters of “tax equi-
ty”. They argued that the tax cuts introduced an unfair privilege for the well-off and went 
against the principle of fair taxation. They even claimed that the reform was unconstitutional. 
This line of reasoning mainly applied to a controversial provision that included a reduction in 
tax rates on dividends for shareholders disposing of at least a ten per cent stake in a corpora-
tion. To a lesser extent, the opponents warned that the reform would lead to a shortfall of sev-
eral hundreds of million Swiss francs with respect to both direct and indirect taxes. More spe-
cifically, a powerful argument stated that the old age pension scheme would suffer if people 
accepted the proposal. I decided to label this kind of argument as the “tax loss” frame.
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Table 4.1: Substantive and Contest Frames (Percentage Shares), and Dialogue Levels of Substantive Frames in Media Input: By Campaign and Camp 
Campaign Asylum     Naturalization       Corporation Tax       
  
 
 con pro 
frame 
dialogue  con pro 
frame 
dialogue  con pro 
frame 
dialogue 
substantive frames             
 human. trad. 38.8 24.8 80.1 rule-of-law 49.0 19.6 61.7 tax equity  48.5 7.7 30.0 
 rule-of-law 21.5 9.3 62.2         tax loss 22.3 8.4 58.9 
 abuse 17.6 26.9 77.0 people final say 21.9 39.3 66.8 SME  5.6 38.4 23.4 
 efficacy 4.0 17.3 36.1 mass naturalization  17.5 20.6 86.6 competitiveness 14.1 27.3 63.6 
 others 13.9 16.1   others 5.0 7.5   others 4.3 11.3   
 all substantive 95.9 94.3   all substantive 93.2 87.9   all substantive 94.8 93.1   
campaign dialogue       69.9       69.3       41.5 
contest frames  4.1 5.7    6.5 13.1    5.2 6.9   
total   100% 100%     100% 100%     100% 100%   
n   726 335     675 107     462 594   
 
 
  
 The proponents of the new law framed the reform in terms of a necessary fostering of 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs), which form the backbone of the Swiss economy. The 
“SME” frame dominated the yes campaign. It stated that these companies were in need of be-
nefiting from a set of planned measures aimed at reducing financial and administrative bur-
dens. The second most important frame of the pro-side turned the public’s attention to the 
overriding importance of the reform for the Swiss economy. The “competitiveness” frame 
maintained that the new law would boost the economy by encouraging investments and the 
creation of jobs. 
 
Oppositional Emphasis Choice: Dialogue 
 The degree of dialogue varies between and within campaigns. The campaign dialogue 
levels are much higher for the immigration ballots (69.9 for the asylum law and 69.3 for the 
naturalization initiative) than for the campaign on corporation tax (41.5). The results provide 
support for my hypothesis with the exception that familiarity seems to be less important for 
campaign dialogue. The tax reform was the most complex issue and the most one-sidedly 
dominated campaign in terms of financial resources of all the campaigns since the beginning 
of the 1980s. In addition, the tax reform was evaluated as the most predictable race. Accor-
dingly, the level of campaign dialogue should, indeed, be lowest in the tax reform campaign. 
Based on the high level of campaign dialogue in the other two campaigns, we can consider 
closeness of the race and familiarity to be important. The naturalization campaign was ex-
pected to be the closest run whereas the asylum law was familiar. 
 We will now turn to frame dialogue and look at whether media frame salience (meas-
ured as the relative frequency in news media) increases dialogue. In the case of the asylum 
law, the humanitarian tradition and the abuse frames were the most salient media frames 
(chapter 7). Both are characterized by a high level of frame-specific convergence. In the in-
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terviews, the campaigners from the contra camp reported that they felt obliged to counter the 
abuse frame because it was so prevalent in the public discussion. This provides strong support 
for our hypothesis. However, salience not always increases frame dialogue. In the naturaliza-
tion and in the tax reform campaign, the political actors did not converge on the two most sa-
lient media frames. These contradictory results do not contribute much to clarify the reasons 
why campaigners ignore a frame or why they may feel compelled to counter a salient frame. 
Overall, the reason why campaigners ignore a frame or feel compelled to counter a salient 
frame is not clear. It might be associated with the familiarity of the issue, with timing, or with 
as yet unknown mechanisms that make a frame a strong frame (Chong and Druckman 2007c). 
 Is the widespread use of the opponents’ arguments a sign of (offensive) trespassing or 
of (defensive) counter-framing? Table 4.2 provides a rather unequivocal answer to this ques-
tion. We can see that the two camps use their opponents’ frames defensively in almost all cas-
es. In other words, we find little trespassing (=offensive use of the opponents’ frames), but 
mainly counter-framing (=defensive use) in all the communication channels. The only excep-
tion to this general finding is the pro camp in the asylum campaign, which does some tres-
passing with respect to the contra camp’s humanitarian tradition frame. In this particular case, 
the pro camp made use of a double-edged argument by endorsing the concern advanced by 
their adversaries. In a first step, its actors pointed out that they were strongly in favor of the 
humanitarian tradition of Switzerland. In a second step, they maintained that the revised law 
would strengthen this claim because it would help to fight against abuse, thereby helping 
those asylum seekers who really deserved protection. This clever counter-framing strategy 
found its expression in slogans that combined both aspects: fighting against abuse and main-
taining the humanitarian tradition. For instance, the pro camp endorsed the humanitarian tra-
dition argument, but accused the contra camp of falsely claiming that the new law constituted 
a threat to this tradition. Or, the pro camp used the humanitarian tradition frame offensively, 
but turned around and accused the contra camp of tolerating or even stimulating asylum abuse 
  
(which, it claimed, had endangered this very tradition). In another example, the pro camp 
dismissed the contra camp’s complaint that the new law violates the UN Charter of Children’s 
Rights and claimed that the law is compatible with this charter. These types of messages were 
intended to appeal to moderate and cross-pressured voters in order to assure victory. 
Table 4.2: The Offensive Use of the Adversaries’ Frames (=Trespassing): Percentage Shares of 
All Adversaries’ Frames Used 
Asylum   Naturalization   Corporation Tax   
 con pro   con pro   con pro 
human. trad.   18.1 rule-of-law   0.0 tax equity    0.0 
rule-of-law   0.0       tax loss   0.0 
abuse 0.0   people final say 0.0   SME 0.0   
efficacy 0.0   mass naturalization 0.0   competitiveness 0.0   
 
 
Contest Emphasis Choice 
Next, we will look at whether political actors primarily used substantive or contest frames. As 
expected, contest frames such as personal attacks and conflicts are only rarely used by politi-
cal actors in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns. As depicted in Table 4.1, the proportion of 
the contest frames is somewhat higher in the naturalization and the tax reform campaign, es-
pecially in the case of the pro camp in the naturalization initiative. This might be due to the 
fact that a former member of the Federal Council from the populist right-wing party (SVP), 
Christoph Blocher, was not re-elected and was instead replaced by another person from the 
same party, Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf, on December 12th 2007. As she accepted the election, 
she was thrown out of the SVP, and a small minority of supporters of Widmer-Schlumpf split 
off from the party. The issue was contentious and emotional, and the naturalization initiative 
was the first vote for which Widmer-Schlumpf was the Federal Councilor responsible. I will 
provide a more detailed overview of this aspect of the vote below, but will first take a look at 
the factors influencing contest frames in general.  
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 According to the regression model presented in Table 4.3, my hypothesis with regard 
to power is confirmed in the first campaign. In the case of the asylum law, the more powerful 
organizations use fewer contest frames. The opposite is the case for the naturalization initia-
tive, whereas in the tax reform, the coefficient is not significant. As mentioned above, the re-
sults in the last two campaigns might have been influenced by the special circumstances. We 
will investigate this aspect below. Moreover, in Table 4.3, it becomes evident that the political 
actors of the more extreme blocks use more contest frames than the political actors of the 
moderate block. This effect is significant in both immigration issue campaigns and almost 
significant at the p=0.10 level in the tax reform. As control variables, I also examine whether 
the right-wing political actors or the governmental camp use more contest frames. In this re-
spect, no clear pattern can be observed based on the political left-right scale. The right-wing 
actors tend to use more contest frames in the asylum law campaign, whereas in the tax reform 
they tend to use fewer contest frames. The governmental camp tends to use more contest 
frames in the naturalization and the tax reform campaign. Further analysis will have to show 
whether this tendency was caused by the special circumstances or holds true in more general 
terms.  
Table 4.3: Rare Event Logistic Regression (Relogit) Explaining the Use of the Contest Frames 
 Asylum Naturalization Corporation Tax 
  robust   robust   robust  
 coeff. s.e. p coeff. s.e. p coeff. s.e. p 
power -0.031 0.009 *** 0.021 0.007 *** 0.007 0.006  
extreme 0.988 0.338 ** 1.647 0.577 ** 0.744 0.475  
li-re 0.146 0.084 ° 0.125 0.186  -0.276 0.157 ° 
governmental camp 0.159 0.420  1.881 1.224  1.408 0.827 ° 
constant -3.215 0.430 *** -6.194 2.158 ** -3.067 0.459 *** 
n 1061 782 1056 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, °p<0.1 
As can be seen in Table 4.1, the share of contest frames is comparatively high in the case of 
the pro camp in the naturalization initiative. Table 4.4 provides a more detailed overview of 
this aspect and shows the use the contest frames by the different actor types. It can be seen 
  
that it was the most powerful actor types, i.e. the authorities and the political parties of the pro 
camp, who campaigned with significantly more conflict frames. In fact, it appears that the 
dispute between Christoph Blocher, the SVP, and Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf caused the qua-
rrelling actors to rely more on these frames. Blocher and the SVP belonged to the political 
parties of the pro camp, and Widmer-Schlumpf to the authorities. Whereas the parties of the 
pro camp used both personal attacks and conflicts, the authorities on the contra side mainly 
emphasized the conflict and abstained from making personal attacks. 
Table 4.4: Contest Frames in the Naturalization Initiative: Percentage Shares by Camp and Ac-
tor Type 
camp  con     pro  
actor type 
authori-
ties 
ad hoc 
committees 
parties 
economic 
interest 
groups 
citizens’ 
interest 
groups parties 
ad hoc 
committees 
personal attacks 1.7 4.0 2.0 9.2 6.6 8.1 0.0 
conflicts 5.6 0.0 2.0 4.1 0.5 8.1 0.0 
all contest frames 7.2 4.0 4.1 13.3 7.1 16.2 0.0 
power by actor type (mean) 41.1 18.0 8.9 8.3 5.0 80.0 18.0 
n 108 25 246 98 198 86 21 
 
In the tax reform campaign, the political parties of the pro camp also used more contest 
frames than the other actor types. Since both campaigns took place soon after the non-re-
election of Blocher, I assume that the actors involved used more contest frame than would 
otherwise have been the case. This influenced the effect of power in the second and third 
campaigns. However, in general, we can conclude that in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns, 
framing is primarily accomplished in substantive terms. 
 
Conclusion 
We can summarize the results according to the three strategic choices of framing which we 
have outlined in this chapter. With regard to the “Substantive Emphasis” and the “Opposi-
tional Emphasis Choices”, we find that political actors tend to emphasize their own frames, 
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but they do not exclusively revert to this behavior. In addition, it has been shown that address-
ing the frames owned by the opponents is largely achieved defensively rather than offensive-
ly, that is, by means of counter-framing rather than trespassing. We have briefly explored a 
successful way of using the argument of the opposing side: A promising counter-framing 
strategy consists in endorsing the argument held by the adversary and simultaneously framing 
it in a disadvantageous manner. We have established that dialogue varies according to the 
complexity of the issue, to the imbalance in financial resources and to the expected closeness 
of the run at the campaign level and to the media salience at the frame level. Surprisingly, is-
sue familiarity is not important for campaign dialogue. With regard to the third choice, the 
“Contest Emphasis Choice”, we have shown that the political actors mainly focus on sub-
stance in direct-democratic campaigns, i.e. they mainly rely on substantive framing. We found 
that actors with more extreme positions use more contest frames and that the dispute between 
Christoph Blocher, the SVP, and Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf caused the quarrelling political 
actors to rely significantly more on conflict frames in the naturalization campaign. 
What do these results mean for the quality of the debate in direct-democratic cam-
paigns? There are two reasons to be optimistic. First, it can be seen that the political actors 
address their opponents’ frames. On average, campaign dialogue in the three direct-
democratic campaigns (60.2) is much higher than the average (44.1) found in the study by 
Kaplan et al. (2006) regarding American candidate television advertising aired in the U.S. Se-
nate campaigns from 1998 to 2002. By contrast, it is lower than the mean (75.3) of dialogue 
in U.S. presidential campaigns from 1960–2000. However, the two immigration campaigns 
reach a level which is as high as that observed in U.S. presidential campaigns. Thus, I con-
clude that there is a quite high level of campaign dialogue in the press releases in Swiss di-
rect-democratic campaigns. The frame dialogue also seems to be quite high (58.8 compared to 
a mean of 24.9 in the study by Kaplan et al. (2006)). Second, we do not find a high level of 
contest frames. In the media input, framing is primarily done in substantive terms. In the case 
  
in which we found more contest frames (naturalization initiative), the authorities used the 
more respectful version of them, i.e. conflicts, instead of personal attacks.  
Let me end this chapter by linking the results to research on deliberation. From a clas-
sical perspective, deliberation is a unified phenomenon with diverse components (rational ar-
gumentation, respect, sincerity) forming a coherent set. Theoretically, the various components 
should reinforce each other. However, it has been an open question whether this works empir-
ically in such a mutually reinforcing way (Bächtiger et al. 2010). The results support the idea 
that the diverse components are linked to each other: Both, dialogue (as a possible indicator 
for rational argumentation) and substantive frames (as an indicator for respect) are highly 
used in direct-democratic campaigns.   
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5 Frame Promotion: The Variation of the Strategic 
Framing Choices in the Different Communication 
Channels and Over Time 
Introduction  
In this chapter, we investigate how the political actors vary their framing choices over time 
and in the different communication channels. I call this the promotion process of frame build-
ing. To examine the variation in the communication channels, I compare the results with the 
findings of the media input channel of chapter 4. The media input channel is the baseline or 
the reference category. As introduced in chapter 1, I distinguish between mediated, unme-
diated and internal channels. In the mediated channels, campaigners must cater to the needs 
and values of journalists. The unmediated channels offer campaigners control over the content 
and form of the message. Both mediated and unmediated channels target the general public, 
while the internal channel is aimed at the members. There are two mediated channels: media 
input (e.g. press releases) and letters to the editor. Political advertisements and direct mail are 
categorized as unmediated channels, and information for members is part of the internal 
channel. 
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The comparison between the channels is worth studying for three reasons. First, in the 
media input, campaigners must satisfy journalists. Thus, news values may determine their 
framing strategies. By comparing the media input with the unmediated channels, we can eva-
luate the ways in which the findings of the media input can be taken as the political actors’ 
true framing intention. Second, successful strategic communication depends on coordinating 
messages across all publications (Norris et al. 1999: 67). As such, despite some variation 
across channels, there should also be some similarity between them. To my knowledge, the 
way in which political actors rely on the same message across different channels in direct-
democratic campaigns has never been investigated. Third, the differences between the chan-
nels should draw the readers’ attention to the fact that the results can vary depending on the 
type of communication channel. For instance, Iyengar (1991) explores the mechanisms by 
which television has impoverished political discourse. Possibly, the results might have looked 
different if he had relied on another channel. It is worthwhile to study the variation in the 
three strategic framing choices over time for the simple reason that we know only little about 
it.  
 Direct mail and information for members were coded only in the asylum campaign, as 
limited resources in terms of time and money restricted analysis in the two other campaigns. 
Nevertheless, I consider it important to include them in my investigation. First of all, it is im-
perative to theoretically distinguish between these channels. Second, the results of one cam-
paign can still provide insight into the potential empirical results of another campaign. More 
problematic is the fact that I use only those letters that were published and appeared in the 
newspapers, rather than all of the letters sent to the editors. The published letters are not nec-
essarily a representative sample of all letters sent to the editor. It is also possible that journal-
ists have edited the letters published in the newspaper. In addition, not all of the published let-
ters come from the political actors or are the result of their strategic framing.  
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 Nevertheless, there are reasons to look at published letters to the editor: First, the let-
ters section can be seen as an open forum for public debate, which “thrives on minimal edi-
torial intervention” (Wahl-Jorgensen 2007: 154). Editors and journalists see their profession 
as “a calling in the service of democracy, free speech, and the public” (Wahl-Jorgensen 2007: 
154). Or, as Gans (2003: 21) pointed out, “journalism views itself as supporting and streng-
thening the roles of citizens in democracy”. In addition to these democratic ideals, editors also 
offer an economic justification for minimal editorial intervention in the letters section (Wahl-
Jorgensen 2007: 154). They explain that allowing all citizens to submit letters will boost the 
newspaper’s popularity and its success in the market. Thus, it is because of democratic ideals 
and market success that editors are reluctant to edit. Third, there are practical constraints that 
also prevent editors from radically altering the letters: Editors work under a constant deadline, 
with the knowledge that the paper has only limited space for letters. I assume that the number 
of published letters is proportional to the number supplied. The selection criteria are similar 
across different types of newspapers (Wahl-Jorgensen 2007: 68): Editors prefer short, cohe-
rent letters, which are submitted exclusively to the respective newspaper, and from different 
locally tied writers. In particular, editors avoid letters which appear to be part of an orches-
trated letter-writing campaign. Campaigners have thus adapted their strategies accordingly. In 
direct-democratic campaigns, political actors draft a short letter containing their main frames 
and request that their members and volunteers personalize and submit it as a letter to the edi-
tor. Alternatively, they teach their supporters how to write quality letters to the editor.  
 Before we start with the investigation of the framing choices, let me illustrate the use 
of the different channels. First, a look at the total number of arguments (n total) in the differ-
ent channels (Table 5.1) provides us with a general idea of the importance of the different 
channels. In the asylum law campaign, the figures indicate that the contra camp was much 
more active in producing arguments for media input, direct mails and information for mem-
bers. It produced more than twice as many arguments for the news media, and almost ten 
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times as many for both direct mails and information for members. By contrast, the pro camp 
produced twice as many arguments in political ads. This suggests that the two camps fol-
lowed different strategies: While the contra camp relied much more on its internal channel 
and on media news reporting, the pro camp relied heavily on paid advertisements. This is a 
result of the organizational structure of the two camps—heterogeneous and decentralized 
(contra) versus predominance of the major parties, especially of the new populist right (pro), 
and of the access to resources. The contra camp has access to more personnel, the pro camp to 
more money (Bernhard 2010). A very similar pattern can be observed in the naturalization in-
itiative. In both cases, the populist right wing party (SVP) had the lead in the pro camp cam-
paign and used the political advertisements channel more often. In the corporation tax reform 
campaign, the pro camp was also highly involved with political advertisements. This time, the 
most powerful Swiss economic interest group (economiesuisse) was the leading house of the 
pro camp. 
Table 5.1: The Total Number (n total) of Frames of the Two Camps, by Communication Channel 
  
  
con pro 
media 
input 
letters 
to edi-
tor ads 
direct 
mail 
info 
for 
mem-
bers 
media 
input 
letters 
to edi-
tor ads 
direct 
mail 
info 
for 
mem-
bers 
Asylum 726 395 569 315 1907 335 202 1249 9 192 
Naturalization 675 628 109   107 361 1358   
Corporation Tax 462 449 45   594 608 1241   
 
Second, Figure 5.1 presents the weekly development of the frames in the media input, the let-
ters to the editor and the political advertisements of the two camps in the three campaigns. In 
the asylum law campaign, the panels show that the contra camp launched its media input at 
well-chosen moments (two peaks), while the pro camp’s media input was not time-related. In-
stead, the pro camp ran a low but steady stream of ads that contained its key frame, which it 
increased heavily towards the end of the campaign. The same can be found in the naturaliza-
tion initiative.  
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Figure 5.1: Weekly Development of the Frames in the Media Input, the Letters to the Editor and 
the Political Advertisements of the Two Camps in the Three Campaigns 
Asylum 
  
Naturalization 
 
Corporation Tax 
  
In the corporate tax reform campaign, we find two peaks in both camps, indicating that both 
camps carefully chose moments to submit input to the media. The peaks are characteristic of 
the media input, and their high amplitude indicates media conferences. The fact that political 
actors pause between media conferences explains the steepness. In the asylum law campaign 
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and the corporate tax reform, we find media input more than ten weeks before voting. In the 
asylum law, this finding goes back to the institutional routine of the contra camp: Bernhard 
(2010) finds that the opponents launch their campaigns much earlier with respect to the refe-
renda than the supporters. However, in the case of corporate tax reform, the pro camp was al-
so active early in the campaign. In this case, it employed a “planting the seed” strategy (Iyen-
gar and McGrady 2007: 140) with an early media input. From the beginning, the pro camp 
wanted to present its core frame in order to influence the opinion leaders and the media. In the 
naturalization initiative, the campaign started later (chapter 2) because the minister was new 
in office. In addition, the highest peak in the media input occurs seven or six weeks before the 
vote takes place. This is the beginning of the “critical period” of media coverage (chapter 6).  
The number of arguments in the letters to the editor increases seven to five weeks before the 
vote occurs, and it peaks two or three weeks before the vote, when the public has received 
voting material and has begun voting (primarily by mail). In the graphs of the pro camps in 
the asylum law campaign and in the naturalization initiative, we see an increase in the use of 
arguments in the political advertisements in the final stages of the campaign. With this addi-
tional effort, the campaigners tried to get out the vote. I call this the “mobilizing strategy”. 
The contra camps lacked advertising money, but also slightly increased their paid media ef-
forts in the final stages of the campaign due to the “mobilizing strategy”. In the corporate tax 
reform campaign, we see many pro camp ad arguments early in the campaign. The pro camp 
also followed a “planting the seed” strategy in the advertisements. The direct mail and infor-
mation for members channel are not presented because the delivery date, i.e. timing, is less 
important and less well-known. 
 Let us now turn to the three framing choices. For each choice, I will discuss the varia-
tion in the communication channels and present the corresponding results. Then, I will inves-
tigate the variation over time followed by a results part. For the same reason as mentioned 
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above (delivery date is less important and less well-known), the direct mail and the informa-
tion for members’ channels are omitted when looking at the variation over time. 
 
Substantive Emphasis Choice: Variation by Communication Channel 
As introduced in chapter 1, strategic actors first have to search for one or two frames they 
think have the capacity to become a strong substantive frame (“Substantive Emphasis 
Choice”). Because the letters to the editor are mediated and scrutinized by journalists, I ex-
pect them to have a set of frames similar to that found in the media input. In the political ad-
vertisements—in contrast to the media input—I expect political actors to focus more on their 
core frame for three reasons: First, advertising provides candidates with much greater control 
over their message than does news coverage. However, advertisements are less credible mes-
sengers than news media coverage (Iyengar and McGrady 2007: 164). Thus, political actors 
have an incentive to use the message that makes them appear most credible, i.e. their core 
message. Second, advertising allows campaigners to shape their message to specifically target 
those voters who are most pivotal to the outcome of a vote. Campaigners use the frame they 
think will most effectively mobilize swing voters. Third, an advertisement focusing on one 
message can be used to grab the attention of the news media (Iyengar and McGrady 2007: 
191). This may be especially relevant with regard to posters, but it can also be seen in adver-
tisements.  
 For direct mail, I expect the political actors to choose the “Substantive Emphasis 
Strategy” similar to advertisements, because both channels can reach citizens directly. Thus, I 
expect them to focus more on the core frame as well. In the information for members, political 
actors communicate with motivated or better-informed readers. Members may be able to han-
dle more frames, and they might also want to become more informed and more aware of dif-
ferent arguments. As a result, campaigners may promote their message using more than one 
Frame Promotion 
 
85 
frame. Thus, with regard to variation of the “Substantive Emphasis Choice” in the different 
communication channels, I expect results in letters to the editors similar to those in media in-
put. I suspect that political actors focus more on their core frame in political advertisements 
and in direct mail, whereas they may have a wider focus in terms of information for members 
than they have in media input. I do not expect any variation between campaigns. 
 Table 5.2 gives an overview of the substantive and contest frames in the media input, 
the letters to the editor and the political advertisements in all three campaigns, i.e. the asylum, 
the naturalization and the corporation tax campaigns. For the asylum law, Table 5.2 also 
shows the frames for the direct mail and the information for members. The main frames of 
each camp (chapter 4) are in bold. Let us first look at the substantive frames in the different 
communication channels. Overall, it is clear that the shares of substantive frames in the media 
input is highly correlated with the shares of the substantive frames in the other channels 
(r=0.87). We already know that in the media input, the most important frame of the contra 
camp makes up 45 percent of the arguments, whereas the pro camp focused on its most im-
portant frame in one third of its arguments (chapter 4).  
The findings in the letters sections are similar to those in the media input of all three cam-
paigns, and they are in line with my hypothesis that we find a similar set of frames in both 
mediated channels. In the political advertisements, the political actors increase the frequency 
of their main frame. With one exception, the percentage is about 50 percent. This result shows 
that the political actors indeed focus most on their main frame in their advertisements: In 
every second argument, they use their core frame. Nevertheless, in the other half, they speak 
about something else – using their own second frame or their rival’s frame.
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Table 5.2: The Main Substantive Frames of the Two Camps, by Communication Channel: Per-
centages 
Asylum 
 
con pro 
 
media 
input 
letters 
to edi-
tor 
poli-
tical 
ads 
direct 
mail 
info 
for 
mem-
bers 
media 
input 
letters 
to edi-
tor 
poli-
tical 
ads 
direct 
mail 
info 
for 
mem-
bers 
substantive           
human. trad. 38.9 36.1 35.7 47.0 33.3 24.8 15.5 13.3 11.1 12.5 
rule-of-law 21.9 4.9 14.8 9.2 18.8 9.3 5.3 3.8 0.0 5.7 
abuse 17.6 19.4 16.9 14.0 11.7 26.9 30.1 53.1 55.6 21.9 
efficacy 4.0 6.4 3.5 4.1 3.0 17.3 7.3 2.8 11.1 24.0 
others 13.9 23.5 28.5 21.0 25.2 16.1 26.7 26.0 22.2 32.3 
all substantive 96.3 90.3 99.3 95.2 92.0 94.3 85.0 99.0 100.0 96.4 
contest 4.1 9.7 0.7 4.8 8.0 5.7 15.1 1.0 0.0 3.7 
total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
n 726 395 569 315 1907 335 202 1249 9 192 
Naturalization 
 
con pro 
media 
input 
letters 
to edi-
tor 
poli-
tical 
ads 
media 
input 
letters 
to edi-
tor 
poli-
tical 
ads 
substantive       
rule-of-law 49.0 48.1 52.3 19.6 26.3 14.4 
 
 
     
people final say 21.9 21.7 28.4 39.3 36.3 23.6 
mass naturalization 17.5 10.8 0.0 20.6 19.1 58.1 
others 5.0 5.6 14.7 7.5 9.7 3.9 
all substantive 93.4 86.2 95.4 86.9 91.4 100.0 
contest 6.5 13.9 4.6 13.1 8.6 0.0 
total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
n 675 628 109 107 361 1358 
Corporation Tax 
 
con  pro 
 
media 
input 
letters 
to edi-
tor 
poli-
tical 
ads  
media 
input 
letters 
to edi-
tor  
poli-
tical 
ads 
substantive       
tax equity  48.5 49.2 60.0 7.7 17.9 3.1 
tax loss 22.3 13.1 31.1 8.4 4.1 2.1 
SME 5.6 12.9 0.0 38.4 31.6 49.0 
competitiveness 14.1 14.5 6.7 27.3 32.4 45.1 
others 4.3 2.5 0.0 11.3 6.6 0.2 
all substantive 94.8 92.2 97.8 93.1 92.6 99.6 
contest 5.2 7.8 2.2 6.9 7.4 0.4 
total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
n 462 449 45 594 608 1241 
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The campaigners use a similar strategy in their direct mail as in the advertisements. The 
communication documents of both channels are directed towards the public. In the communi-
cation with the members, the political actors have a wider focus. They use their main frame 
for an average of only 27 percent (=(33+21)/2)of the time. The pro camp even promoted the 
“efficacy” frame more than the “abuse” frame. 
 Figures 5.2–5.4 provide typical examples of advertisements which the two sides used 
during the campaign. These figures illustrate that the camps generally focus on one message 
in advertisements. There is one exception, in the asylum law campaign, in which the contra 
camp focused less on one frame. This can be explained in two ways: First, as the interviews 
revealed, the contra camp perceived the abuse frame to be so strong that they felt the need to 
counter-frame it, even in their own advertisements. Second, the contra camp also used a high-
er proportion of “other” frames because many organizations with different foci and different 
frames were involved in one committee (Figure 5.2 – contra camp). 
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Figure 5.2: Political Advertisements of the Two Camps in the Asylum Case 
Pro Camp Contra Camp 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Political Advertisements of the Two Camps in the Naturalization Initiative 
a) Advertisement of the Populist Right in Support of Its Initiative 
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b) Advertisement of the Moderate Right’s Contra Campaign 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Political Advertisements of the Two Camps in the Corporation Tax Case 
a) Pro Camp 
 
b) Contra Camp 
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In general, the core frame of the media input also remains the core frame of the other chan-
nels. However, there are three exceptions. The first is found in the naturalization initiative. 
The core frame of the pro camp in the media input is the “people final say” frame. In the po-
litical advertisements, this frame is used in only 23.6 percent of all frames. Instead, the “mass 
naturalization” frame is used in 58 percent of all frames. This result shows a change in the 
strategy of the pro camp. The campaigner responsible for this strategic change explained in an 
interview: Towards the end of the campaign, the pro camp changed its strategy because the 
campaigners received feedback from their activists indicating that the “people final say” 
frame was not convincing. In addition, the pro camp had more funds available than they had 
originally planned. This allowed them to publish a significant number of political advertise-
ments in the last three weeks of the campaign. They tested different arguments and decided to 
promote primarily the “mass naturalization” frame. As a result, we see the “mass naturaliza-
tion” frame emphasized in their advertisements. The pro camp reused its well-known adver-
tisement from the 2004 naturalization of second and third generation immigrants campaign 
(Figure 5.3a). Because the end of the campaign was nearing, the pro camp was unable to 
change its core frame in the other channels too.  
The second exception is found in corporate tax reform. The core frame of the pro camp is the 
“SME” frame. Nevertheless, in the letters to the editor, the “competitiveness” frame is em-
phasized. This indicates that the “SME” aspect was not particularly controversial and became 
a weaker frame in this campaign (chapter 8). The third case is found in the asylum law cam-
paign, in which the pro camp most promoted the “abuse” frame in the media input. This is not 
the case in the information for members, in which the pro camp relied most on the “efficacy” 
frame, most frequently used by the moderates of the pro camp. Thus, in this communication 
channel, it is the frame of the moderate part of the pro camp that is more visible, while the ex-
treme part of the pro camp dominated the other channels. 
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 Table 5.3 investigates the factors influencing the percentage with which a frame is 
used. The unit of analysis is the use of a frame in a channel over the whole campaign, as 
shown in Table 5.2. It shows that core frames are used significantly more, whereas contest 
frames are used less. In addition, in line with my expectation, the campaigners focus more on 
their core frames in the advertisements and the direct mail than in the other channels. Both 
coefficients (core *direct mails, core * political ads) are positive. The corresponding coeffi-
cient from advertisements (core * political ads) is not significant at the five percent level be-
cause the focus of the advertisements in the naturalization campaign was not on the core 
frame. This coefficient becomes significant at the five percent level if the naturalization cam-
paign is excluded. 
Table 5.3: Influencing Factors on the Shares of Substantive and Contest Frames: OLS Regres-
sion Coefficients, Standard Errors and Levels of Significance 
 coef. s.e. p 
constant 15.07 1.30 *** 
core 22.68 2.91 *** 
contest frames -8.40 2.34 *** 
political ads -1.54 2.20  
direct mail -3.56 3.31  
core * political ads 9.48 5.24 ° 
core * direct mail 17.19 8.08 * 
adj. R2   0.58 
n   126 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, °p<0.1 
Note: The share of the frames (=dependent variable) are the shares shown in Table 5.2. 
 
Substantive Emphasis Choice: Variation over Time 
Do the political actors vary their “Substantive Emphasis Choice” over time? Campaigners 
should not waffle or flip-flop between the frames (Iyengar and McGrady 2007: 129). Rather, 
the campaigners should stay on message (Norris et al. 1999, Perron 2007) or on their core 
frame, which they chose according to the “Substantive Emphasis Choice”. Staying on mes-
sage means the capacity to repeat the central campaign message, even when challenged by 
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journalists, the opponents or simply by the campaign environment. This promotion practice 
goes hand in hand with the well-known advice put forward by the issue-ownership theory (Pe-
trocik 1996), which states that political actors should focus on the issue or issue attribute for 
which they enjoy an advantage. Of course, if a message is failing, it might be better to jettison 
plans and adapt to the circumstances. Nevertheless, strategic communication is based on the 
principle of planning for all eventualities, and developing a popular message well in advance 
of the crucial phase of the campaign. Thus, I expect the campaigners to stay on their core 
frames in all channels in all campaigns. The empirical results from the three campaigns show 
that the campaigners generally stay on frame. The main frames are promoted from the very 
beginning and no new frame appears in the course of the campaign. In addition, the most im-
portant frame of a camp remains the most important over time in all channels. Thus, it can be 
stated that campaigners normally do not change their “Substantive Emphasis Choice” during a 
direct-democratic campaign. As already mentioned, there is one exception to this general be-
havior: The main frame of the pro camp was the “people final say” frame at the beginning. 
Towards the end of the campaign, however, the pro camp emphasized the “mass naturaliza-
tion” frame the most in their advertisements. 
 
Substantive Emphasis Choice: Related Factors 
Next, we elaborate on two factors which are related to the “Substantive Emphasis 
Choice”: the management of events and how the political actors play one media outlet against 
another. In an ideal campaign, each political actor hopes to enjoy a regular stream of favora-
ble news coverage, while his opponent suffers from a lack of attention or poor coverage. In 
the real world, the campaigners have to compete for media attention. Using Bentele’s term, 
the political actors adapt to the media logic (Bentele 2005: 211). Thus, the political actors not 
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only have to decide about their strong frame, but also have to find opportunities to promote it 
during the campaign. 
The “nuts and bolts” of press management is the strategic scheduling of events, i.e. the 
scheduling of opportunities to promote the message. Put simply, events must be designed and 
scheduled to attract maximal news coverage. There are three types of events: genuine, me-
diated, and staged events (Kepplinger and Habermeier 1995, Kepplinger 1998: 662). Genuine 
events are provided by the daily routine of the policymaking process (e.g. parliamentary 
votes), mediated events are triggered by key events and influenced by the media (e.g., the 
world economic forum, elections), and staged events, or so-called “pseudo” (Boorstin 1992) 
events (e.g., press conferences or demonstrations), are produced only in order to obtain media 
attention. Staged events would not occur without the mass media since their inherent goal is 
to transport the message to the media, and ultimately to the audience (Schmitt-Beck and 
Pfetsch 1994: 114). Staged events have to pass the selection logic of the media. News value 
research has found that events pass the media logic more easily if they carry news factors 
such as unexpectedness, damage, controversy, relevance or reach (Schulz 1997, Eilders 1997: 
67, 259). Direct-democratic campaign events are neither genuine nor mediated events. Most 
events happening during direct-democratic campaigns are staged events. There are two kinds 
of staged events: routine and protest staged events. Routine staged events take place regular-
ly, such as media releases or conferences, while protest staged events are out-of-the-ordinary 
events such as demonstrations, concerts, or street theater. Protests are a functional equivalent 
of media conferences for social movement organizations that are less powerful and have less 
access to the mass media (Neidhardt 1994: 32). Routine staged events might be central for 
powerful actors, whereas protest staged events might be more common among weaker actors 
such as for citizens’ interest groups and social movements.  
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We find that the political actors in direct-democratic campaigns mainly rely on routine 
staged events such as media conferences and media releases. In the three campaigns, every ad 
hoc committee and all large political parties involved hold at least one media conference. In 
the tax reform campaign, the economic interest groups were also active with a media confe-
rence. In the three cases, six to nine media conferences took place during a campaign (i.e. in 
the three months before the vote). The small parties, or the citizens’ interest groups, did not 
organize a media conference on their own due to a lack of resources or know-how, as they re-
ported in the interviews. However, in coalition with large parties, they were also present in 
conferences. If coalitions held a media conference, different organizations spoke in order to 
increase the credibility of the message. In addition, the most prominent or powerful speaker of 
each organization promoted the message in order to increase the chance of media attention. 
Almost all media conferences are held in the Swiss capital Berne, as political events take 
place there: The parliament is located in Berne, the important media outlets have journalists 
on the ground and most parties and citizens’ interest groups are also resident in Berne.  
The most common form of the routine staged events is the press release. More than 
thirty press releases were found in every campaign. In the asylum law, the contra camp also 
relied on protest staged events – it organized one concert, one demonstration, and street thea-
ter. As mentioned above, protest staged events are an instrument for the less powerful organi-
zations, especially citizens’ interest groups. In the tax reform campaign, a citizens’ interest 
group of the contra camp produced an informative and elaborated videotape about taxes. In 
the interviews, some citizens’ interest groups remarked that they did not fit well into the di-
rect-democratic discourse for two reasons: On the one hand, they assumed that they have a 
broader perspective because they consider the global situation and international law to a 
greater extent. On the other hand, they pointed to their longer time horizon. Their campaigns 
dealt with topics such as the reform of the financial system, which usually last for several 
years. 
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In order to attract maximal news coverage, the campaigners produce routine staged 
events actively but also reactively. They can actively attract media attention by informing 
about their position and the issue at stake only once. This kind of information subsequently 
loses its news value. The campaigners have to compensate this loss by finding new opportuni-
ties to promote their frames, and thus they become reactive. Four different ways can be found 
to achieve this: reaction to events in one’s own camp, to the opponent, to the media and to 
facts. Let us illustrate these four types of reaction with examples from the three campaigns: 
First, the campaigners react to events occurring in their own camp. This is particularly suited 
to large political parties, who often organize a convention to adopt a recommendation for the 
vote and take it as an opportunity for promoting their message concerning the next direct-
democratic vote: In the asylum law campaign, the right-wing party (SVP) reported on their 
convention and announced that the senior party members were also in favor of the new law. 
In the tax reform campaign, the Christian Democrats (CVP) stated that the women of their 
party also supported the reform. This promotion practice seems to be especially relevant for 
the large parties because they often announce their position early in the campaign. 
Second, the campaigners react to their opponent, the opponent camp. For instance, in 
the asylum law campaign, the pro camp promoted the abuse frame, claiming that the new law 
was needed in order to prevent abuse. The contra camp felt compelled to react. The contra 
camp organized a media conference called “the untruths of the pro camp” and counter-framed 
the abuse argument. In addition, it invited three asylum seekers to speak about their destinies. 
These asylum seekers had been sent back to their native countries, in which they had been 
imprisoned. The contra camp alleged that these cases were judicial errors. Most importantly, 
they argued that the number of judicial errors was much higher than the pro camp claimed and 
that the new law would increase this number even more. On the very same day, the pro camp, 
in turn, reacted to the conference of the contra camp. This time, the responsible department of 
the administration (BfM) responded with a press release in which it refuted the accusation of 
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the contra camp. It argued that while asylum seekers were, indeed, rarely imprisoned for short 
periods, the arrests were often aimed at clarifying the asylum seekers’ identification, or were 
made for reasons that are not relevant to the asylum, such as due to non-political criminal 
acts. On another occasion in the asylum law campaign, the contra camp claimed that the in-
formation bulletin sent to each citizen produced by the government did not contain proper in-
formation.  
 Third, the campaigners also react to the media. For example, in the naturalization ini-
tiative campaign, the pro camp reacted to a TV program (Rundschau), claiming that the de-
scriptions of the circumstances in the program were misleading. In the naturalization initiative 
campaign, too, the right-wing party (SVP) announced that the former minister and head of the 
party (Blocher) and the responsible minister and excluded party member (Widmer-Schlumpf) 
would participate in the Swiss TV debate show (Arena). It appears that the right-wing party 
tends to be more reactive to the media than the other political actors.  
Fourth, the campaigners react to facts appearing in the course of the campaign. During the 
asylum law campaign, it emerged that an asylum seeker (Solongo Chinbat) had abused the 
system. The pro camp reacted to this fact with a press release in which it used the case to fur-
ther promote their message: it claimed that a new law was needed in order to prevent such 
abuse. In the tax reform campaign, the argumentation of the Social Democrats – who were in 
charge of the contra-committee during the campaign – resonated well with external events 
happening at the same time. The Social Democrats mainly argued that the tax cuts were an 
unfair privilege for the well-off and went against the principle of fair taxation (tax equity). 
They even claimed that the reform was unconstitutional. This line of reasoning mainly applied 
to a controversial provision that included a reduction in tax rates on dividends for sharehold-
ers who held at least a ten per cent stake in a corporation. In the last phase, the Social Democ-
rats reacted to the UBS subprime crises and presented individuals who would profit from the 
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reform. By that time, the subprime crisis of the UBS had become a political issue: On De-
cember 10th 2007, UBS had unveiled 11 billion Swiss francs (10 billion US dollars) of sub-
prime writedowns and announced that it had obtained an emergency capital injection from the 
Singapore sovereign fund and an unnamed Middle East investor. On January 30th 2008, UBS 
announced that it would write down 4.4 billion Swiss francs (4 billion US dollars) in bad in-
vestments for the year 2007 and would report a net loss of 12.5 billion Swiss francs (11.4 bil-
lion US dollars) in the fourth quarter of 2007. On February 14th 2008, UBS confirmed a net 
loss of 4.4 billion Swiss francs (4.0 billion US dollars) in 2007.12 For many people, these 
losses of a major Swiss bank were a strong contradiction to the very high bonuses some man-
agers were being awarded. However, only towards the end of the campaign, on February 14th, 
did the Social Democrats make an explicit link to the UBS and to its president of the board, 
Marcel Ospel. They claimed that controlling and major stockholders such as Ospel – who was 
the president of the board of directors of UBS AG – would be the primary beneficiaries of the 
tax reform. In the naturalization initiative campaign, the pro camp reacted to the murder of a 
naturalized person and emphasized the importance of saying yes to the vote. Overall, the 
campaigners tend to use media conferences actively, whereas in the press releases they tend to 
act more reactively. Anything that might give the political actors an additional possibility to 
promote their message further or increase its credibility is used as a reason for a media re-
lease.  
Besides the strategic managements of events, a second practice to promote one’s own 
frame could be to play one media outlet against another (Iyengar and McGrady 2007: 134). 
The abundance of journalists covering a campaign provides the campaigners with the option 
of awarding access to sources on the basis of the anticipated quality of their coverage. Theo-
retically, this is above all an option for the minister. His campaigner reported that the minister 
                                                 
12
 <http://www.drs4news.ch/www/de/drs4/themen/news/wirtschaft/die-ubs-im-strudel-der-
finanzkrise/72270.64530.chronologie-der-ubs-finanzkrise.html>, 16.03.2009. 
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basically has unlimited media attention. However, according to an informal, traditional con-
ception, the minister is expected to exercise his or her campaigning role with a certain re-
straint (Kriesi 2009). Based on this norm, the minister is not expected to play one media 
against each other. The other campaigners do not have recourse to this opportunity, because 
media attention is generally scarce. Playing one source against another seems to be better 
suited for exclusive stories or unforeseen events such as the announcement of a new party 
strategy or a resignation of a party’s president, which include a high inherent news value. 
Thus, we cannot expect to find this practice in direct-democratic campaigns. 
Indeed, the interviews with the campaigners reveal that playing one source against 
another is not used in direct-democratic campaigns. Normally, the campaigners send their 
media releases to all media outlets and invite all of them to their media conferences. Some-
times they might have mailing lists which do not include all of the media outlets. However, 
they do not intend to play the newspapers against each other or deliver their message exclu-
sively: The missing newspapers are not interested and did not subscribe to the mailing list. It 
would be a vein endeavor to send the message to all of them. Nevertheless, playing one 
source against another did occur on one occasion. In the tax reform campaign, a tabloid 
newspaper (Blick) refused to accept an advertisement from the major Swiss union (SGB). The 
union used the same slogan (“I am not stupid”), copying Europe’s largest retailer for consum-
er electronics (Media Markt). For the SGB, its slogan and its link to Media Markt fit very well 
with the issue at stake, because major shareholders of Media Markt are people who would 
typically benefit from the tax reform. The advertisement showed a photograph of a major 
shareholder of Media Markt, and it stated that he would benefit from the tax reform. “Blick” 
refused to show the advertisement because it could harm the personal rights of this major 
shareholder. For the campaigner, another reason seemed to be more plausible: Blick did not 
want to upset Media Markt because it was one of its important advertisers. The campaigner 
then tried to exploit the story and informed other media outlets. The popular TV news pro-
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gram “10vor10” was not interested. Finally, it was covered by a regional newspaper, which 
produced an article called “Blick refuses an advertisement of the SGB”. This is a case in 
which a campaigner played one source against another. However, this occurred only once in 
the three cases investigated. It can thus be seen as the exception that proves the rule. 
Oppositional Emphasis Choice: Campaign Dialogue by Communication Channel 
The extent to which the two camps converge on the same frames is defined as the campaign 
dialogue (chapter 1). From the letters section, we are already aware that editors strive for an 
open forum and “aim to create dialogue” (Wahl-Jorgensen 2007: 66). I expect the level of 
campaign dialogue in the letters to be similar to that found in the media input. In their politi-
cal advertisements and direct mail, campaigners follow issue ownership theory and emphas-
ize issues on which they enjoy an advantage over their opponent (Iyengar and McGrady 2007: 
142). This also appears to be plausible for frames. In addition, we do not have political adver-
tisements on television in Switzerland. Normally, ads in newspapers or flyers are small (half a 
newspaper page), decreasing the chance of a dialogue. They often include no more than a 
short, catchy message, and thus do not lend themselves to extensive debate. As a conse-
quence, it is expected that campaigners will engage in less campaign dialogue with regard to 
ads and direct mail than they will with regard to the media input. When speaking to their own 
constituency in their information for members, political actors focus primarily on their own 
arguments. For this reason, I expect fewer opponents’ frames in the information for members 
than in the media input.  
 Hence, with regard to the variation of the “Oppositional Emphasis Choice” in the dif-
ferent communication channels, I expect a similar amount of campaign dialogue in letters sec-
tions to in media input. By contrast, campaigners are expected to use fewer opponents’ frames 
in their political advertisements, direct mail and information for members than they use in 
media input. In accordance with the results found in chapter 4, I hypothesize that issue com-
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plexity and inequality of financial resources will reduce dialogue in all channels, whereas ex-
pected race closeness will increase convergence.  
Looking at the non-bold numbers in the first four rows of Table 5.4, we see that in the media 
input, both sides address the main frames of the opposing camp in an average of every four 
arguments. They primarily address the most important frame of the opposing camp and, se-
condarily, the other camp’s next most important frame. The pattern in the letters to the editor 
is similar to that found in the media input. On average, the opponents’ frames are used in 25 
percent of the promoted frames. This suggests that the two main frames on both sides were 
strong frames, such that neither side could ignore the frames of the opposing side. Instead, 
both frames elicited strong defensive reactions from opponents in both channels. In all other 
channels, the political actors address their opponents’ frames in only around 15 percent of all 
frames.  
Table 5.4: Use of Opponents’ Main Frames in the Different Communication Channels 
  Contra Pro Average 
Letters to the Editor Asylum Law 19.4 + 6.4 = 25.8 15.5+5.3 = 20.8 
25.8 
Naturalization 21.7+10.8 = 32.5                   26.3 
Corporation Tax 12.9+14.5 = 27.4 17.9+4.1 =  22.0 
Political Ads Asylum Law 16.9+3.5 = 23.4 13.3+3.8 = 17.1 
18.7  
Naturalization 28.4+0.0 = 28.4                  14.4 
Corporation Tax 0.0+6.7 =   6.7 3.1+2.1 =    5.2 
Info for Members Asylum Law 11.7+3.0 = 14.7 12.5+5.7 = 18.2 16.5 
Direct Mail  Asylum Law 14.0+4.1 = 18.1 11.1+0.0 = 11.1 14.6 
   
 Table 5.5 shows the level of campaign dialogue (campaign-level convergence) in the 
different communication channels of the three campaigns. A number of 100 would mean that 
they speak about the same frames to the same extent, while number of 0 would indicate that 
they used totally different frames. The highest level of campaign dialogue is found in the let-
ters to the editor in two of the three campaigns. Even in the third case, the naturalization 
campaign, the level of campaign dialogue in the letters’ section is almost as high as that 
which is found in the media input.  
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Table 5.5: Campaign Dialogue in the Different Communication Channels 
 Asylum Naturalization Corporation Tax mean 
letters to editor 72.6 72.5 56.1 67.1 
media input 69.9 69.3 41.5 60.2 
political ads 51.1 39.5 13.1 34.6 
info for members 50.5   (50.5) 
direct mail 38.6   (38.6) 
 
In all three campaigns, the dialogue level of the ads is low. In the asylum law, we find the 
lowest level of dialogue in the direct mail. In the communication to the members, we observe 
a level of convergence similar to that found in the political advertisements. The results sup-
port my expectation that the levels of campaign dialogue in the mediated should be higher in 
the unmediated and internal channels. With regard to the differences between the campaigns, 
we find further support for the idea that complexity and inequality of financial resources re-
duces dialogue (chapter 4). The tax reform was the most complex issue and the one that has 
been most financially dominated by a single camp since the early 1980s. For all communica-
tion channels, we find the lowest levels of dialogue in the corporation tax reform campaign. 
In contrast to the media input results (chapter 4), we do not find more dialogue in the closer 
race (naturalization initiative). Thus, I conclude that the expected closeness may be of minor 
importance for campaign dialogue. 
 
 
Oppositional Emphasis Choice: Campaign Dialogue over Time 
How do the campaigners vary the level of campaign dialogue (“Oppositional Empha-
sis Choice”) over time? In real-world debates, framing strategies such as alternate frames 
(promotion of one’s own frames) and direct rebuttals (=counter-frames) (Jerit 2009) are 
common. Gilland and Marquis (2006) document that in contrast to Riker’s so-called “domin-
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ance principle”, there is no concentration on a smaller number of frames over the course of a 
direct-democratic campaign. Koopmans supports this notion, stating that he does not expect a 
“long-term tendency towards an increasingly uniform public discourse […] [P]ublic discourse 
is kept alive by the small minority of ‘distortions’ or ‘mutations’” (Koopmans 2004: 389). 
Based on this reasoning, I also expect there to be no concentration on a smaller number of 
frames toward the end of the campaign in the media input, in the letters to the editor or in the 
media coverage. In the political advertisements, I expect to find less campaign dialogue but I 
do not have a specific hypothesis about variation over time here. In addition, I expect no vari-
ation between the campaigns. 
Figure 5.5 shows the level of campaign dialogue (campaign-level convergence) in me-
dia input, letters to the editor, and political ads on all three cases taken together over time. In 
the media input, we see that the political actors converge on the most important frames in 
around 60 percent of the cases when they are active with media input (eight to three weeks 
before the vote takes place). They continue to use their opponents’ frames during the whole 
campaign. In the letters to the editor, the level of campaign dialogue slightly decreases in the 
fourth week before the vote but increases again afterwards. Further research will have to ela-
borate on this finding. It might be possible that in the letters, dialogue is most alive towards 
the end.  In the political advertisements, the dialogue level varies more than in the other chan-
nels. It drops to very low levels in the last three weeks, when political actors are most active-
ly. 
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Figure 5.5: Campaign Dialogue Over Time and in the Different Communication Channels 
 
Note: In weeks 15–9, there were too few observations. 
Oppositional Emphasis Choice: Offensive or Defensive Use? 
With regard to the “Oppositional Emphasis Choice”, campaigners must also decide whether 
to use their opponents’ frames offensively (=trespassing) or defensively (=counter-framing). 
To my knowledge, the way in which this choice varies by communication channels has never 
been investigated. It has been argued that campaigners “have enough rhetorical freedom when 
designing campaign messages that an amenable frame can likely be found for nearly any is-
sue” (Sides 2007: 467). In a similar way, the campaigners have enough rhetorical freedom to 
talk effectively about the rival’s frame. Typically, political actors rely on goal ranking, issue 
categorization, institutional role assignment (Nelson 2004) or direct rebuttal (Jerit 2009) when 
debating the framing of an issue. In all of these prominent framing tactics, the rival frames are 
downplayed in a defensive way. Thus, I expect offensive use of opponents’ frames to be used 
rarely in all channels. At first glance, this expectation contradicts what we know from re-
search about (issue) trespassing, i.e. trespassing at the issue level. Issue trespassing is an op-
tion, in particular for defeat (Sides 2007). However, issue trespassing refers to the issue and 
not the frame level. Thus, there is no contradiction. In mediated channels, a message will have 
to be selected by journalists. Acting as gatekeepers (White 1950, Breeds 1955), journalists de-
termine what message is put forth. Trespassing by the political actors may make messages 
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less credible, potentially reducing the offensive use of frames in the mediated channels. On 
the other hand, journalists may prefer to take an offensive stance, thereby motivating the po-
litical actors to increase the offensive use of frames in the mediated channels. Political ads 
and direct mail focus on a camp’s core frame, which is indicative of campaigners that are nei-
ther interested in their opponents’ frames, nor in trespassing. For the same reason, I do not 
expect much trespassing in the information for members channel. 
Table 5.6 shows the percentage of the offensive use (=trespassing) of opponents’ 
frames in each channel. The defensive use of the opponents’ frames (=counter-framing) is not 
shown but can easily be calculated (100% - offensive use = defensive use). Overall, the two 
camps use their opponent’s frames defensively in the overwhelming majority of the cases in 
every channel. In other words, we find few instances of trespassing and an emphasis on coun-
ter-framing in all communication channels. Most examples of offensive use of the opponents’ 
frames are found in the letters section. In all channels, we see no systematic variation over 
time. Most of the time, campaigners counter-frame their opponents’ frames if they use them at 
all, i.e. use them in a defensive way (not shown). 
Table 5.6: The Offensive Use of the Adversaries’ Frames in the Communication Channels: Per-
centage of Adversaries’ Frames Which Were Used Offensively 
channel con pro 
letters to editor 6.9 8.9 
info for members 0.6 6.2 
political ads 0.0 4.5 
media input 0.0 3.6 
Note: The percentage shares are averaged over core and second adversaries’ frame and over campaigns. The 
direct mail channel is not presented because of the small number of cases. 
 
Contest Emphasis Choice: Variation by Communication Channel 
In general, I expect political actors to rely primarily on substantive frames in all their commu-
nication channels. Letters to editors are rejected if they place a paper at risk of a libel suit, 
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alienate advertisers, threaten readers or journalists with violence, or are racist. In all other 
cases, editors accept letters even if they are “uncomfortable with the tenor of the debate” 
(Wahl-Jorgensen 2007: 155) because they believe letters highlighting conflict or attacking 
other persons will encourage dialogue (Wahl-Jorgensen 2007 67f., 154f.). In addition, a let-
ters section can also perform a “safety valve” function (Wahl-Jorgensen 2007: 80) by helping 
readers vent their anger. In this way, a letters section serves a therapeutic function and help 
readers cope with their emotions. Consequently, I expect more contest frames in letters sec-
tions than in other channels. Although it is primarily the result of angry readers, the greater 
share of contest frames may also be a result of strategy on the part of volunteers, who want 
letters to appear authentic.  
With regard to political ads, I expect that newspaper editors, who depend on advertis-
ing revenue, will refuse to print advertisements that are too aggressive in order to avoid alie-
nating potential advertisers. Nevertheless, contest frames, i.e. personal attacks and criticism, 
are still possible. It is well-known that, in the US, campaigners rely heavily on negative or at-
tack advertisements (Iyengar and McGrady 2007: 147ff). Typically, consultants differentiate 
between critiques on performance, which focus on opponents’ records, and character assassi-
nations, in which opponents are portrayed as immoral people. As a result of several factors, 
however, both tactics appear to be insignificant in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns. First, 
the opponent’s character is not at stake. Second, the Swiss consensus democracy is based on 
power sharing, which handicaps clear responsibilities and performance critiques. Third, the 
Swiss culture is less confrontational. As a result, I expect political actors to use arguments in 
their advertisements instead of contest frames, such as attacks.  
For similar reasons, I expect the same for direct mail. I expect more contest frames in 
the information for members. In this channel, campaigners may resort to using misleading, 
unsubstantiated, and even outright false allegations against opponents. Such attacks can 
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strengthen the division between in- and out-groups in such a way as to strengthen the ties of 
organization members. In line with the results of chapter 4, I expect more contest frames in 
the naturalization initiative campaign because of the dispute between Christoph Blocher and 
Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf. Thus, with regard to the variation in the “Contest Emphasis 
Choice” in the different communication channels, I hypothesize that I will find more contest 
frames in letters to the editor than in media input. Political actors, however, will rely primarily 
on substantive frames in political advertisements and in direct mail. In information for mem-
bers, they may also use more contest frames. I also expect to find more contest frames in the 
naturalization initiative. 
 Let us look again at Table 5.2. As expected, contest frames, such as personal attacks 
and conflicts, are rarely used by political actors in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns, regard-
less of the communication channel. In the letters to the editor, the proportion of contest 
frames is, with one exception, higher than that of media input. Even though I rely on the pub-
lished letters to the editors, I can assume that the share of contest frames in the letters submit-
ted is not significantly different: First, letters contain the writer’s name and are submitted by 
locals. This allows for personal attacks. Second, as argued in the theoretical section, the edi-
tors strive for minimal intervention and allow attacks because they believe dialogue will 
emerge from controversial letters. On average, 10 percent of all statements in the letters sec-
tion are contest frames. In the naturalization initiative campaign, the pro camp exceptionally 
used so many contest frames in the media input that the share of contest frames is higher in 
the media input than in the letters to the editor. 
In the political ads, the political actors generally refrain from using contest frames. As a re-
sult, contest frames are used, on average, in 1.5 percent of the statements in the ads. Similarly, 
in the direct mail, the political actors use contest frames on average only 2.4 percent of the 
time; in communications with their members, contest frames appear in only 5.8 percent of the 
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cases. Table 5.7 shows that the difference in the use of the contest frames between the chan-
nels is significant. When comparing the frequency of contest frames to the media input (refer-
ence category), they are used more often in the letters to the editor, and they are used less of-
ten in the political advertisements and the direct mail. The use of contest frames in the direct 
mail is based on a very small sample (n=2), and thus is not significant at the five percent lev-
el.  
Table 5.7: Influencing Factors on the Share of Contest Frames 
  coef. s.e. p 
constant 6.92 1.17 *** 
political ads -5.43 1.66 ** 
letters to editor 3.50 1.66 * 
info for members -1.10 2.34  
direct mail -4.40 2.34 ° 
adj. R2   0.58 
n   22 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, °p<0.1 
However, as we see in Table 5.2, substantive frames predominate in all channels. Thus, we 
can state that in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns, framing is done primarily in substantive 
terms in all channels. With the exception of the pro camp in the asylum law campaign, there 
are more contest frames in the naturalization initiative because of the dispute between Chris-
toph Blocher, the populist right-wing party (SVP), and Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf. In the asy-
lum law campaign, AUNS, a citizens’ interest group from the conservative right, also cam-
paigned on the pro side. It prepared several aggressive draft versions of letters. 
 
Contest Emphasis Choice: Variation over Time 
 How do the campaigners vary the “Contest Emphasis Choice” over time? Campaign-
ers of ad hoc committees in the asylum law campaign and of economic interest groups in the 
corporation tax reform campaign believed to have more influence on the frame building 
process before the “crucial phase” started. Based on their experience with the media, these 
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campaigners presumed that scarcity in terms of media attention increases during the “crucial 
phase” when more actors are involved. To compensate for this increasingly scarce media at-
tention, the political actors might increase the news value of their events (Schulz 1997) by be-
coming more aggressive or increasing the conflict towards the end of a campaign. This means 
that they might increase their contest frames in the media input towards the end. For the other 
channels or between campaigns, I do not expect any variation. 
Table 5.8 shows the regression of “time” and other influencing factors on the share of 
contest frames in the media input. “Time” is measured in campaign weeks. This variable is 
significant in the asylum law and the corporation tax reform. This means that in the media in-
put of the asylum law and of the corporation tax reform, the campaigners significantly in-
creased the usage of contest frames. The other influencing factors are the same as those used 
in chapter 4. The respective effects on the contest of the campaign remain the same, with the 
exception that extremity becomes insignificant at the five percent level in the asylum law 
campaign. With regard to the use of contest frames over time in the other channels, there is no 
variation over time. We will see in chapter 7 that the news media follow suit and increase the 
contest frames towards the end too. 
Table 5.8: Rare Event Logistic Regression of Time and Other Influencing Factors on Contest 
Frames in Media Input 
 Asylum Naturalization Corporation Tax 
  robust    robust    robust   
 coef. s.e. p coef. s.e. p coef. s.e. p  
time 0.108 0.031 *** -0.157 0.080 * 0.104 0.036 ** 
power -0.037 0.011 *** 0.018 0.008 * 0.009 0.007   
extreme 0.739 0.409 ° 1.628 0.563 ** 0.524 0.499   
li-re 0.187 0.081  0.159 0.178   -0.164 0.132   
governmental camp -0.356 0.474   2.003 1.159  0.976 0.688   
constant -1.918 0.578 *** -7.198 2.024 *** -2.343 0.512 *** 
n 1061 782 1056 
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 °p<0.1 
Note: Rare event logistic regression was used because contest frames occur only rarely (4.6%–7.6% of the ob-
servations are contest frames; the rest are substantive frames). Relogit provides neither pseudo R2 nor ratios. 
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Conclusion 
We can summarize the results in terms of the strategic framing choices.  With respect to the 
“Substantive Emphasis Choice” and the “Oppositional Emphasis Choice”, we find that politi-
cal actors generally also use their main frames in channels other than the media input, too. 
The frame emphases in the letters section are similar to those found in the media input. In the 
political advertisements, with two exceptions, the core frame of the media input appears more 
frequently. Similar results have been found for direct mails. Accordingly, the political actors 
pay more attention to their opponents’ frames in the media input and in the letters to the editor 
than in the advertisements and direct mails because the mediation motivates them to enter into 
campaign dialogue with each other. This is a critical finding because campaign dialogue is 
important to the democratic process. Citizens are able to make more informed decisions when 
they are exposed to different frames. Thus, the likelihood of vote manipulation is reduced 
when citizens are exposed to counter-frames (Druckman 2004, Chong and Druckman 2007a).  
These findings are also relevant to research regarding media-based politics because we 
show that there are differences between the channels. The quality of debate in the advertise-
ments and direct mails is lower than the quality of debate in the other communication chan-
nels. Thus, media input (and –as reported in chapter 6– news media coverage) is capable of 
evaluating the quality of discourse. Political advertisements and direct mails have functions 
other than to provide dialogue. They should mobilize citizens to vote or increase public de-
bate. Furthermore, we find instances of counter-framing rather than trespassing, which was 
virtually absent. With regard to the differences between the campaigns, we find further sup-
port for the idea that issue complexity and inequality of financial resources reduce campaign 
dialogue (chapter 4). In contrast to the results in the media input, we do not find more conver-
gence in the closer race (naturalization initiative).  
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The findings from the political advertisements also validate the findings of the media input. 
The use of frames in the advertisements shows the true intentions of the campaigners because 
they are in sole control of their message in this unmediated channel. The core frames in the 
media input remains the core frame in the advertisements, which shows that the frames used 
in the media input are not used simply to placate journalists but are representative of the in-
tentions of the actors.  
 
With regard to variation over time, it can be concluded that the political actors stay on their 
frame with one exception: In the naturalization initiative, the pro camp switched from the 
“people final say” frame to the “mass naturalization” frame in its ads toward the end of the 
campaign. The “people final say” frame was not convincing. Campaign dialogue does not 
disappear over the course of the campaign. In the media input, campaign dialogue remains 
high until campaigners stop promoting their message. In the letters to the editor, the level of 
dialogue is also high and even moderately increases towards the end. In the political adver-
tisements, the dialogue level varies most, but remains rather low during the last three weeks 
of the campaign when the campaigners rely most on this channel.  
Concerning the “Contest Emphasis Choice” in the different communication channels, 
we show that in direct-democratic campaigns, the political actors often refrain from using 
contest frames in their ads and in direct mail whereas we find more contest frames in the let-
ters to the editor and in the communication with the members than in the media input. In the 
communication with the members, attacks are used to strengthen the division between mem-
bers and non-members whereas the letters section might serve readers also to vent anger. In 
line with the findings of chapter 4, we notice more contest frames in the naturalization initia-
tive. There is not much variation over time. However, towards the end of the campaign, we 
identify more contest frames in the media input. 
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6 Frame Mediation: Contribution of the Journalists 
 
Introduction 
Journalists and their sources are mutually dependent on each other. Their relationship is often 
viewed as more or less “symbiotic” (Gans 1979, Sigal 1973) and has become more controver-
sial in the last decades due to the decline of the traditional party press in Western countries. 
The leading roles of the political parties have changed or have been challenged (e.g. perma-
nent campaigning). As a consequence, the media has become more independent. Today, scho-
lars agree that the relationship is reciprocal and multi-faceted: “The relationship between 
sources and journalists resembles a dance, for sources seek access to journalists, and journal-
ists seek access to sources.” Gans’ tango metaphor has been recently discussed by Strömbäck 
and Nord (2006). They conclude that, in the context of Swedish election campaigns, journal-
ists usually lead the tango because they have ultimate power over the content of news stories. 
In other words, journalists dominate the selection of the news (Baerns 1979). “In any event, 
sources can only make themselves available; it is the journalists who will decide if they are 
suitable. [...] The source-journalist relationship is a tug of war: while sources attempt to ‘man-
age’ the news, putting the best light on themselves, journalists concurrently ‘manage’ the 
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sources in order to extract the information they want” (Gans 1979: 117). Direct-democratic 
campaigns are well institutionalized. By crafting and promoting the frames, political actors 
provide the set of frames upon which journalists rely. This renders the selection of the jour-
nalists secondary to the role of the political actors. Nevertheless, I start from the assumption 
that the relationship is reciprocal: Journalists need political actors as a source for their stories 
and political actors need the media to convey their messages to the public and their voters. In 
this respect, it is not important here who takes the lead in this tango dance. It takes two to tan-
go and it is important to investigate this symbiotic relationship in more detail. 
In this chapter, we shall explore the contribution of journalists in frame building 
(which I call frame mediation). Following Strömbäck and Nord (2006), one can distinguish 
between a content level and a process level of frame mediation. At the content level, the jour-
nalists and the political actors negotiate and battle over how the issue is framed. As has been 
shown in chapter 4 and 5, the political actors construct and promote the main frames into the 
public discourse in direct-democratic campaigns. But do journalists also contribute at the con-
tent level? At the process level of frame mediation, journalists and the political actors nego-
tiate and battle over when and where the frames are reported. When reporting on direct-
democratic campaigns, I argue that the journalists face at least five choices which are relevant 
for frame building.  
 
Journalists’ Choices 
Effort Choice 
First, the journalists have to decide how much effort they wish to undertake in frame building 
(“Effort Choice”). Market orientation challenges resource-intensive ways of covering politics 
(Baker 2002). As a consequence of the market orientation, the media are pressured by a per-
manent cost competition. In the last 20 years, this pressure has increased since the number of 
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readers of the press has been declining, and the number of media outlets has been shrinking. 
Thus, the expensive and ethical coverage of political matters is increasingly challenged, and, 
overall, the “effort” of the media in covering politics is put into question (Baker 2007). Re-
source-intensive journalistic formats such as in-depth commentaries or reportages could be 
replaced by emotionalized, personalized and provocative horse race coverage, or by simple 
reprints of press releases of political actors. Nevertheless, in Switzerland, like in other con-
sensus countries, the press is the dominant type of media and still earns more in advertising 
revenue than other types of media (Künzler 2005): The newspapers enjoy constitutional pro-
tection and are part of everyday life for a majority of Swiss citizens (Marcinkowski 2006). In 
2000, there were 453 newspapers sold for every 1000 Swiss adults (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 
23). Such a comparatively high rate of newspaper readership is only topped by Scandinavian 
countries. The high subscription rates build the financial foundation of the press; advertising 
provides another 60–80 percent of subscription newspaper revenue (Meier 2004: 251). These 
two resources give the press a sound financial basis (Marcinkowski 2006). In addition, direct-
democratic campaigns are newsworthy because they are important (Schulz 1997). Importance 
is measured in terms of lives affected. Direct-democratic campaigns affect the general public 
and are thus important.  
 As a consequence, the media are expected to make an effort in all three direct-
democratic campaigns and to “provide the public with the campaign information needed for 
voting on the campaign issue” (Gerth et al. 2009: 85). I expect no variation between the cam-
paigns but to find differences between the media types. In this regard, I distinguish the fol-
lowing types of media: high-quality elite newspapers (“elite”), regional newspapers (“region-
al”), tabloid newspapers (“tabloid”), free newspapers (“free”), and Public Service TV news 
(“TV”). Elite newspapers are particularly expected to invest resources in accurate, indepen-
dent and objective campaign coverage because they primarily aim at providing high-quality 
news. Regional newspapers are also expected to make an effort in reporting about direct-
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democratic campaigns because the process of concentration has strengthened the leading re-
gional papers: Fewer titles produce an increasing level of circulation (Lucht and Udris 2008). 
Tabloid newspapers are not expected to make an extra effort in direct-democratic campaigns 
because they want to deliver soft news stories with emotionalized and easy-to-understand 
messages. The free newspapers want to have the latest news headlines. Direct-democratic 
campaigns only rarely provide such latest news. Thus, the free newspapers probably report 
only rarely about direct-democratic campaigns. Even though the effort of the TV cannot di-
rectly be compared with the effort of the newspapers, it seems interesting to include TV in the 
analysis, too. The Swiss public broadcasting organization (SRG) still operates as a non-profit 
enterprise. It is constitutionally bound to produce television programming for the entire coun-
try (Meier 2004: 253), meaning that the TV programming also has to provide information 
about the political issues of the country. I do not expect variation between the campaigns be-
cause direct-democratic campaigns are routine action and the news media are generally ex-
pected to cover them.  
 
Balancing Choice 
Second, the journalists about the degree to which they want to balance out the messag-
es (“Balancing Choice”). Journalism has always had many functions: it provides information, 
entertainment, and sometimes also advocates politically. The advocacy function was central 
when the newspapers began to emerge, in many cases based on the initiative of political par-
ties in the late eighteenth to early nineteenth century (Hallin and Mancini 2004, Blumler and 
Kavanagh 1999). At this time, the newspaper served a political party and was financed by 
subsidies from political actors. In this model, the journalist is a political advocate or “political 
journalist”, i.e. a publicist who wants to influence public opinion in the name of a political 
faction. By the late nineteenth century, another model of journalist was beginning to emerge – 
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the “professional journalist”. The “professional journalist” is a neutral provider of informa-
tion, independent of partisanship or particular interests. This second model of journalism is 
often connected to a commercial media. Commercial media is financed by political adver-
tisements and its purpose is to make money. In reality, “political journalists” also adopt norms 
of political balance and no “professional journalist” is fully neutral or free of any political 
ties. Nevertheless, these two models of journalists differ in the strength of connections be-
tween journalists and political actors. The difference between the two models is expressed in 
more general terms by the concept of political parallelism (Hallin and Mancini 2004, Blumler 
and Gurevitch 1995(1975), Seymour-Ure 1974). Political parallelism means the degree to 
which the “structure of the media system paralleled that of the political system” (Hallin and 
Mancini 2004: 27). It exists when a media outlet can be aligned with a general political ten-
dency and has a number of different components.  
Political parallelism can, as already mentioned, be manifested in the journalistic norms and 
practices. “Perhaps most basically, it refers to media content – the extent to which the differ-
ent media reflect distinct political orientations in their news and current affairs reporting” 
(Hallin and Mancini 2004: 28). If the media reflect both a pro and a contra view, they provide 
a rather balanced view, which is associated with a low level of political parallelism. Con-
versely, a one-sided or imbalanced proliferation of information is associated with a high level 
of parallelism. In media systems of North and Central Europe, political parallelisms is rather 
low and the neutral-informational professional journalism is dominant (Hallin and Mancini 
2004). Accordingly, the journalists are expected to give a more or less balanced account of 
messages from both camps. I do not expect to find any differences between the media types or 
the campaigns as I expect that the same professional ethos has been valid for the country as a 
whole during the whole period. 
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Standing Choice 
Third, the journalists decide to whom they give standing (“Standing Choice”). By 
standing, I mean “having a voice in the media” (Ferree et al. 2002: 86). Numerous studies 
have shown that media attention is biased toward the more powerful actors (e.g., Galtung and 
Ruge 1965, Gans 1979, Danielian and Page 1994, Schulz 1997). In this line of argumentation, 
the so-called “indexing hypothesis” predicts that “[m]ass media news professionals (…) tend 
to ‘index’ the range of voices and viewpoints (…) according to the range of views expressed 
in mainstream government debate about a given topic” (Bennett 1990: 106). Conflict within 
the political elite is newsworthy and – based on the news values theory – expected to be re-
ported. In other words, the actors that dominate the decision-making process seem to get pre-
ferential access to the media (Danielian and Page 1994). Based on the result by Höglinger 
(2008) and Tresch (2009), the same seems to be at work in Switzerland. As stated by Tresch 
(2009: 85), “Swiss media mostly [...] largely reproduce existing hierarchies and structures of 
influence.” The reporters rely on powerful actors because they prove a convenient and regular 
flow of information. It makes their job efficient because it eliminates the need to double-
check facts (Hackett 1985). I therefore expect powerful actors to garner more standing.  
Beside powerful actors, I expect that political parties obtain more standing than other 
actor types. Swiss parties have traditionally been weak because they are lacking in resources 
(money and staff). In addition, they are weak because the party system is horizontally (a large 
number of parties) and vertically (subnational level is important as well) fragmented. Howev-
er, Ladner (2005: 59, 73) has found that direct-democratic instruments offer parties particular 
opportunities to step on the public stage. He has argued that direct-democratic instruments al-
low parties an advantage in terms of media attention and as such allow them to compensate 
their institutionally weak position. This finding is supported by Höglinger (2008) and Tresch 
(2009). Höglinger (2008) showed that the parties (see also Linder (1994)) benefit from direct 
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democratic procedures and get more standing than one would expect based on their power. In 
line with his findings, I expect that the large political parties (for Switzerland these are: SVP, 
FDP, CVP, SP, and GPS2) find more standing than one would expect based on their power.  
I will also control for the influence of citizens’interest groups  (i.e. political actors 
such as citizens’ interest groups, church organizations and SMOs). Höglinger (2008) reports 
that citizens’ interest groups get more standing in direct-democratic campaigns than in ordi-
nary media coverage. I expect that they do not get more standing when controlling for power. 
This assumption is based on the finding that direct-democratic institutions give citizens’ inter-
est groups the opportunity to become powerful actors (Linder 1994) and is also in line with 
Höglinger’s (2008: 238) results: Only those citizens’ interest groups get more standing which 
have the capacity to organize their members, i.e. which can become powerful. In other words, 
the influence of citizens’ interest groups works indirectly, through power. Citizens’ interest 
groups can become powerful and through their power, they also might garner media attention. 
Journalists might also rely on experts because the “objectivity routine prevents reporters from 
overtly expressing their point of view” (Shoemaker and Reese 1996: 125).    
The results are not expected to vary depending on the media type with the exception of 
the regional newspapers which are more tied to parties. The members of the parliament cam-
paign in their home canton for the political parties and the regional newspapers give them par-
ticular standing. The findings are expected to vary depending on the campaign issue. Journal-
ists might rely most on powerful actors and on experts in complex issues because it becomes 
more difficult to evaluate the quality of information and less political actors are capable of 
making their claims. 
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Timing Choice 
Fourth, the media have to decide when they want to report a frame (“Timing Choice”). 
I expect the journalists to cover direct democratic campaigns mainly between the sixth and the 
third week before the final days of the vote. This may not be an obvious assumption, as in 
Switzerland, political actors are allowed to publicly debate right up to the day of the vote. 
However, it can be explained by the information routine of the authorities and the voting be-
havior of the Swiss citizens and is in line with the idea that political institutions appear to in-
fluence the timing of the news coverage in ordinary politics (Baerns 1991: 98). Since 1978, 
the government and Parliament have presented their views in a ballot pamphlet, which is sent 
to each citizen. The pamphlet presents the government’s position first and in more detail, fol-
lowed by the challengers’ points of view. This mailing is sent to the citizens three to four 
weeks before the vote. The majority of citizens wait until they receive the pamphlet and sub-
sequently send their ballot by mail. Thus, the “critical period” of the information processing is 
situated just before and during this mailing of the ballots. I do not expect to discern any dif-
ferences between the media types. I expect to find earlier media coverage in the asylum law 
campaign since the political actors started their campaign earlier. 
 
Dialogue Choice 
Fifth, the journalists have to decide how much campaign dialogue they want (“Dialo-
gue Choice”). There is little consensus regarding what constitutes campaign dialogue. Bennett 
et al. (2004) use the concept of “responsiveness”, i.e. mutual reactions from the opposing po-
litical actors. Their concept entails that a political actor not only uses the opponents’ frame 
but that he also identifies the source of the opponents’ frame. My approach is less demanding. 
Campaign dialogue does not require that the actors refer to each other. For me, it is crucial 
that the audience learns about the position of a political actor on each frame. This requires that 
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both camps are present in the media with the frames of both camps (campaign-level conver-
gence). It seems less important that they refer to each other, because the issue is at the fore 
and not the actors. I expect that this is the case- that the journalists provide campaign dialogue 
because of the news’ media’s mediating function. The news media have to mediate the mes-
sage of the political actors. This refers to “any acts of intervening, conveying, or reconciling 
between different actors, collectives, or institutions” (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999: 249). In 
this way, the news media is an intermediary agent which transports meaning from the political 
actors to the audience and sometimes replaces for interpersonal exchanges. The media fulfill 
this mediating function by setting limits to the spectrum of the debated frames and by present-
ing a debate about these main frames. In chapter 4, it has been found that the political actors 
converge to some extent on the frames. The media is expected to converge even more on the 
same frames than the political actors, because of its mediating function.  
I expect some differences in campaign dialogue between the media types and the 
styles of coverage. I expect more convergence in tabloid news and on TV, because these me-
dia types are particularly prone to simplification and sensationalism. They might address a 
narrower view and focus more on the same aspects. The same might apply for commentaries 
in which journalists pick out one or two frames in order to discuss them more profoundly. By 
contrast, the free press might be less convergent than other media types because it filters the 
messages less and takes less care in reporting a coherent picture. I would also expect to find 
less convergence in elite newspapers because they might offer a broader view, meaning that 
their usage of “other” frames (i.e. non main frames) might be higher (as was the case in the 
asylum campaign). However, my measure of dialogue excludes these “other” frames and thus 
I do not expect to find any difference with regard to the elite newspapers. I expect to find less 
convergence on the front pages, where the journalists want to attract the reader’s attention 
with one message, than in the main body of an article or in commentaries. In the corporation 
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tax reform, the convergence might be lowest – in line with the findings of chapter 4 – because 
issue complexity handicaps campaign dialogue. 
For the “Dialogue Choice”, the number of contest frames can also be relevant. The 
more contest frames a newspapers reports, the less dialogue is possible because, to put it 
simply, contest frames are without substantive content. In general, I expect that the journalists 
will use more contest frames because moderate market competition slightly increases the 
journalists’ preferences for these frames. With regard to different media types, I expect to find 
fewer contest frames in elite newspapers because they should be particularly interested in the 
substantive debate. Conversely, I expect to find more contest frames in tabloid news, on TV 
and on the front pages. On the front pages, contest frames can attract attention. Tabloid news-
papers and TV are interested in emotional and sensational coverage, which would bring about 
more contest frames. In addition, journalists are expected to use more contest frames toward 
the end of the campaign, either because political actors promote more contest frames, or be-
cause the debate becomes more heated as the campaign comes to a close. 
Before turning to methodology, I will summarize the hypotheses (Table 6.1): With re-
gard to the “Effort Choice”, I hypothesize that the journalists make an effort. Elite newspapers 
might make the greatest effort, whereas free newspapers make the least. Second, the media 
are expected to balance out the messages between the two camps and tend to provide an equal 
number of arguments from both camps (“Balancing Choice”). Third, I expect powerful politi-
cal actors and large political parties to be covered more prominently (“Standing Choice”). In 
regional newspapers, large parties might garner most standing. In complex issues, I expect 
power to become even more relevant and journalists to rely on experts. Fourth, journalists are 
expected to cover direct democratic campaigns mainly between the sixth and the third week 
before the vote takes place (“Timing Choice”). Fifth, with regard to the “Dialogue Choice”, I 
expect that journalists will increase dialogue compared to the level of campaign dialogue 
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found in the media input. Furthermore, I expect more convergence in tabloid news, on TV, 
and in commentaries. By contrast, I expect to find less convergence in the free media and on 
the front pages. In the corporation tax reform, dialogue might have been handicapped by the 
complexity of the issue. With regard to contest frames, overall, I expect to see slightly more 
contest frames in the news media than in the media input. In addition, I expect to find fewer 
contest frames in elite newspapers and to find more in tabloid news, on TV, on the front pages 
and towards the end of the campaign. 
Table 6.1: Overview of the Hypotheses 
 General expectation Variation depending on.. 
 
Journalists… Media Type, Genres, Tim-
ing  
Issue Characteristics 
Effort Choice …make an effort elite: more effort 
free: less effort 
none 
Balancing Choice …balance the news none none 
Standing Choice …give higher standing to 
powerful actors and large po-
litical parties 
regional: higher standing of 
large parties 
(results will additionally 
show that the effect of pow-
er is still significant but 
weaker in elite and regional 
newspapers.) 
complexity: powerful actors 
and experts more impor-
tant 
Timing Choice …cover the campaign mainly 
between the sixth and the 
third week before the vote 
takes place, dependent on 
activity by political actors 
none none 
Dialogue Choice …provide dialogue tabloid, TV and commenta-
ries: more dialogue 
free and front page: less di-
alogue 
complexity: less dialogue 
                elite: less contest frames  
tabloid, TV, front page, end  
of campaign: more contest  
frames 
         
Results 
Effort Choice 
Table 6.2 addresses the “Effort Choice” and shows the average number of articles produced 
by a media type in each campaign. At the bottom, the total numbers of articles in each cam-
paign are listed. These numbers show first of all that the media were involved in all three 
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campaigns. With regard to the media types, we find the highest average number of articles in 
elite and regional newspapers. Not surprisingly, we find the lowest number in the free media. 
Across the campaigns, we observe the highest numbers in the familiar and easy issue (asylum 
law), whereas we discern the lowest in the unfamiliar and complex issue (corporation tax). 
The early involvement in the asylum law might have increased the number of articles, whe-
reas the late start of the naturalization initiative probably reduced the number of articles pro-
duced. In addition, it is possible that the complexity of the issue in the corporation tax reduced 
the number of articles the journalists produced on this issue. However, further studies need to 
show whether this finding can be generalized.  
Table 6.2: Effort: Average Number of Articles / TV Reports Produced By Media Type 
media type Asylum Naturalization Corporation Tax number of outlets 
elite 58 41 28 4 (2)∗ 
regional 44 29 28 9 (1) 
tabloid 14 12 11 3 (1) 
TV 11 3 5 2 
free 6 7 1 2 
total 559 380 327 20 
analysis of variance F=3.96, p=0.028 F=2.60, p= 0.081 F=2.23, p=0.118  
∗ Note: The number in the brackets shows the number of Sunday newspapers. For the mean, the Sunday news-
papers were counted as 1/6 according to the proportion of weekdays they produce an issue. For instance, we ar-
rive at 2.33 outlets in the elite media type. The elite newspapers together produced 136 articles in the asylum law 
campaign. Divided by 2.33, this is 58.  
One of the regional newspapers (St. Galler Tagblatt) was remarkably active in the asylum law 
and corporation tax reform. It produced 81 articles on the asylum law and 51 on the corpora-
tion tax reform. This finding might be explained by the fact that in both cases prominent fig-
ures with local ties were involved. In the asylum law, one of the ad hoc committees (BK) op-
posed to the reform proposal was led by a member of the business elite (Markus Rauh), who 
had grown up and lived in the area. In addition, a minister (Regierungsrat) of St. Gallen, Peter 
Schönenberger, also joined his committee. On the pro camp, another minister (Regierungsrat) 
of the canton of St. Gallen, Karin Keller-Sutter, was also active. In the corporation tax reform, 
a professor (Waldburger) from the University of St. Gallen was an important expert on this is-
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sue and criticized the reform from early in the campaign. It is possible that the involvement of 
these locally tied figures increased the news value and triggered more articles. Proximity is 
one of the news factors (Galtung and Ruge 1965, Schulz 1976, Price and Tewksbury 1997). A 
short telephone conversation with the responsible editor from this newspaper (Stefan Schmid) 
confirmed this suggestion; when presented with the finding, he suggested the very same ex-
planation. In addition, he assented that the journalists were also personally interested in both 
issues, which might also contribute to explaining this finding.  
 
Balancing Choice 
Next, we will look at the ratio between pro and contra arguments in the media input and in the 
news media coverage (“Balancing Choice”). Table 6.3 reveals that in both immigration issue 
campaigns, the political actors of the contra camp promoted more frames than the political ac-
tors of the pro camp (media input). On the other hand, the pro camp was more active in the 
tax campaign. The ratio between pro and contra arguments is lower in the news media than in 
the media input for both immigration issues. This means that the media tend to balance the 
difference between contra and pro camp on these issues. The same ratio between contra and 
pro camp arguments as in the media input is found in the news media in the tax campaign. In 
this campaign, the news media did not balance out the news. Nevertheless, the ratio is most 
balanced in this case. From these findings, I conclude that, even though the news media do 
not report exactly the same amount of arguments on each side, they tend to balance the news.  
Table 6.3: Balancing: Number of Arguments on Each Side by Campaign and Ratio of Contra / 
Pro Arguments 
 media input news media 
  contra pro contra/pro contra pro contra/pro 
asylum 726 335 2.2 1528 927 1.6 
naturalization 675 107 6.3 1176 733 1.6 
corporation tax 462 594 0.8 943 1123 0.8 
Note: There is no difference between media types. 
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In the second interview of the asylum law, we asked the campaigners in an open-ended ques-
tion how the media should deal with their media input from a normative point of view. Sever-
al actors mentioned that the media should balance the news and that both camps should have a 
voice. In this regard, the media fulfills their expectation. In another open question, we asked 
them how the media dealt with their input. Many political actors from both camps answered 
that the media reported both perspectives. By contrast, Amnesty International and the right-
wing party (SVP) were unhappy with the coverage. Amnesty International claimed that the 
newspapers from the German part were one-sided, whereas the SVP complained that they 
were often ignored except when they were provocative. Based on the content analysis, there is 
no hint that the SVP was ignored. In both the asylum law and the naturalization initiative, it 
was the party that received the most attention in the news media. In the corporation tax 
reform, the SVP was less active. Interestingly, some political actors reported that the leader of 
the SVP (Blocher), who was also the responsible minister in the asylum law campaign, had 
received substantial media attention. This statement can be confirmed based on the content 
analysis. He was, in fact, the most important individual actor in the news media coverage of 
the asylum law. In this regard, the statement by Amnesty International finds more empirical 
support than the critique by the SVP. In both the naturalization initiative and the corporation 
tax reform, we posed questions in a closed manner. Almost no campaigner (between zero and 
three percent of all political actors) reported that the media always ignored their media input 
or did not report their slogan. Thus, the interviews give support to the overall finding that the 
media tends to balance the news and only very few (SVP inclusive) feel they were treated 
badly.  
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Standing Choice 
Table 6.4 shows the results for the effects of power and actor characteristics (large party, citi-
zens’ interest group, extreme position on left-right scale) on standing, i.e. on the numbers of 
arguments with which an actor is present in the news media. All variables have a very signifi-
cant effect on standing: Powerful actors and large political parties get more standing whereas 
citizens’ interest groups and extreme actors get less. A change from 0 (mean) to 2.3 (95 per-
centile) on the standardized power measure increases the standing by 103 argument counts, 
with everything else being equal. The other variables are kept constant at their mean, or at ze-
ro in the case of the dummy variables. Similarly, large parties have a significantly higher 
standing. On average, they get 60 more argument counts than other actors, everything else be-
ing equal. The high standard error of the corresponding effect can be explained by the fact 
that there often is only one large party campaigning on a given side. Citizens’ interest groups 
garner a reduced standing of 9 argument counts. Extremity serves as a control variable. It is 
the deviation from the center, based on the self-evaluation on the political left-right scale. A 
change from 2.2 (mean) to 4.7 (95 percentile) on the extremity scale decreases standing by 8 
argument counts. Extreme actors may get less standing because they are less credible. The ef-
fects of power and extremity do not vary between the different media types. The effect of the 
large political parties is particularly strong in the regional newspaper (not shown here). This 
might be related to the remaining strong ties of the political parties to the regional units (can-
tons). In direct-democratic campaigns, the members of the parliament campaign in their home 
canton and the regional newspapers give them particular standing. Citizens’ groups are least 
present in the free media. Free media might focus on the most powerful political actors in 
their rather rare coverage.  
 
 Frame Mediation 
 
127
Table 6.4: The Effect of Power and Actor Characteristics on Standing in the News Media in the 
Three Campaigns: Negative Binominal Regression Model, Incidence-Rate Ratios (ratio) and 
Significance Level 
 
ratio s.e. p 
power 3.194 0.582 *** 
large parties 6.328 2.657 *** 
citizens' int. groups 0.160 0.059 *** 
extreme 0.627 0.071 *** 
pseudo R2=0.111, n=108 
   
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05 
Note:1. For this analysis, I excluded all of the actors who were not interviewed, as power and extremity are only 
measured for those who were interviewed. 2. Standing is measured by the total of arguments with which an or-
ganization was present in the news media during the whole campaign. 3. Given that we are dealing with count 
data, the Poisson model is appropriate; however, given the overdispersion we found in the data, we use the nega-
tive binomial, a special version of the Poisson model that is more adapted to this particular type of problem. 4. 
Power is standardized for each campaign (zmean=0, sz=1). 5. There are five large parties in Switzerland (SVP, 
FDP, CVP, SP, GPS). The citizens’ interest groups, church organizations and SMOs are called citizens’ int. 
groups. 6. All coefficients remain highly significant for the different media types or for the different campaigns.  
The effects stay more or less the same in all three campaigns (not shown here). In line with 
the expectation, power has the largest effect in the corporation tax campaign (complex issue). 
In the asylum law campaign, citizens’ interest groups also reach a relatively high standing. In 
the asylum law campaign, two highly involved ad hoc committees (K2N and BK) with two 
very famous representative figures also reach a high standing thanks to the prominence of 
their speakers. In the tax reform campaign, the most resource-rich and powerful economic in-
terest group actor, economiesuisse, was the leading house of the pro-committee. In spite of its 
power and money, it did not dominate the news media. It pursues its specific interest and pri-
marily wants to win the issue-specific vote and not be the most visible actor. Rather, it turns 
the spotlight on the allied political parties. In all direct-democratic campaigns, it is the task of 
the political parties to articulate its claims and to inform the citizens about the issue at stake 
and its position. Thus, the influence of economiesuisse works mainly indirect. 
The journalists do not exclusively rely on campaign inputs by political actors; they al-
so turn the spotlight on experts. In the asylum and the naturalization initiative campaigns, the 
experts get a low standing on the contra side (5 and 6 percent) whereas in the contra camp of 
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the tax reform, the experts reach a high level of standing (20 percent) (not shown). Since the 
issue is complex, experts are needed to debate it and to explain its meaning. However, for the 
quality of direct-democratic debates and for the question of the manipulability of the outcome 
of direct-democratic votes, one has to ask why the experts are more visible on one side. This 
can be problematic because experts enjoy a high level of legitimacy. A more detailed analysis 
reveals that the high standing of the experts on the contra side in the corporation tax reform 
was triggered by an article in a Sunday newspaper, the “NZZ am Sonntag”: In the edition of 
January 13, 2008, a journalist reported on the experts who criticized the corporation tax 
reform. The newspapers from the German-speaking part of Switzerland were the first to react. 
For instance, on January 15, the “Tagesanzeiger” (a centre-left regional newspaper) put the 
conflict between the experts and the responsible minister (Merz) on the front page and wrote 
that Merz had been let down by the experts. The “Tagesanzeiger” had already brought up the 
criticism of one professor (Waldburger) on November 26, 2007. However, it remained on a 
low level of standing. The story in the “NZZ am Sonntag” was necessary to leverage the is-
sue. The “NZZ” (a liberal quality paper and the weekday-sister of the “NZZ am Sonntag”) 
reacted differently. On January 16, it published an article by one of the experts. On the very 
same page, there was an article from the pro side in which the head of the most important 
economic interest group, economiesuisse, was also able to explain his opinion. A third type of 
reaction can be found in the “St. Galler Tagblatt” (regional newspaper, belongs to NZZ pub-
lishing house, i.e. is liberal). This newspaper probably reacted due to the local proximity to 
the experts. It published an interview with the expert on January 18 but also covered the op-
posing view. With one exception, the newspapers in the French part of Switzerland did not 
react to the story in the “NZZ am Sonntag”. Only the quality newspaper of the French part, 
“Le Temps”, followed on January 28 with coverage of the expert’s criticism. Crossing the 
language border clearly requires some time. This illustration shows first, that media bias is not 
the reason for the high standing of the experts of the contra side. Nevertheless, in the reaction 
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of the “Tagesanzeiger”, one can see an ideological imprint, whereas in the “NZZ”, it seems 
important that both camps are able to give their opinion. Second, this case also shows that 
there are two public spaces – one in the French-speaking and one in the German-speaking part 
of Switzerland (Tresch 2009). It is interesting to note that the pro camp was disappointed by 
the “NZZ am Sonntag”. They were disappointed that this liberal newspaper reported critically 
on the tax reform several times. As a short telephone conversation with the responsible jour-
nalist revealed (Heidi Gmür), the article in the “NZZ am Sonntag” was based on the curiosity 
and personal initiative of this journalist. After having heard several times the claim of profes-
sor Waldburger that the new law violated the constitution, she was wondering what other pro-
fessors thought about the issue. She found that, with one exception, all the professors she in-
terviewed were against the new law. Only one of the professors interviewed stated that he be-
lieved slightly that the new law did not violate the constitution. However, this one professor 
was not familiar with the issue and stated that his opinion should not be reported. The journal-
ist also had the required resources to write the story. She had worked for a Sunday newspaper 
and the issue was important. In addition, the information was relevant and interesting. The 
journalist did not expect her article to provoke such a reaction.  
Table 6.5 investigates whether the standing of the experts in the tax reform is relevant 
for the content. The adversaries of the corporation tax reform, together with the experts, main-
ly focused on matters of “tax equity”. They argued that the tax cuts were an unfair privilege 
for the rich and went against the principle of fair taxation. They claimed that the reform was 
unconstitutional. This line of reasoning mainly applied to a controversial provision that in-
cluded a reduction in tax rates on dividends for shareholders who held at least a 10 per cent 
stake in a corporation. Compared to the other actors, the share of the tax equity frame is sig-
nificantly higher among the experts. Thus, as a result of the increased standing of the experts, 
the tax equity frame became more important.  
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Table 6.5: Shares Devoted to the “Tax Equity” Frame in the News Media of the Tax Reform 
Campaign: Comparison between Experts and Rest 
Corporation Tax contra pro 
experts 63.6 58.6 
others 46.8 14.7 
n 943 1123 
analysis of variance F=17.02, p=0.000 F=42.29, p=0.000 
 
This is especially relevant for the pro side: The “SME” frame dominated the yes campaign. It 
states that the small and medium companies, which form the backbone of the Swiss economy, 
needed to benefit from a set of planned measures aimed at reducing financial and administra-
tive burdens. In their media input, the “SME” frame was present with 38.4 percent (see Table 
7.1). In the news media, the share reduced to only 30.4 percent. At the same time, the use of 
the tax equity frame by the pro camp increased from 7.7 percent in the media input to 15.3 in 
the news media. In other words, the “tax equity” frame introduced by the experts crowded out 
the “SME” frame to some extent. 
Next, we investigate the role of the regional newspapers in the tax reform campaign. 
As mentioned, the tax reform was aimed at the small and medium enterprises. Since SMEs 
are typically an important part of the social life of regions and communities, it is especially 
important for regional media to cover issues that affect SMEs in the regions they cover. They 
might do so by portraying collaborators of individual SMEs that are affected by the result of 
the vote, by explaining consequences for the communities, and by citing regional political ac-
tors. Thus, the regional newspapers possibly made an extra effort to focus on the “SME” as-
pect of the issue. Table 6.6 shows that the regional newspapers gave significantly more stand-
ing to the regional political actors in the tax reform campaign. 
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Table 6.6: Standing of Regional Political Actors in Different Media Types and Campaigns 
media type Corporation Tax 
regional 50.0 
elite 33.5 
tabloid 34.3 
free   0.0 
TV 38.5 
n 2066 
analysis of variance (regional vs. other media types): F=44.27, p=0.000 
Table 6.7 investigates whether the higher standing of the regional actors in the regional news-
papers of the tax reform campaign is relevant for frame building. The regional newspapers 
possibly emphasized more the “SME” frame because this frame addresses the needs of small 
and medium companies. This is not the case, as Table 6.7 shows. There is only a negligible 
difference in the use of the “SME” frame between the different media types. Thus, the region-
al newspapers gave higher standing to regional actors without giving more emphasis to the 
“SME” frame. 
Table 6.7: Use of the “SME” Frame in Different Media Types 
frame Corporation Tax 
regional 22.6 
elite 21.2 
tabloid 19.1 
free 20.0 
TV 16.7 
total 21.9 
n 2066 
analysis of variance: F=0.58, p=0.671 
 
Timing Choice 
Figure 6.1 shows the intensity of the three campaigns based on the number of arguments, ag-
gregated over the weeks. First, we see that the campaigns – after being covered on a lower 
level for some weeks – only started in earnest seven weeks (for the corporation tax) or six 
weeks (for the asylum law and the naturalization campaign) before the day of the vote. The 
media coverage of the asylum law campaign started earlier due to some highly involved polit-
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ical actors of the contra camp who began early. Second, in the third week before the vote, the 
debate in the news media peaked.  As suggested above, this is related to the mailing of the in-
formation bulletin three to four weeks before the campaign. Finally, the debate was covered 
on a significantly lower level in the two last weeks of the campaign. This result corresponds 
to findings from previous research about referendum campaigns (De Vreese and Semetko 
2004). The timing of the media coverage in the three campaigns correlates highly at around 
0.8.13 There are no significant differences between the media types. 
Figure 6.1: Coverage in the News Media Over Time 
  
Nevertheless, the media can introduce accents during a campaign. First, the TV, in its role as 
a public service organization, is responsible for one or two public opinion polls during cam-
paigns. In the asylum law campaign, the first of the two public opinion polls predicted a close 
result, encouraging the contra camp to increase its efforts — without success as we know. In 
the naturalization initiative, the first of the two polls revealed a surprisingly high number of 
“yes” voters (48 percent of the respondents). Again, this prompted the contra camp to increase 
its efforts, which resulted in a successful campaign. In both instances, the second poll did not 
                                                 
13
 The weekly argument counts of the asylum law and the naturalization campaign correlate at 0.78 (0.89 for the 
last 10 weeks), those of the asylum law and corporation tax reform at 0.73 (0.79 for the last 10 weeks), and the 
corporation tax and naturalization campaign correlate at 0.88 (0.84 for the last 10 weeks).  
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have a comparable effect. In addition, the other camp remained more or less unaffected by the 
poll. Second, the media organized the Swiss TV debate show (Arena), which, in the case of 
the naturalization initiative, attracted a record number of viewers (810,000) and triggered 
news coverage in the following days. This was an extraordinary event that can be explained 
with the showdown between the new justice minister (Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf) and the 
former minister (Christoph Blocher) in this TV show. Normally, “Arena” is less important. 
On average, 234,000 view Arena14. The timing of this event is important because it can affect 
the effort a political actor puts forth or the content of a public debate. 
 
Dialogue Choice 
The degree of campaign dialogue (campaign-level convergence) in the different campaigns, 
types of media outlets and media genres is shown in Table 6.8. In the asylum law campaign, 
we find a dialogue level of 70.1, in the naturalization campaign it is 64.0 and in the corpora-
tion tax campaign it is 55.3. With regard to differences between the campaigns, it can be 
noted that the lowest level of campaign dialogue is found in the case of the complex issue, the 
corporation tax reform. In comparison to the level of dialogue in the mediated communication 
channels (chapter 5), we note that there is no more campaign dialogue in the news media. 
These findings are unexpected because the news media, with its mediation, is expected to in-
crease campaign dialogue. In light of the results, however, it becomes clear that political ac-
tors anticipate the mediating function and adapt to the media logic by increasing campaign di-
alogue in the media input themselves. However, in the corporation tax reform, the news me-
dia converge on the main frames in 55 percent of their arguments, whereas in the media input, 
the two camps speak about the same frames in 41 percent of their main arguments. This result 
indicates that the mediation function is important in the complex issue.  
                                                 
14
 <http://www.nzz.ch/nachrichten/politik/schweiz/streit_um_neue_arena_nach_der_rekord-
sendung_1.736781.html>, February 2010. 
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Surprisingly, the campaign-level convergence is not significantly higher in tabloid newspa-
pers and on TV news. I interpret this as a good sign for democracy. It seems that these media 
types do not simplify too much. At the same time, the convergence is, as expected, signifi-
cantly lower in free news media. The free press mediates less and provides a less coherent 
picture. These newspapers mainly reprint the information provided by the news agency. In 
addition, convergence is not significantly higher in the commentaries than on the front page.  
Table 6.8: Level of Campaign Dialogue by Campaign, Media Type and Media Genre 
campaigns  
Asylum 70.1 
Naturalization 64.0 
Corporation Tax 55.3 
all Campaigns (mean) 63.1 
 
media type all campaigns 
regional 64.6 
tabloid 63.6 
TV 62.9 
elite 59.9 
free 28.3 
analysis of variance (free vs. other media types) F=7.86, p=0.015 
 
media genre all campaigns 
commentaries 65.5 
front page 54.6 
analysis of variance (commentaries vs. front page) F=0.89, p=0.402 
Overall, the journalists slightly increased the use of contest frames when compared to those 
used in the media input. In news media, we find an average share of 15.5 of contest frames 
(see Table 7.1) compared to an average use of 6.8 percent in the media input. According to 
the regression model presented in Table 6.9, significantly more contest frames are used on the 
front pages than in commentaries or in the body of the news articles in all three campaigns. 
The model predicts the following probability increase (not shown) on front pages: 5.3 percen-
tage points in the corporation tax reform campaign, 9.3 percentage points in asylum law, and 
10.3 percentage points in the naturalization initiative campaigns (with the other dummy va-
riables kept constant at zero). With regard to differences between media types, the idea that 
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significantly fewer contest frames (-4.4 percentage points) are found in the elite newspapers is 
supported by the results of the asylum law campaign. However, this is not the case in the oth-
er two campaigns. In line with my hypothesis, tabloid newspapers use more contest frames in 
the two immigration issue campaigns (asylum law: +5.5 percentage points, naturalization in-
itiative: +15.8 percentage points). The results are mixed with regard to TV news. In the asy-
lum law, we find an increasing effect of TV (+ 11.9 percentage points), whereas in the corpo-
ration tax reform the opposite is the case (- 5.1 percentage points). Probably, the non-profit 
characteristic of the Swiss public broadcasting service prevents the TV from using more con-
test frames. As expected, towards the end of the campaign, the news media increased the con-
test frames (+4.0 percentage points in the asylum law to +7.7 percentage points in the corpo-
ration tax reform). “Time” measures the campaign weeks. This result is in line with the find-
ings of chapter 5, which stated that the political actors increase their contest frames in the me-
dia input towards the end. In the naturalization initiative, “time” remains insignificant. There 
are two likely reasons for this: First, the campaign was so short, and second, the campaigners 
and journalists used more contest frames due to the conflict between Widmer-Schlumpf, 
Blocher and the SVP. Concerning the control variable, we find a tendency that the govern-
mental camp is reported with more contest frames (asylum law: +3.3 percentage points, cor-
poration tax: +4.0 percentage points). It is not clear what this result means. It is possible that 
the governmental camp attacks the other camp more in order to reproduce power. 
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Table 6.9: Logistic Regression Explaining the Use of the Contest Frames 
 Asylum Naturalization Corporation Tax 
    robust     robust     robust   
  odds s.e. p odds s.e. p odds s.e. p 
front page 1.949 0.432 ** 1.891 0.564 * 1.783 0.565 ° 
commentaries 0.587 0.141 * 1.040 0.178   0.895 0.177   
elite 0.663 0.104 ** 0.833 0.127   0.955 0.180   
tabloid 1.518 0.365 ° 2.474  0.576 *** 0.563 0.226   
TV 2.368 0.564 *** 1.256 0.439   0.414 0.217 ° 
time 1.038 0.014 ** 0.975 0.030   1.116 0.031 ** 
governmental camp 1.263 0.151 ° 0.961  0.124   1.524 0.227 ** 
n 2455 
  
1909 
  
2066 
  pseudo R2 0.030 
  
0.013 
  
0.019 
  
***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, °p<0.1 
 
Conclusion 
The results can be summarized based on the five choices: With regard to the “Effort Choice”, 
we find that journalists make an effort in all three campaigns. Elite newspapers make the 
greatest effort, whereas free newspapers add the least. In addition, the journalists make more 
effort in longer campaigns than in shorter ones. One of the regional newspapers made a re-
markably high effort in two campaigns because representative figures with local ties were in-
volved and the journalists were interested in the issue. Second, we find that the journalists 
tend to balance out the messages of each camp in all three campaigns. There are no differenc-
es between media types. Third, powerful actors and large political parties are covered more 
prominently than other political actors, whereas citizens’ interest groups and extreme actors 
are given less attention (“Standing Choice”). The influence of power is particularly strong in 
the complex issue, whereas the large political parties garner an especially high standing in the 
regional newspapers. Furthermore, it seems as if the free newspaper focus more on the power-
ful political actors in their rather sparse coverage than other media types. In the complex is-
sue, the experts also have a high standing and contributed to the media frames. Fourth, jour-
nalists cover direct democratic campaigns mainly between the sixth and the third week before 
the vote takes place following the institutional routine of the political authorities and actors 
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(“Timing Choice”). Nevertheless, the media introduced accents in the campaign by conduct-
ing public opinion polls. In the naturalization initiative, the TV debate show “Arena” intensi-
fied the debate, and the journalists increased their use of contest frames towards the end of the 
campaign. Fifth, with regard to the “Dialogue Choice”, we do not find any more campaign di-
alogue in the news media than in the media input (Chapter 5). The political actors probably 
anticipate the mediation function of the news media and increase campaign dialogue in the 
media input. However, in the complex issue (Corporation Tax) the news media provides a 
higher level of dialogue, indicating that the mediating function is important. With regard to 
differences between media types, we find less campaign dialogue in free news media. The dif-
ferences between the other media types do not vary significantly. In addition, we find slightly 
more contest frames in the news media than in the media input. In two of the three campaigns, 
we find more contest frames on the front pages, in tabloid news and towards the end of the 
campaign. Surprisingly, significantly more substance in elite newspapers is found only in one 
campaign. 
Is this contribution of the journalists “sufficient”? In terms of the distinction drawn by 
Strömbäck and Nord (2006), we find that the journalists contribute to the process and content 
levels of frame mediation. On the process level, journalists generally follow the institutional 
routine of the political actors when timing news coverage. Nevertheless, they can sometimes 
introduce accents into a campaign by using a public opinion poll or a TV debate show (“Are-
na”). With regard to the content level, we reveal that journalists balance the news, give higher 
standing to powerful actors and large parties and provide campaign dialogue. Additionally, as 
the corporation tax reform initiative showed, other frames enter a debate in the form of as the 
experts’ views, Overall, the process is well-institutionalized and made routine, which is seen 
as a system of checks and balances against too political actors gaining too much power or 
media influence. Referring to Gans’ metaphor, I can conclude that the journalists and the po-
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litical actors are dancing the tango well, as they are familiar with both their dance partners and 
the music. 
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7 Key Factors in Frame Building 
 
After having explored the crafting, promoting and mediating processes which result in the 
media frames, we elaborate now on key factors. We use media frames as dependent variables 
and investigate the factors that influence the creation or changes of frames applied by journal-
ists. This chapter first explores the ability of political actors to use their media input to influ-
ence media frames and investigates whether the relationship between political actors and 
journalists is reciprocal or unidirectional. Based on the assumption that media input by politi-
cal actors influences news media frames, the chapter then looks at the factors in more detail 
with emphasis on the influence of power, the salience of frames in media input, and the mul-
tiplication effect of the minister (i.e. the Federal Councilor). 
 
Who Is the Driving Force and Which Communication Channel Is Important?15 
                                                 
15
 A shortened and earlier version of this chapter is going to be published in: Hänggli, Regula (2011b). On the 
basis of the naturalization initiative campaign, a paper discussing which key factor of frame building belongs to 
which part of the model has been submitted to ABS (Hänggli 2011a).  
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As introduced in chapter 1, my general approach for conceptualizing the relationship between 
political actors and the mass media is an actor-oriented political process model, as it has been 
introduced by Wolfsfeld (1997). The relationship between the campaigners in the public de-
bate and the mass media is one of mutual dependence but, significantly, as Gans (1979) 
stressed, this relationship is likely to be an asymmetrical one: “Although it takes two to tango, 
either sources or journalists can lead, but more often than not, sources do the leading”. 
Wolfsfeld’s key hypothesis (p. 3) makes the same point: the political process is likely to be 
the driving force in this relationship. The reasons he provides for this hypothesis are numer-
ous, but, most importantly, he suggests that the mass media are much more likely to react to 
political events than to initiate them. This is in line with Sigal’s idea (1973) that by releasing 
news, political actors take the first step toward making news. It is also in the tradition of 
Baerns’ “Determinationsthese” (1991), a thesis well-known among Swiss and German com-
munication scientists. It says that news coverage is based on contributions from political ac-
tors more than sixty percent of the time. In particular, Baerns states that political actors influ-
ence the content of news coverage (1991: 98). As discussed in chapter 6, Strömbäck and Nord 
(2006) disagree with Sigal, Gans and Baerns and conclude that journalists, not politicians, 
lead the tango. They assert that journalists have the ultimate power and control over the fram-
ing of news stories. However, they also state that, with the exception of one main national tel-
evision program, between 65 and 77 percent of the news stories in the four main newspapers 
and the two main television news programs in Sweden are based on media input from political 
actors. They agree that the political actors are frequently used as sources in the news stories. 
Thus, the political actors are expected to lead the frame building process by providing the 
frames. It is in this context that we refer to Bentele et al.’s (1997) term “Induktion”, i.e. a 
communicative input which has an impact on the news. By framing the issue strategically, we 
argued (see chapter 4) that political actors face at least three strategic choices. The journalists 
contribute to the debate by clarifying the opposing positions (which Bennett et al. 2004 call 
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“recognition”) and by eliciting mutual reactions from the opposing political actors (which 
they call “responsiveness”). With regard to the second and third choices involved in strategic 
framing (“Oppositional Emphasis Choice” and “Contest Emphasis Choice”) I expect that 
moderate market competition slightly increases the journalists’ preferences for the offensive 
strategy and for contest frames.  
I expect that the media input is the most important communication channel in the 
frame building process because the media releases and conferences are, obviously, directed 
towards the news media and sent or organized several times during the campaign phase. I call 
this the channel hypothesis. Posters and political advertisements (see chapter 1 for an over-
view of the different communication channels) are not suited for introducing new frames be-
cause they can only transport very short messages. Instead, they are used for mobilizing, and 
rarely also for provocation. Posters might be able to strengthen and support a frame promoted 
in the media input, also on the emotional level. Provocative posters or advertisements can be 
used to trigger a heated public debate or a debate about a certain framing. Such a heated de-
bate occurs only rarely and none of our campaigns represented such a case. 
 
Power of the Political Actor, Salience of Frames in Media Input and the Role of the  
Minister  
The impact of a promoted frame depends on the power of the political actor. Numerous stu-
dies have shown that media attention is biased toward the more powerful actors (e.g., Gans 
1979, Wolfsfeld 1997, Entman 2007). The so-called “indexing hypothesis” predicts that 
“[m]ass media news professionals (…) tend to ‘index’ the range of voices and viewpoints (…) 
according to the range of views expressed in mainstream government debate about a given 
topic” (Bennett 1990: 106). Conflict within the political elite is newsworthy and – based on 
the news values theory – expected to be reported. In other words, the actors that dominate the 
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decision-making process seem to get preferential access to the media (Danielian and Page 
1994). Based on the result from chapter 6 (“Standing Choice”), the same seems to be at work 
in Switzerland. The reliance on powerful actors is expected not only to influence the attention 
an actor can garner, but also to be essential in the frame building process: more powerful po-
litical actors should have more influence in frame building. I call this the power bias hypothe-
sis. The idea that powerful actors are influential in frame building goes back to the approach 
that news media actors follow the political actors depending on the degree and nature of mar-
ket competition. More specifically, it is in line with the news values theory, which states that 
news values determine how much prominence an event or a frame is given by the media. In 
the original theory (Galtung and Ruge 1965), news decisions are traced back to specific prop-
erties of events and actors – so-called news factors – that make them newsworthy and increase 
their chances of making the news. Such news factors include, among other things, conflict or 
controversy, resonance with well-understood story themes, or the status and relevance of an 
actor (Galtung and Ruge 1965, Schulz 1976, Price and Tewksbury 1997). Swiss direct-
democratic procedures have been shown to increase the media standing of actors who are no-
toriously weak, such as social movement organizations or the Swiss political parties 
(Höglinger 2008). However, while outsiders might find more attention in the media due to di-
rect-democratic instruments, I expect that their influence on frame building is still restricted 
because they attract less media attention than powerful actors and large parties (Chapter 6). 
Concerning the issue characteristics, I expect familiarity and complexity to be crucial. In the 
construction of frames for familiar issues, I expect greater involvement from a higher number 
of political actors. This is because more political actors are knowledgeable about the issues 
and have developed clear opinions. Thus, access to media would be more open. With regard 
to complex issues, however, the opposite is to be expected: Fewer political actors have the 
expertise to participate in the public debate.  
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Next, the salience of the frame(s) in the media input is crucial. This is in line with stu-
dies of agenda building, which have confirmed that the salience of issues in the media input is 
positively related to the salience of issues in news media (Kiousis et al. 2006). The salience of 
the frames in the media input can be measured by the frequency with which they are men-
tioned in the media input of the political actor. The theoretical idea behind this factor is that 
journalists follow the political actors based on the professional norms in journalism. In West-
ern democracies, the neutral-informational professional journalism is dominant (Hallin and 
Mancini 2004). Based on this neutral-informational journalistic norm, the media should give 
an accurate account of important events, actors and messages within the institutionalized are-
nas of the political system and make the political process transparent for the citizen public. 
The journalists are expected to disseminate information as neutral chroniclers and impartial 
observers. This norm is in line with the mirror approach, which conceives of the media as a 
mirror of political reality (e.g., Schulz 1976, McQuail 1992). Thus, the media are assumed to 
report the frames proportionally to the degree to which they are promoted. This can be meas-
ured by the frequency with which a frame is mentioned in the media input of the political ac-
tor. I call this the salience hypothesis. 
 The messages of the minister, or in general, of the most prominent institutional speak-
er of the debate, are expected to be met with higher response by the media than the messages 
of the other actors. I call this expectation the multiplication hypothesis. By minister, I am re-
ferring to a Federal Councilor. The Federal Council is the Swiss government which has seven 
members. Federal Councilors are confronted with a double task: they are a member of the go-
verning college, and they direct one of the seven federal ministries (Kriesi and Trechsel 
2008). Based on the news values theory, the minister responsible for the proposition submit-
ted to the vote is expected to garner more media attention. Both, the prominence and prestige 
of a given actor are expected to increase the news value of a frame promoted by this actor 
(Galtung and Ruge 1965, Schulz 1976, Price and Tewksbury 1997).  
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As introduced in chapter 2, there are two different direct-democratic instruments: initi-
atives and referendums. Both present the voters with a binary choice – either in favor (pro) or 
against (con) the issue-specific proposition at stake. However, we can distinguish between the 
two according to the source of the proposition: initiatives are propositions “from below”, 
formulated by organizations representing groups of citizens, while referendums concern prop-
ositions “from above”, i.e. legislative acts proposed by the government and adopted by Par-
liament. Since, in the case of a referendum, the legislative act is worked out (sometimes over 
several years) and proposed by the government and its administration, the minister is expected 
to be more important in referendum campaigns than in initiative campaigns. In addition, the 
minister is expected to be more influential with regard to complex issues in which he and his 
administration are most knowledgeable. In complex issues, access to information is also more 
important and/or scarcer, which gives an advantage to the minister. Familiarity does not ap-
pear to be critical: Even when they are faced with unfamiliar issues, political actors should be 
able to compensate for their lack of knowledge. 
In summary, the hypotheses are as follows: First, I expect the political actors to take 
the lead in the frame building process. Second, I expect the media input to be the most impor-
tant channel in this process (channel hypothesis). Third, the power bias hypothesis states that 
powerful actors get easier access to the media with their frames than weak actors. I expect 
power to be less important in familiar issues and more important in complex issues. Fourth, 
the salience of the frames in the media input is crucial for its frequency in the media (salience 
hypothesis). Fifth, the minister’s frames are multiplied most (multiplication hypothesis), par-
ticularly in referendum campaigns and in complex issues. 
Finally, external events taking place during the campaign can be relevant with regard 
to frame building as well. Lawrence (2000) argues that high-profile media coverage of un-
planned events provide a special opportunity for reframing. The same has been shown by 
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Baumgartner et al. (2008) where unexpected and scandalous events in and around the death 
penalty debate in the U.S. have triggered a shift in the existing debate towards the innocence 
frame. Also, banalities such as summer or Christmas holidays structure the debate.  
 
Method 
We shall pursue a double strategy for data analysis, and treat the campaign agenda both as an 
aggregate and a daily phenomenon. The purpose of such a double strategy is to find mutually 
reinforcing results. In the analysis of daily effects, we use a zero-inflated negative binominal 
regression model. Given that we are dealing with count data, the Poisson model is appropri-
ate; however, given the overdispersion found in the data, we use the negative binomial, a spe-
cial version of the Poisson model that is adapted to this particular type of problem.16 When in-
terpreting zero-inflated models, it is easy to be confused by the meaning of the effect parame-
ters (the incidence-rate ratios). Such models have two parts – an inflation model and a count 
model. The inflation model estimates the effects (incidence-rate ratios) on the possibility that 
an argument does not make it into the media, i. e. on the possibility of its absence from the 
media. The count model estimates the effects (incidence-rate ratios) on the frequency of an 
argument’s presence in the media. When the same independent variables are included in the 
equation for both models, the effects from the two models often point in opposite directions, 
i.e. the one is smaller, the other larger than one. This makes sense from a substantive point of 
view. In the inflation model, a ratio smaller than one implies a higher probability that the 
                                                 
16
 Overdispersion implies the presence of greater variability (statistical dispersion) in the predicted counts for a 
given value of x than would be expected based on the Poisson regression model. Stata provides a likelihood-ratio 
test for overdispersion. In addition, due to the excess zeros in the data, also called zero inflation, a zero-inflated 
count model is necessary. Greene (2000) has proposed the Vuong (1989) test for non-nested models in order to 
establish whether a zero-inflated model is necessary. Zero-inflated count models assume that there are two latent 
(i.e. unobserved) groups: an “Always Zero” and a “Not Always Zero” group and that zero counts are generated 
by two independently operating processes. In the first process (Inflation Model), the zeros belonging to the “Al-
ways Zero” group are generated. An argument in this group has an outcome of zero with a probability of one. 
This process is binary; it generates zeros or ones. If this first process results in one, the second process is as-
sumed to come into play: a negative binominal regression process (Count Model) which generates zeros of the 
“Not Always” group. An argument in this group might have a zero count, but there is a non-zero probability that 
it has a positive count. 
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frame does make it into the media; correspondingly; in the count model, a ratio larger than 
one increases the frequency in the media. 
 In other words, these two models allow a distinction to be drawn between frame pres-
ence/absence in the media, on the one hand, and frame frequency in the media, on the other 
hand. Accordingly, frame building can be conceived as being composed of two processes – 
the daily frame absence/presence and the daily frame frequency. In a similar way, Tresch 
(2009) defines two dimensions of standing: presence (=non-absence) and prominence. Since 
both, absence and frequency are measured on a daily basis, I refer in this context to the daily 
frame absence/presence and daily frame frequency.  
 For the estimation of these models, we will use a stacked file, with five (four in the na-
turalization campaign) cases for each day, one for each of the main frame categories, plus one 
for the residual category. We shall introduce a dummy variable for each one of the main 
frames, in order to control for their variable salience. In order to control for contemporaneous 
correlation, we will cluster the standard errors over time (=robust s.e.).17 We shall also lag the 
dependent variable by one day so as to control for the autoregressive effect. Zero-inflated 
models may be very sensitive to the specification of the inflation model (see Appendix Table 
A3). It is therefore important to perform a sensitivity analysis (Steenbergen 2008, Long and 
Freese 2006). 
 In the first time-series analysis of daily effects (Table 7.2), we will study the lagged ef-
fect of the framing of political actors on the framing of the media and vice versa. In order to 
do so, we can make use of the fact that political actors and the media do not communicate si-
multaneously, but in a stable morning-evening sequence in which the publication of (morn-
ing) newspapers precedes events produced by the political actors during the day, which are in 
turn consistently followed by the broadcast of (evening) news bulletins and by the press of the 
                                                 
17
 This correction was designed for linear models and it is not completely clear whether it works as well for this 
kind of model. However, the results are also robust without the clustering (Appendix model s2). 
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next day. Lagging the independent framing of the political actors of the two camps (contra 
and pro) by one day (t-1) provides the relevant input for the framing of the press, while the 
framing of the political actors of the same day (t) provides the input for TV. Conversely, the 
independent framing of the newspaper and of the TV lagged by one day (t-1) provides the in-
put for the political actors on day (t). The arguments from the newspaper and from TV were 
combined in the media variable. In the second time-series analysis (Table 7.3), we will inves-
tigate the lagged effect of power, of the counts in the media input, and of the minister varia-
ble.18 
 
Results 
The Lead of the Political Actors and Media Input as the Important Communication 
Channel 
Figure 7.1 compares the percentage shares of the frames in the media input with the shares of 
the frames in the media’s news reporting. There are two graphs for each campaign – one with 
the shares of the contra camp (on the left) and one with the shares of the pro camp (on the 
right). The overall impression is that, in general, the news media rather faithfully reproduce 
the framing by the two camps. Thus, the percentage shares of the frames in the news media 
are generally similar to the shares found in the media input. There are two instances (the 
abuse frame of the pro camp in the asylum campaign and the mass naturalization frame of the 
pro camp in the naturalization campaign), where the news media increased the share of the 
main frames compared to the media input. This finding is probably due to the advertisements: 
                                                 
18
 I will use the following abbreviations for the variables: Media (t-1) is the number of arguments reported in the 
media on day t-1. Contra input (t-1) and pro input (t-1) is the number of arguments presented as input material by 
the pro and the contra camps, respectively, on day (t-1). Minister (t-1) is the minister dummy of day t-1. Contra 
ads (t-1) and pro ads (t-1) are the number of arguments presented in the political advertisements of the contra or 
the pro camp on day t-1. Power contra (t-1) and power pro (t-1) are the sum of daily power of the respective 
camp. Human. trad. and the remaining variables in the count model are dummy indicators for the four (three in 
the naturalization campaign) main framing categories, with the residual category (“others”) forming the refer-
ence category. 
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In both cases, the pro camp was very active with advertisements and focused on the respective 
frames in the ads (chapter 5). Moreover, compared to media input, the media doubled the 
share of the pro camp’s tax equity counter-frame and also increased the share of the contra 
camps’ efficacy and SME counter-frames. This finding reflects the media logic which favours 
dialogue. 
Figure 7.1: Comparison Between the Percentage Shares of the Frames in the Media Input and 
in the News Media 
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Table 7.1: Substantive (Offensive and Defensive Use) and Contest Frames of the Two Camps in the Media Input and the News Media: Percentages 
    Asylum  Naturalization Corporation Tax 
     media input news media   media input news media   media input news media 
      con pro con pro  con pro con pro  con pro con pro 
substantive                              
 offensive human. trad. 38.7 4.5 30.2 2.5 rule-of-law 48.9 0.0 46.0 0.0 tax equity  48.5 0.0 47.8 0.3 
   rule-of-law 21.5 0.0 9.3 0.3           tax loss 22.3 0.0 15.2 0.2 
   abuse 0.0 26.9 0.0 27.8 people final say 0.0 39.3 0.1 31.5 SME 0.0 38.4 0.3 30.2 
   efficacy 0.0 17.3 0.0 12.8 mass naturalization 0.4 20.6 0.1 24.8 competitiveness 0.0 27.3 0.0 25.9 
   others 13.9 16.1 23.8 22.1 others 4.9 7.5 7.2 5.8 others 4.3 11.3 2.5 4.5 
    all offensive 74.1 64.8 63.4 65.6 all offensive 52.6 65.5 53.3 62.1 all offensive 75.1 76.9 65.8 61.0 
 defensive human. trad. 0.1 20.3 0.0 12.6 rule-of-law 0.2 19.6 0.0 18.5 tax equity  0.0 7.7 0.0 15.0 
   rule-of-law 0.4 9.3 0.0 4.5           tax loss 0.0 8.4 0.0 8.2 
   abuse 17.6 0.0 16.2 0.5 people final say 21.9 0.0 18.5 0.0 SME 5.6 0.0 9.7 0.2 
   efficacy 4.0 0.0 7.5 0.1 mass naturalization 17.0 0.0 11.1 0.0 competitiveness 14.1 0.0 11.8 0.2 
   others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 others 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 others 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
   all defensive 22.2 29.6 23.8 18.3 all defensive 40.6 19.6 29.6 18.5 all defensive 19.7 16.2 21.6 23.5 
contest   4.1 5.7 12.8 16.2   6.5 13.1 17.0 19.0   5.2 6.9 12.7 15.5 
total 
  
  100% 100% 100% 100%   100% 100% 100% 100%   100% 100% 100% 100% 
n      726 335 1528 927   675 107 1176 733   462 594 943 1123 
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Table 7.1 gives a more detailed overview of the frames in the media input and in the news 
media of the three campaigns. Compared to Figure 7.1, it adds the distinction between the of-
fensive and defensive use of the frames, and reports the “others” and the “contest” frames. 
The media input corresponds to what was shown in chapter 4 (Table 4.1). Compared to the 
media input, there are few additional differences in the media’s news reporting. First, in the 
case of the asylum law, the media framing is more diverse than the political actors’ input, 
since the “other” thematic frames account for roughly a quarter of the media frames on either 
side, while they make up only one seventh (contra camp) or one fifth (pro camp) of the input 
material produced for the media. The use of this residual type of frame can be interpreted as a 
sign of the independence of the newspaper from the government’s position, since the most 
important quality paper of Switzerland – the NZZ – contributed substantively to this category. 
In the other two campaigns, the media made no special effort with their own or other frames. 
Thus, the media do not show more frame building power in the case of the unfamiliar issue, 
the corporate tax reform. Second, as one might also have expected on the basis of the Ameri-
can and British experience, and as already reported in chapter 6, the media rely more heavily 
on contest frames in their news reporting. However, even in their case, substantive frames 
largely predominate. Thus, we can state that in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns, framing is 
primarily conducted in substantive terms. Third, there is also not a great deal of trespassing 
(=offensive use of the opponents’ frame) in the media, either. If the opponents’ frames are 
used, they are used defensively. 
 
Having established the predominance of substantive framing and having shown the rare use of 
trespassing, we now focus exclusively on the substantive frames, i.e. on the arguments, and 
combine the offensive and defensive use of the substantive frames. Table 7.2 presents the re-
gression results for the three campaigns. On the left-hand side of each table, the media’s fram-
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ing constitutes the dependent variable, on the right-hand side it is the framing by the two 
camps, which constitutes the dependent variables. 
Let us first look at the left-hand side of the tables for the three campaigns, where the 
news media frames are the dependent variable. In the inflation model (absence), the ratios of 
both camps (contra (t-1) and pro (t-1)) are smaller than one, which means that the input of the 
political actor decreases the probability of the frame’s absence in the media. Two of the cor-
responding six effects reach conventional levels of significance, one is significant at the ten 
percent level. In the count model (frequency), the ratios are larger than one. This means that 
the input of the political actors increases the argument frequency in the news media. With two 
exceptions, the effects are significant at the five percent level. One is significant at the ten 
percent level. We will discuss these results in more detail later (Table 7.3). 
As is shown by the right-hand side of the three tables, the reverse does not apply: the framing 
by the media on the previous day (media (t-1)) has a decreasing or no effect on the framing by 
political actors: In the inflation model (absence), the ratios are smaller than one but only the 
ratios of the corporation tax reform are significant at the 5 percent level. Moreover, and more 
importantly, in the count model (frequency), the ratio is smaller than one, which means that if 
a camp has succeeded in getting into the media on a given day, it will reduce its effort to get 
into the media on the following day. With two exceptions, these negative effects are signifi-
cant at the five percent level. In summary, the results of Table 7.2 strongly suggest that the 
frames promoted by the politicians influenced the media frames, whereas the opposite is less 
likely. Thus, we feel comfortable in considering the political actors as the driving force in the 
frame building process and the media input as the crucial communication channel19. 
 
                                                 
19
 I also tested whether the previous day’s political advertisements influenced the absence/presence of news me-
dia frames. I found that there was no effect in all three cases. 
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Table 7.2: Who Is Driving Whom? Results of Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression of Media Framing on Lagged Framing by the Two Camps, 
and Vice Versa: Ratio, Robust Standard Errors and p-Levels 
Asylum 
dependent variable: news media  dependent variable: media input 
news media   robust    contra camp   robust    pro camp   robust   
  ratio s.e. p    ratio s.e. p    ratio s.e. p 
count model      count model       count model      
(frequency)      (frequency)       (frequency)     
media (t-1) 1.021 0.015 0.168  media (t-1) 0.928 0.021 0.001  media (t-1) 0.917 0.036 0.028 
contra input 
(t-1) 
1.032 0.013 0.015 
 
contra input (t-
1) 
0.984 0.009 0.078  contra input (t-
1) 
    
pro input (t-1) 1.066 0.069 0.320 
 pro input (t-1)       pro input (t-1) 1.060 0.055 0.259 
human. trad. 0.955 0.126 0.725  human. trad. 2.173 0.404 0.000  human. trad. 1.668 0.470 0.069 
rule-of-law 0.415 0.048 0.000  rule-of-law 1.554 0.367 0.062  rule-of-law 0.524 0.194 0.081 
abuse 0.904 0.109 0.401  abuse 1.803 0.522 0.042  abuse 1.865 0.360 0.001 
efficacy 0.492 0.065 0.000  efficacy 0.408 0.096 0.000  efficacy 0.941 0.139 0.678 
inflation model        inflation model        inflation model       
(absence)       (absence)       (absence)      
media (t-1) 0.289 0.633 0.050  media (t-1) 0.983 0.033 0.609  media (t-1) 0.999 0.053 0.978 
contra input 
(t-1) 
0.287 1.668 0.454 
 
contra input (t-
1) 
0.943 0.027 0.031  contra input (t-
1) 
     
pro input (t-1) 0.000 2.327 0.000 
 pro input (t-1)       pro input (t-1) 0.984 0.123 0.897 
constant 0.602 0.327 0.065  constant 1.731 0.659 0.009  constant 1.602 0.315 0.000 
n total: 560, n zero obs.: 262  n total: 560, n zero obs.: 501  n total: 560, n zero obs.: 488 
Vuong: z=5.37, Pr>z=0.000  Vuong: z=1.4, Pr>z=0.081  Vuong: z=1.88, Pr>z=0.030 
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Naturalization 
dependent variable: news media  dependent variable: media input 
news media   robust    contra camp   robust    pro camp   robust   
  ratio s.e. p    ratio s.e. p    ratio s.e. p 
count model       count model       count model      
(frequency)       (frequency)       (frequency)      
media (t-1) 1.008 0.012 0.515  media (t-1) 0.961 0.014 0.008  media (t-1) 0.908 0.047 0.061 
contra (t-1) 1.044 0.013 0.001  contra (t-1) 0.987 0.011 0.276  contra (t-1)      
pro (t-1) 1.054 0.034 0.095  pro (t-1)       pro (t-1) 0.865 0.166 0.450 
rule-of-law 3.010 0.656 0.000  rule-of-law 8.010 3.093 0.000  rule-of-law 2.626 0.638 0.000 
people-final-say 2.541 0.495 0.000  people-final-say 3.351 1.084 0.000  people-final-say 7.684 2.299 0.000 
mass naturalization 2.187 0.428 0.000  mass naturalization 3.653 0.877 0.000  mass naturalization 1.804 0.496 0.032 
inflation model        inflation model        inflation model       
(absence)     (absence)     (absence)    
media (t-1) 0.115 0.998 0.032  media (t-1) 0.982 0.021 0.397  media (t-1) 0.631 0.555 0.407 
contra (t-1) 0.003 22.091  0.789  contra (t-1) 0.950 0.080 0.516  contra (t-1)      
pro (t-1) 0.226 0.732 0.042  pro (t-1)       pro (t-1) 0.000 1.338 0.000 
constant 1.774 0.298 0.000  constant 1.712 0.574 0.001  constant 1.865 0.976 0.056 
n total: 364, n zero obs.: 203  n total: 364, n zero obs.: 308  n total: 364, n zero obs.: 343 
Vuong: z = 6.87, Pr>z=0.000  Vuong: z = 2.12, Pr>z=0.017  Vuong: z = 2.13, Pr>z=0.017 
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Corporation Tax 
dependent variable: news media  dependent variable: media input 
news media   robust    contra camp   robust    pro camp   robust   
  ratio s.e. p    Ratio s.e. p    ratio s.e. p 
count model       count model       count model      
(frequency)       (frequency)       (frequency)      
media (t-1) 1.010 0.009 0.271  media (t-1) 0.981 0.009 0.040  media (t-1) 0.981 0.016 0.258 
contra input (t-
1) 
1.095 0.025 0.000 
 contra input (t-1) 0.781 0.066 0.003  contra input (t-1)      
pro input (t-1) 1.083 0.036 0.015 
 pro input (t-1)       pro input (t-1) 0.603 0.061 0.000 
tax equity  4.931 0.981 0.000  tax equity  4.872 2.619 0.003  tax equity  0.815 0.273 0.541 
tax-loss 2.789 0.521 0.000  tax-loss 2.631 1.489 0.087  tax-loss 0.537 0.195 0.088 
SME 3.525 0.635 0.000  SME 0.652 0.410 0.497  SME 3.188 0.468 0.000 
competitiveness 3.816 0.558 0.000  competitiveness 0.986 0.616 0.983  competitiveness 1.467 0.230 0.015 
inflation model        inflation model        inflation model       
(absence)       (absence)       (absence)      
media (t-1) 0.166 0.529 0.001  media (t-1) 0.288 0.455 0.006  media (t-1) 0.932 0.030 0.018 
contra input (t-
1) 
0.712 0.237 0.152 
 contra input (t-1) 0.866 0.275 0.599  contra input (t-1)      
pro input (t-1) 0.891 0.067 0.082 
 pro input (t-1)       pro input (t-1) 0.605 0.683 0.462 
constant 1.044 0.287 0.000  constant 2.102 0.667 0.002  constant 1.734 0.362 0.000 
n total: 445, n zero obs.: 246  n total:445, n zero obs.: 395  n total: 445, n zero obs.: 380 
Vuong: z = 5.92, Pr>z=0.000  Vuong: z = 3.5, Pr>z=0.000  Vuong: z = 2.61, Pr>z=0.000 
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However, in the corporation tax reform, there are hints that it might also have worked the oth-
er way round, i.e. that there is an influence of the media frames on the promoted frames in the 
media input: The two ratios (0.224, 0.934) in the inflation model (absence) on the right-hand 
side of Table 7.2 are significant. In the following, we investigate these two cases of the corpo-
ration tax reform campaign. For the examination, only the smaller counts in the news media 
are relevant since 90 percent of the counts in the news media are smaller than or equal to 11 
(Figure 7.2).  
Figure 7.2: Histogram of the News Media Counts in the Corporation Tax Reform 
 
Figures 7.3 and 7.4 reveal that the frames in the news media probably influenced the media 
input frames by the contra camp, whereas in the case of the pro camp, the influence of the 
news media was not important. The line shows the probabilities of a zero count in the media 
input dependent on the number of frames in the news media. For each frame, a graph is pre-
sented. Figure 7.3 investigates the effect on the frame counts of the contra camp. The graphs 
show that a small number of news media frames bring about a remarkable drop in the proba-
bility of a zero count in the media input. This means that the news media significantly and 
strikingly increases the probability that a frame is used in the media input on the next day. As 
the upper left graph shows, this is most valid for the tax equity frame, where the correspond-
ing probability increases by more than 0.3. As we already know from chapter 5, the Social 
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Democrats reacted to the UBS subprime crises. They claimed that stockholders with control-
ling shares, such as Ospel, who was the president of the board of directors at UBS AG, would 
also benefit from the tax reform (tax equity).  
Figure 7.3: Probability of Zero Counts in the Media Input (t) of the Contra Camp 
Corporation Tax 
 
  
 
Figure 7.4 examines the effect on the promoted frames of the pro camp. There is no similar 
drop. In the case of the pro camp, the predicted decrease in the zero probability is only around 
0.1. In summary, the data support the idea that the promoted frames in the media input influ-
ence the news media frames, whereas the news media influenced the promoted frames only in 
the case of the contra camp in the exceptional case of the corporation tax reform.   
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Figure 7.4: Probability of Zero Counts in the Media Input (t) of the Pro Camp 
Corporation Tax 
  
  
 
In both count and inflation Model, the lagged dependent variable (media (t-1)) controls for 
serial correlation. The significant ratio in the inflation model (absence) is smaller than one, 
which means that the frames in the news media reduce the probability of a zero count on the 
following day. In other words, the media also writes about the campaign independently of the 
explicit input of the two camps. It has established its own routines for how to deal with a di-
rect-democratic campaign. As is shown by the panels in Figure 7.5, which present the daily 
development of the media coverage of the two camps, these routines imply that there is a 
“critical period” of press coverage towards the end of the campaign, when the citizens have 
received their voting material and are doing their voting (mainly by mail). For the asylum 
law, and to a lesser extent also for the tax reform, there is also a first “critical period” at the 
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beginning, when the Swiss media presents the basic issues of the campaign and the contrast-
ing positions of the two camps. Furthermore, external events structure the debate. In the asy-
lum law campaign, summer holidays bring a reduction of media coverage in the middle of the 
campaign (weeks 9–6). In the naturalization initiative, the first 100 days of Eveline Widmer-
Schlumpf in office as a minister clearly structured the campaign. Only when this first 100 
days had passed in the 8th week before the vote did the campaign and media coverage about 
this issue start. In the case of the corporate tax reform, the campaign did not begin until after 
the Christmas break.  
Figure 7.5: The Development of the Campaign on a Weekly Basis – by Camp and Campaign: 
Absolute Counts of Substantive Frames 
Asylum 
 
Naturalization 
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Corporation Tax 
  
 
Power of the Political Actor, Salience of the Frames in the Media Input and the Role of the 
Minister 
Power is expected to be relevant for frame absence/presence because powerful actors have 
preferential access to the media (Danielian and Page 1994). A frame needs powerful actors in 
order not be ignored. Weak political actors can make a great effort and provide many argu-
ments; they still will not get standing in the media because they are weak and their frames 
will remain absent in the debate. Thus, the power of the actor promoting a frame, and not the 
salience of a frame in the media input is crucial for frame absence/presence. Minister status is 
not responsible for frame absence/presence either, because many powerful actors other than 
ministers promote their frames and find standing. We expect that access to the media in di-
rect-democratic campaigns is not restricted to ministers but to powerful actors in general. By 
contrast, the salience of the promoted frame and the involvement of the minister are expected 
to become relevant for the frequency with which a frame appears in the media. First, in line 
with the mirror approach, the media are assumed to report the frames proportionally to the 
degree to which they are promoted. The more a frame is promoted, i.e. the more salient it is in 
the media input, the more the media will report it the next day – under the condition that a 
powerful actor is promoting it. In addition, such prominent actors as the minister responsible 
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for the issue can be expected to get disproportionately high standing. They have an advantage 
that does not hold for powerful actors in general (for a discussion of which key factors belong 
to which part of the model see Hänggli 2011a).  
 We test the same model for news media framing as before (the left hand side of the 
previous tables), but, given my hypotheses, we now use the daily power of the two sides (and 
no longer their media input) for the explanation of their absence/presence in the media in the 
inflation model (but not for frame frequency in the count model), and we add a dummy indi-
cator for the presence of the minister responsible for the campaign for the explanation of 
frame frequency. The sum of daily power corresponds to the total amount of power of the ac-
tors’ who promote a given camp on a certain day. For example, two actors of the pro camp 
hold a media conference together while no other actor of their camp is active on this day. Ac-
tor A is a powerful actor who scores 86 on the power measure, whereas actor B reaches only a 
score of 18. Together, they arrive at 104 points, the sum of daily power of the pro camp. Al-
ternatively, one could have used the mean or median of the power of the actors involved. The 
results show little change if we operationalize power differently.  
 The results are presented in Table 7.3. First, let us look at the lower part of Table 7.3 
(Inflation Model). The lagged dependent variable (media (t-1)) controls for serial correlation 
and for continuing frame attention in the dependent variable. All power ratios are smaller than 
one. This means that power reduces the probability that a frame is absent in the news media. 
In other words, the greater the power of the actors presenting the arguments of a given camp 
on a given day, the higher the chance that their argument will be covered in the media on the 
next day. However, the corresponding ratios are not always significant. Thus, in the asylum 
law campaign, power has no significant impact on frame presence or absence in the media. 
This result meets my expectation that in familiar issues, access to the public debate is less re-
stricted to powerful actors as it is in less familiar cases.  
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Table 7.3: Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial Regression of Media Framing: Ratios, Robust Standard Errors and p-Levels 
Asylum  robust    Naturalization   robust    Corporation Tax  robust  
  ratio s.e. p     ratio s.e. p     ratio s.e. p 
count model 
(frequency)       
count model 
(frequency)      
 
count model 
(frequency)      
media (t-1) 1.019 0.018 0.294  media (t-1) 1.008 0.013 0.528  media (t-1) 1.007 0.008 0.380 
contra input (t-1) 1.033 0.014 0.015  contra (t-1) 1.032 0.006 0.000  contra input (t-1) 1.082 0.017 0.000 
pro input (t-1) 1.010 0.097 0.916  pro (t-1) 1.059 0.038 0.074  pro input (t-1) 1.059 0.025 0.015 
minister (t-1) 2.043 1.062 0.169  minister (t-1) 3.038 0.747 0.005  minister (t-1) 4.290 1.345 0.000 
human. trad. 0.956 0.129 0.737  rule-of-law 3.572 0.690 0.000  tax equity  5.102 1.017 0.000 
rule-of-law 0.401 0.066 0.000        tax loss 2.802 0.561 0.000 
abuse 0.931 0.114 0.563  people-final-say 2.928 0.496 0.000  SME 3.780 0.641 0.000 
efficacy 0.477 0.065 0.000  mass naturalization 2.421 0.412 0.000  competitiveness 3.875 0.596 0.000 
inflation model 
(absence)        
inflation model 
(absence)       
 
inflation model 
(absence)       
media (t-1) 0.308 0.905 0.193  media (t-1) 0.106 0.642 0.002  media (t-1) 0.183 0.614 0.006 
power contra (t-1) 0.851 0.235 0.490  power contra (t-1) 0.000 0.832 0.004  power contra (t-1) 0.863 0.087 0.092 
power pro (t-1) 0.953 0.161 0.763  power pro  (t-1) 0.944 0.015 0.118  power pro (t-1) 0.980 0.013 0.120 
constant 0.749 0.356 0.035  constant 1.971 0.335 0.000  constant 0.980 0.310 0.000 
n total: 560, n zero obs.: 262  n total: 364, n zero obs.: 203  n total: 445, n zero obs.: 246 
Vuong: z=5.70, Pr>z=0.000  Vuong: z=6.14, Pr>z=0.000  Vuong: z=6.49, Pr>z=0.000 
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In the naturalization initiative, the power of the contra camp is highly significant while 
the power of the pro camp is not. There are two reasons for the insignificance: First of all, on-
ly two actors were involved on the pro side. One of them produced 75 percent of all frames, 
which means that there is almost no variation in the power variable. In addition, the pro camp 
only promoted few arguments, i.e. 94 percent of the counts are zero counts, because for most 
of the time, no frame was promoted. The small number of cases reduces the significance. In 
the corporate tax reform, the effects of power are also somewhat limited: powerful actors of 
the pro camp could not significantly decrease the absence of their frames, whereas power was 
significant for the contra camp at the 0.10-level only. It is surprising that the power of the pro 
camp is not more significant, because the most powerful and resource-rich interest group, 
economiesuisse, was the leading house of the pro-committee and was heavily involved in this 
campaign. There are three reasons which may explain this unexpected finding. First, econo-
miesuisse was evaluated as the most powerful actor in the campaign. It gave the money, 
pulled the strings and led the campaign. However, as we have already observed, it preferred to 
stay in the background and turn the spotlight onto the political parties with whom it formed a 
coalition. Its influence on the media is, therefore, underestimated because it was mainly an in-
direct one, via its political party allies. The model, however, does not account for indirect ef-
fects. If we re-estimate the model and try to take this indirect influence into account by as-
signing the power value of economiesuisse to the allied political parties or by lumping eco-
nomiesuisse and its party allies together to form one single actors, the corresponding effect 
becomes significant at the 0.10 level. Second, economiesuisse and the ad hoc pro committee 
were no longer proactive with press releases and press conferences in the last six weeks. In 
this last phase, they had planned to concentrate on political advertisements. Moreover, with its 
three reactions to the press conferences of the Social Democrats, the ad hoc committee could 
not garner any attention. 
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Third, the argumentation of the Social Democrats – who were in charge of the contra-
committee during the campaign – resonated well with external events happening at the same 
time (chapter 5). The Social Democrats mainly argued that the tax cuts were an unfair privi-
lege for the well-off and went against the principle of fair taxation (tax equity). Towards the 
end of the campaign, as mentioned above, they linked their argumentation to the subprime 
crisis of the UBS and to its president of the board, Marcel Ospel, by claiming that such rich 
managers as Mr. Ospel would primarily benefit from the corporate tax reform. These events 
possibly gave support to the tax equity frame and, ultimately, may have convinced undecided 
voters and helped to explain why the vote unexpectedly (see chapter 2) became so close. This 
case does not support the idea that power is more important in complex issues, indicating the 
need for further research.  
 Next, let us look at the upper part of Table 7.3, the Count Model (frequency). Overall, 
the lagged number of promoted frames and the lagged minister dummy significantly increase 
the daily frequency of the frame in the news media. The results are quite robust (not shown 
here). There is variation between the camps with regard to the specific campaigns. In the asy-
lum law, the contra camp significantly influenced the daily frequency of the news media 
frames, while the pro camp remained without influence. This makes sense for several reasons. 
First, the economic interest groups remained more or less uninvolved. Second, the centre par-
ties, which belonged to the pro camp, led a half-hearted campaign and preferred to stay invis-
ible, whereas the right-wing party was more active with political advertisements (chapter 5). 
Third, the pro camp was active indirectly through the responsible minister, who had been a 
member of the right-wing party. The minister officially wanted to keep a low-profile cam-
paign. He refused, for instance, to participate in the most important TV debate on Swiss Ger-
man television. The influence of the minister is probably underestimated in this campaign be-
cause he was very active unofficially (not included in media input). He gave several speeches 
at public meetings of the right-wing party. Since these speeches were unofficial we were un-
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able to include them in our analysis and they are neither part of the minister dummy nor part 
of the pro camp indicator. In the naturalization initiative, the number of promoted frames by 
the contra camp was significant, whereas the promoted frames of the pro camp is significant 
only at the 0.10 level. The pro camp invested a lot of money in political advertisements (chap-
ter 5) and was less active with media input. Finally, the minister dummy is also significant at 
the 0.05 level in this campaign. In the corporate tax reform, the number of promoted frames 
of both camps and the minister dummy significantly increase the frequency of the news media 
frames on the next day. The regression results support the salience and the multiplication hy-
pothesis, which state that the number of promoted frames is crucial and the input by the mi-
nister is amplified by the news media. The results suggest that the minister plays a particularly 
important role in complex issues (most significant). 
 
The multiplication effect of the minister’s frame is explored in Table 7.4. It is compared with 
the multiplication effect of the frames of the other actor types of both camps. The table shows 
the average number of arguments in the news media as a function of the input by different ac-
tor types on both sides on the previous day. For instance, in the asylum law campaign, the pro 
camp was reported 6.2 (top left number) times with the humanitarian tradition frame when the 
minister had promoted this frame on the previous day. By contrast, the media offered the 
same frame only 1.5 times when the political parties of the pro camp used it on the previous 
day or 2.5 times when the citizens’ interest groups of the pro camp did the same. When none 
of the actor types of this camp promoted the frame the day before, the media reported this 
frame 1.1 times. Compared to other actor types, Table 7.4 reveals that the minister 
(=authorities) meets with the largest response in the asylum law and in the corporation tax 
reform20. The multiplication effect of the minister is larger in the corporation tax reform than 
                                                 
20
 In contrast to Table 7.3, it was possible to include the informal speeches of the minister in the asylum law. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the minister is so important.  
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in the asylum law. Both results are in line with the results of Table 7.3. They give support to 
the ideas that the media multiply the frames used by the minister the most and that the minis-
ter is especially influential in complex issues. Compared to the other actor types, the input of 
the minister was less important in the naturalization initiative. In this campaign, all other actor 
types of the contra camp reached a higher multiplication effect than the minister. Possibly, the 
minister is less important in initiatives than in referenda since the initiatives occur at the be-
ginning of the decision-making process and the government and its administration are unin-
volved in the policy proposal. Since we did not include other actor types in Table 7.3, we 
cannot compare the influence of different actor types based on the count model. Nevertheless, 
the power ratio of the contra camp in the inflation model indicates the same result: It is close 
to zero which means that – though it is significant – it has almost no effect.  
 
Compared to the number of arguments found in the media input and in the news media 
in Table 7.1, the small multiplication effects of the pro camp in the naturalization initiative is 
surprising. We find more than 6 times as many arguments in the news media than in the me-
dia input (Table 7.1). This is more than in all other cases and, accordingly, the multiplication 
effect should have been highest in this case. More detailed analyses reveal four reasons for 
this finding: First, the initiative text often only consists of a sentence or two. It is sufficiently 
short that the media referred to it together with a short statement from the launching political 
actor without any media input from the initiator. Second, the hype surrounding the conflict 
between Blocher, the populist right-wing party (SVP) and Widmer-Schlumpf also provided 
the pro camp with media attention. New developments in the conflict were eagerly awaited by 
the journalists and gave the pro camp opportunities to speak about the initiative in the inter-
views. In addition, there was the most important TV debate (Arena) in which Blocher and 
Widmer-Schlumpf participated and which was covered and discussed by the news media very 
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prominently. Fourth, the pro camp also garnered media attention with its aggressive poster, 
which is not part of the media input. According to the Swiss Commission against Racism, it 
was even a racist poster.  
Table 7.4: The Media Frames, With Input by the Different Actor Types on Either Side: Average 
Number of Frames per Day 
 
core argument 
contra 
2nd argument 
contra 
core argument 
pro 
2nd argument 
pro 
 
    
 Asylum human. trad. rule-of-law abuse efficacy 
pro         
authorities 6.2 0.7 8.3 3.5 
pol.parties 1.5 0.3 6.5 2.4 
citizens' int. groups 2.5 - 5.5 - 
without input 1.1 0.5 1.9 1.0 
contra 
       
ad hoc committees 10.0 1.3 6.6 3.3 
citizens' int. groups 6.0 1.5 3.7 4.0 
econ. int. groups 5.0 1.5 4.0 - 
pol. parties 1.7 1.5 2.0 0.7 
without input 4.5 1.4 2.4 1.1 
 
        
Naturalization rule-of-law  people final say mass 
naturalization 
pro     
pol. parties 3.3  4.3 4.1 
ad hoc committees 3.0  2.0 - 
without input 1.9  3.3 2.4 
contra     
pol. parties 18.6  11.3 9.7 
econ. int. groups 18.8  8.5 5.5 
citizens' int. groups 16.2  7.2 4.8 
authorities 14.9  6.4 5.1 
without input 5.0   1.9 1.2 
 
Corporation Tax tax equity tax loss SME competitiveness 
pro         
authorities 8.3 7.0 12.3 11.8 
econ. int. groups 6.7 1.0 10.4 7.2 
pol. parties 6.8 6.0 8.8 5.7 
without input 1.4 0.9 2.9 2.8 
contra 
        
pol. parties 14.4 3.2 3.0 1.3 
econ. int. groups 12.5 10.7 3.0 1.4 
citizens' int. groups 4.5 2.0 - 1.4 
without input 4.5 1.4 1.0 1.1 
Note: In the asylum law campaign, the economic interest groups of the pro camp are not shown because they 
were not very active with media input. The same is true for the ad hoc committee of the contra camp in the 
naturalization initiative.  
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Table 7.5 shows the predicted change in the news media counts depending on a change from 
the minimum to the maximum value in the key factors. We can see that the counts are most 
sensitive to the media input of the two camps and the minister’s presence, whereas the pre-
dicted change based on a change of power is relatively small.  
Table 7.5: Predicted Change in the News Media Counts 
Asylum Naturalization Corporation Tax change in … 
3 7 6 power contra (t-1) 
1 0 1 power pro (t-1) 
29 83 65 contra input (t-1)  
1 9 30 pro input (t-1)  
6 16 19 minister (t-1) 
7 668 148 
cumulative effect: minister (t-1)  
+ contra input (t-1) / pro input (t-1) 
Note: The predicted change is based on a change in the key factors from the minimal to the maximal value. The 
remaining variables were set at the mean or at zero (minister (t-1)), and the main frame of the respective camp 
was used. 
Conclusion 
The direct-democratic campaigns in Switzerland are a contest of thematic framing, a clash of 
arguments which, in the final analysis, allows the voters to evaluate the merits of alternative 
ways of framing an issue. Just as it is argued by Sniderman and Theriault (2004: 158), in real-
life politics, “opposing camps campaign on behalf of competing ways of understanding what 
is at issue”. My analysis confirms that the input of the political actors plays a decisive role in 
Swiss direct-democratic campaigns. It is the political actors who introduce the most important 
frames into the public discourse.  
 With regard to the “Substantive Emphasis Choice”, we find that the political actors 
tend to emphasize their own frames and that the framing input of the political actors was deci-
sive (channel hypothesis). The media tended to respect frame ownership and reported accor-
dingly. With regard to the “Oppositional Emphasis Choice”, we can summarize that while the 
political actors did indeed focus predominantly on their own frames, they did not do so exclu-
sively, but referred to their adversaries’ frames as well. They did so mainly in a defensive 
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way, however, relying more on counter-framing than on trespassing. The journalists also re-
ported both camps with their adversaries’ frames, and attributed a slightly more offensive 
stance to both camps. With regard to the “Contest Emphasis Choice”, we saw that the political 
actors mainly focused on substance, i.e. they mainly relied on substantive framing. The subs-
tantive frames also dominated in the media. However, the journalists gave more emphasis to 
conflicts than the political actors.  
 The results support also the salience, power bias and multiplication hypotheses. With 
regard to the daily frame absence/presence (Inflation Model), the campaign-specific power of 
a political actor is important, whereas the number of promoted frames and the minister play 
an influential role for the daily frame frequency (count model). It can be shown that power 
was not important in the case of the familiar issue (asylum law), but further research is needed 
to determine the relative importance of power in complex issues. The minister’s influence is 
highest in the case of the complex issue (corporate tax). Finally, external events can moderate 
the influence of frame building. 
The question is what the results imply for the quality of direct-democratic debates and for the 
question of the manipulability of the outcome of direct-democratic votes. We find that the mi-
nister (=Federal Councilor) plays an important role. The Swiss political elites are somewhat 
uneasy with this important role of the authorities in direct-democratic campaigns (Kriesi 
2009): According to an informal, traditional conception, the minister is expected to exercise 
his or her campaigning role with a certain restraint. While entitled to provide the voters with a 
balanced diet of information, the authorities should leave the opinion formation in the general 
public primarily to civil society, the social and political forces of the country. This low-key 
approach of government is not confirmed in the study at hand. We find that the minister is 
very influential in the frame building process in direct-democratic campaigns. The view that 
the government’s task is to govern would be more adequate. In a direct-democratic campaign, 
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this means that the government is responsible for the quality of the debate. The best way to 
guarantee the quality of direct-democratic campaigns is not to prevent the government from 
defending its position, but to guarantee that the competition of frames is not suppressed by the 
preponderance of any actor during the campaign – be it the government or some actor from 
civil society.  
The results give rise to optimism with regard to the question of manipulability of the 
outcome. Even though power of the political actors is helpful for being present with a frame, 
it does not help in also being predominant with it. In addition, three or four rival frames with 
the respective counter-frames were supplied by the political actors and found in the media in 
all three campaigns. Thus, the voters can evaluate the merits of three or four alternative ways 
of framing an issue and there is no single dominant perspective. Finally, even though the cor-
porate tax reform campaign has been the most one-sidedly dominant campaign in terms of fi-
nancial resources of all campaigns since the beginning of the 1980s, economiesuisse (the 
leading house of the pro-side in this campaign) was not able to dominate with its frame in the 
public debate, despite all of its money. 

  
 
 
 
 
 
8 Framing Effects 
 
In order to gauge the effects of the frames in communication on the frames in thought, I in-
vestigate first the strength of frames. The extent to which a frame influences other elites is de-
fined as the strength of a frame in communication, whereas the strength of a frame in thought 
is measured through the frame relevance for the vote decision. The question that arises is 
whether the same frames are strong in both communication and in thought. Even more impor-
tant is the question of whether this relationship is causal. Do the strong frames in communica-
tion cause the frames in thought to become strong? The purpose of this chapter is to answer 
these questions. Finally, I will look at the relative importance of the frames in thought for the 
vote decision in comparison to the partisan heuristic. I will be able to show that the same 
frames are strong in both communication and in thought. In the asylum law and in the corpo-
ration tax reform, the core frames in communication even caused the frames in thought to be-
come stronger over time (framing effect). Furthermore, frames in thought are also important 
when controlling for the partisan-based path of opinion formation. 
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Strength of Frames in Communication 
I will begin by introducing a measure for the strength of frames in communication. This is re-
levant for several reasons. First, the measure provides a tool for addressing the strength of 
frames resulting from frame building. We know from chapter 1 that the strategic actors search 
for a frame that they believe has the capacity to become a strong substantive frame. So far, 
however, I have not addressed this concept. Second, an understanding about the strength of 
frames in communication can possibly help to make experiments about framing effects more 
realistic. If we are aware of the strength of frames in communication in the real world, we can 
employ the same strength in experiments. Third, such a measure might also contribute to 
identify the factors that make a frame in thought strong (Chong and Druckman 2007c: 116). It 
appears evident that the strength of frames in communication is linked to the strength of 
frames in thought. However, as long as we do not know the strength of a frame in communi-
cation, it is also impossible to gauge the extent to which frames in communication and frames 
in thought are linked. 
 As introduced in chapter 1, a frame in communication is “the key consideration em-
phasized in a speech act” (Chong and Druckman 2007c: 106). It “organizes everyday reality” 
(Tuchman 1978: 193) by providing “meaning to an unfolding strip of events” (Gamson and 
Modigliani 1987: 143, 1989). Media frames constitute particular frames in communication 
that are characterized by the fact that the information is provided by the media. Frames in 
communication are more comprehensive; they also include information presented by cam-
paigners or politicians, i.e. the frames promoted in media input. Accordingly, I have defined a 
strong frame in communication as a frame that provokes a defensive reaction by the oppo-
nents and/or that resonates in the media (chapter 1). This conceptualization of strength is 
based on Koopmans’ idea that resonant or provocative messages travel further (Koopmans 
2004: 374).  
 Framing Effects 
 
175
 Two characteristics of frames in communication have proved to be particularly impor-
tant in influencing strength: credibility of source and cultural congruence of frame content 
(Chong and Druckman 2007b: 100). As far as credibility of the source is concerned, the 
theory of issue ownership states that the advantage of certain actors on a given issue arises 
from the reputations they have developed for effective issue-specific policy making, which is 
created by the accumulated historical evidence of the actors’ activities related to the issues in 
question. As Scammel (1999: 729) observes: “Reputation, based on record and credible prom-
ises, is the only thing of substance that a party can promote to potential voters”. With respect 
to congruence with central cultural themes, Entman (2004: 14) maintains that the most inhe-
rently powerful frames are those that are “fully congruent with schemas habitually used by 
most members of society”. Moreover, Entman (2004) claims that ambiguous contested mat-
ters are more difficult to frame, and that frames incongruent with dominant schemas are 
blocked from spreading by common culture. Gamson (1992: 135) and Wolfsfeld (1997: 32) 
make similar points in discussing the concept of “cultural resonance”. Frames that employ 
more culturally resonant terms have a greater potential for influence. Snow and Benford 
(1988: 210) refer to the concept of “narrative fidelity”. Some frames, they write, “resonate 
with cultural narrations, that is, with stories, myths, and folk tales that are part and parcel of 
one’s cultural heritage”. Thus, cultural congruence, or narrative fidelity, increase the appeals 
of a frame by making them appear natural and familiar. Furthermore, the strength of frames in 
communication might vary depending on the issue. I suggest that the complexity of an issue 
might weaken a frame, since complexity handicaps campaign dialogue. Political actors might 
have to explain more what the issue at stake is about before they can discuss each other’s 
frames. Finally, the numbers of main frames discussed per issue probably also reduces the 
strength of the frames in communication. 
 
Chapter 8 
 
176
Strength of Frames in Thought 
Traditionally, a strong frame has been applied to frames in thought and has been defined as a 
frame that is persuasive or applicable (Druckman 2009: 25). “Strong frames are those that 
emerge from public discussion as the best rationales for contending positions on the issue” 
(Chong and Druckman 2007c: 116). Frames in thought, also called individual frames, are “in-
ternal structures of the mind” (Kinder and Sanders 1990: 74). A person who reads a media 
frame might add some personal experience, forge links that are not explicitly made in the text 
or use another individual cognitive device to make sense of the political news. In other words, 
a frame in thought is the individual’s cognitive understanding of a given situation (Goffman 
1974). The precondition for a frame in thought to become strong (=applicable) is that it is ac-
cessible (= one is exposed to this frame) and available (=understandable) (Druckman 2009). 
Accessibility implies conscious information processing.  
Ultimately, frame building is only relevant when frames evolving from the construc-
tion, promotion and mediation processes have an impact on opinion formation. In direct-
democratic campaigns, it is probable that the strong frames in communication achieve the 
precondition for strong frames in thought: The frames of direct-democratic campaigns are ex-
pected to be accessible because they are highly present in the media. They are also expected 
to be available since they are strategically chosen by the campaigners. The campaigners are 
well experienced: They typically have a good understanding of the citizen’s cognitive capaci-
ty and choose their frames accordingly. In addition, the media are not interested in transport-
ing messages which cannot be understood by their readers. I also suggest that they do not 
merely reach the precondition of a strong frame in thought, but really become applicable. My 
first hypothesis (H1) is as follows: In direct-democratic campaigns, strong frames in commu-
nication are also strong frames in thought. 
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Framing Effects  
Most importantly, I wish to ascertain whether the link between frames in communication and 
in thought is causal. When a frame in communication affects an individual’s frame in thought, 
i.e. their cognitive understanding of a given situation and/or their opinion, it is called a fram-
ing effect (Druckman 2001). In direct-democratic campaigns, I expect the frames in commu-
nication to have a causal effect on the frames in thought (H2). The campaigns allow causal in-
ferences to be drawn about direct-democratic campaign effects because they imply the inten-
sification of flow in frame communication. A number of studies identify moderator variables 
of framing effects such as frame competition, predispositions, citizen deliberation, political 
information, and source credibility (Druckman 2001: 241). The first two factors seem to be 
the most relevant ones: First, framing competition is most relevant because the public debate 
among political elites is the “key engine driving the citizens’ voting choices” (Kriesi 2005: 
202). Second, the predispositions are conceived as the “clearest limit on framing effects” 
(Chong and Druckman 2007c: 111). In the rest of this chapter, I will thus concentrate on 
these.  
I will treat these moderating factors as control variables because I am interested in the 
overall framing effect, when controlling for these factors. In other words, all variables have a 
direct effect on the vote intention. I am particularly interested in the importance of the frame-
based path in comparison to the partisan-based path. Such a comparison is possible only if 
both paths are modeled as independent variables and used simultaneously. First, I will control 
for competition between different frames. Sniderman and Theriault (2004) find that people 
exposed to several frames are less prone to a framing effect (see also Chong and Druckman 
2007b). Second, predispositions are also controlled for in the model. Voters might compare 
the information contained in a frame with their own predispositions and reject frames which 
contradict their predispositions (e.g. Shen and Edwards 2005). There are general and issue-
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specific predispositions. According to the dual-process theories in social psychology (Chaiken 
and Trop 1999, Eagly and Chaiken 1993), the general predisposition, i.e. the partisan prefe-
rence, is very important. This approach distinguishes between two paths of individual opinion 
formation process: the frame-based (=systematic) path and the heuristic path. The main dis-
tinction between the two is based on the role played by frames. In systematic opinion forma-
tion, frames are important for the voting decision. It also entails conscious thinking and per-
sonal involvement (i.e. motivation and ability), increasing the usage of the frame-based path 
(Druckman and Nelson 2003, Slothuus 2008). Empirical tests of the impact of frame-based 
reasoning on the voters’ decision are scarce, although Kriesi’s study (2005) is ground-
breaking in this regard. His results show that frame-based voting is reinforced by two key 
campaign characteristics – intense campaigns preceding the vote and familiar projects. Intense 
campaigns increase frame-based voting because they reduce information hurdles for the vot-
ers (accessibility) and motivate voters to assess conflicting arguments (i.e. assess their appli-
cability) (see Chong and Druckman 2007b). Familiarity of an issue increases the use of the 
frame-based path because it makes arguments easier to comprehend (availability). A framing 
effect takes this frame-based path.  
In contrast to the frame-based path of opinion formation, heuristic opinion formation 
is based on heuristic shortcuts. Partisan heuristic is a very important heuristic shortcut in di-
rect-democratic campaigns (Kriesi 2005: 168). It means that voters follow the recommenda-
tion made by the partisan elites without necessarily paying attention to frames; it is their parti-
san preference which influences their voting choice (e.g. Slothuus forthcoming). Indeed, vot-
ers might even change their voting position and bring it in line with their favorite party’s posi-
tion in order to be consistent. Several terms are used to describe this behavior, such as rationa-
lization (Jacoby 1988), projection (Iyengar and Kinder 1987), persuasion (Brody and Page 
1972), and issue opinion change (Lenz 2009). In all of these cases, the heuristic path domi-
nates the frame-based (=systematic) path. Kriesi (2005: 222) claims that in direct-democratic 
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campaigns, the frame-based path is more important than the heuristic path. In accordance with 
his findings, I expect the frame-based path to be important in direct-democratic votes, even 
when controlling for and in comparison to the partisan-based path (H3).  
Besides the general predisposition, there is the issue-specific predisposition (issue-
specific value, attitude or policy core belief). This predisposition is linked to the substantive 
content of the specific choice at hand such as, for instance, the xenophobic predisposition in 
immigration issues. Typically, partisan and issue-specific orientations tend to be consistently 
aligned in the individual’s mind, but this need not always be the case. To the extent that vot-
ers are aware of a mismatch between their partisan and their issue-specific orientations, they 
are likely to be ambivalent with respect to their voting choice (Alvarez and Brehm 1995, 
2002, Rudolph 2005, Steenbergen and Brewer 2004, Selb et al. 2009, Kriesi 2010b). In this 
case, the voter has some grounds to favor the policy and other grounds to oppose it. As Steen-
bergen and Brewer (2004) point out, most people probably do not care about conflicting pre-
dispositions, until they realize that they imply different meanings for their position on a par-
ticular policy. Campaigns, being rich in information, are likely to draw people’s attention to 
such conflicting predispositions, and open the possibility for exploiting them. Thus, it is im-
portant to control not only for predispositions but also for ambivalence. Since I generally ex-
pect different effects for the initially undecided voters (Kriesi 2010b), I will also include con-
trol variables for these voters. 
In the following, I will discuss methods and then investigate the strength of the frames 
in communication and in thought. I will first present the results for strength of frames in 
communication. Second, I will compare my measure of strength of frames in communication 
with the evaluation by the campaigners. Third, I shall compare it to the commonly used 
measure of a strong frame, i.e. the strength of frames in thought. Fourth, I will investigate the 
extent to which the strength of frames in thought increase over time (framing effect). In order 
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to gauge the strength of frames and the framing effects, I will control for competition among 
the frames, partisan orientation (i.e. the voters’ general predisposition), issue-specific orienta-
tion (i.e. the voters’ predisposition linked to the substantive content of the specific choice at 
hand), ambivalence and indecision. Fifth, I will explore the relative importance of the frame-
based (=systematic) path of opinion formation process in comparison to the partisan-based 
(=heuristic) path. 
 
Operationalization and Methods 
The strength of the frames in communication is operationalized by the opponents’ defensive 
reactions with respect to a given frame, i.e. by the shares of the opponents’ counterarguments, 
averaged across the frames in the media input and the media frames (Hänggli and Kriesi 
2010). This means that trespassing (= offensive use of opponents’ substantive frames) is not 
part of my measure of strength. I believe that trespassing is an attempt to “steal” the frame of 
the opponent by using the same argument and taking the same position as one’s adversary. I 
consider that a frame which can be stolen is not a strong frame. To provide an example for the 
calculation: The pro camp counter-framed (=defensive use of the argument) the humanitarian 
tradition frame with a share of 20.3 in the media input and attained a news media share of 
12.6 percent with it (Table 7.1). The average of the two numbers is 16.5 percent, i.e. the 
strength of this frame. I take the average because it is more intuitive. In such a way, the max-
imum is 100 percent, which would indicate that the actor defensively speaks only about his or 
her opponents’ frame. The minimum is 0 percent. 
Empirically, the strength of frames in thought is usually established by asking individ-
uals to rate the persuasiveness of various frames in communication, on a particular issue. 
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Since this measure is not at my disposal, I will use the respondents’ position21 on the different 
frames and measure the impact the position has on the voting choice. The stronger the corres-
ponding effect, the more important the frame, i.e. the stronger the corresponding frame in 
thought. I will speak of a framing effect if there is a significant increase in the strength of a 
frame in thought over time. Thus, the strength of frames in thought is measured at a certain 
point in time, whereas the framing effect refers to the significant increase over time. 
The variable to be explained in the models corresponds to the vote intention prior to 
the vote and to the vote choice after the vote. Vote choice and vote intention will not be dis-
tinguished from one another in the following. This variable distinguishes the supporters of the 
propositions (coded as 1) from both their opponents and the undecided voters (coded as 0)22. 
For the group of the initially undecided voters, a dummy variable is introduced that takes into 
account the effects attributable to this group. It takes the value of 1 for those who were unde-
cided at the beginning of the campaign, and 0 otherwise. The voting choice will be estimated 
based on the position of the different frames, controlling for frame competition, partisan and 
issue preference, ambivalence, and indecision. Frame competition is controlled for by using 
different frames at one and the same time. The model makes full use of the panel structure of 
the data.  
Besides the effects of the frames, there are three control variables in the model: one 
each for the two key predispositions and one for ambivalence. It is important to note that the 
two predispositions were measured only once, at the beginning of the campaign. Following 
Tillie (1995) and Van der Eijk et al. (2006), the partisan predispositions are operationalized 
on the basis of propensity scores, i.e. of a set of questions asking the respondents to indicate 
                                                 
21
 The specific questionnaire item reads as follows (for the humanitarian tradition frame, for example): “On a 
scale from 0 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree), how much do you agree with the argument: The hu-
manitarian tradition must be maintained?” 
22
 For the vote intentions, the specific questionnaire item reads as follows: “If there were a ballot tomorrow, 
would you be strongly in favor, rather in favor, rather against or strongly against the toughening of the asylum 
law?” Being (strongly or rather) in favor of the proposition is coded as 1, and being undecided or (rather or 
strongly) against as 0. For the reported vote, the questionnaire item reads: “How did you vote? Did you agree 
with or reject the asylum law?” Again, agreement is coded as 1 and non-decision and rejection as 0. 
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how likely it is that they will ever vote for each of the five major Swiss parties. The responses 
range from “will never vote for this party” (score 0) to “will certainly vote for this party at 
some time in the future” (score 10). Based on this information, both parties and voters were 
mapped onto a single latent continuum using a non-parametric multiple unidimensional un-
folding technique (see Coombs 1964, Van Schuur 1993). Using voters’ preference orderings 
among parties, non-parametric unfolding models rank both parties and voters on a latent di-
mension.23 Subsequently, the party ordering can be tested against the null hypothesis that the 
parties are not represented along the latent scale in terms of their rank in the unfoldable order. 
The unfolding model unveils a rank ordering of the five parties from left to right, which 
matches conventional agreement (GPS, SPS, CVP, FDP, and SVP) and corresponds to the as-
sumption of unidimensionality for all three campaigns. 
The measure for the issue-specific predisposition depends on the type of proposition. 
Xenophobia, the issue-specific predispositions for the asylum and naturalization campaigns, is 
measured by a set of questions about the perception of threats caused by foreigners.24 For the 
corporation tax, the issue-specific predisposition score is intended to measure the individual’s 
stakes in the market economy25. The ambivalence measure is the product of a respondent’s 
score on the partisan predisposition scale and the negatively signed issue-specific predisposi-
                                                 
23
 Respondents who do not attribute a utility higher than five to any of the six parties, plus the (very few) res-
pondents who attribute equal preferences to all of the parties, are considered not to have any particular partisan 
predisposition and, accordingly, are dropped from the analysis. I have used MUDFOLD 4.0 for my analysis (see 
van Schuur and Post, 1998).  
24
 The five statements concerned individual safety threat (“I am afraid of increasing violence and vandalism in 
my neighborhood by foreigners”), individual economic threat (“I am afraid that my economic prospects will get 
worse because of foreigners”), collective safety threat (“I am afraid of increasing violence and vandalism in 
Swiss society by foreigners”), collective cultural threat (“These days, I am afraid that the Swiss culture is threat-
ened by foreigners”), and collective economic threat (“I am afraid that the economic prospects of Swiss society 
will get worse because of foreigners”). With regard to partisan predispositions, these questions were only asked 
once, at the beginning of the campaign, since my aim is to determine the extent to which voters converge on 
their pre-campaign issue-specific predispositions. 
25
 The questions were part of a battery that asked for the kind of country the respondents preferred. Each item 
asked the recipient to choose between a polar contrast: “Please tell me what kind of Switzerland you prefer: a 
Switzerland... a) …with more state interventions in the economy, or with more market competition; b) ... that 
places more emphasis on solidarity, or on individual responsibility; c)... with large income differences, or small 
income differences?” Each item was measured on a five-point scale, ranging from strong agreement with the first 
part to strong agreement with the second part of the item. 
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tion scale26. A more detailed discussion of predispositions, ambivalence and indecision can be 
found in Kriesi (2010b). I build on his model by adding the framing coefficients (β4 and β5, 
see below), which refer to the effects of the frames on the vote at the different points in time.  
Since I have a binary dependent variable and the responses of a voter in a panel are not 
independent of each other (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005: 247), I use a random intercept 
probit model, which takes the following form: 
voteij = (α + ui) + β1ipi +β2ppi +β3ambi + β4fci+β5fpi +∑j (αj+β6jfci+β7jfpi )+∑j (αj+β8jipi 
+β9jppi +β10jambi) +β11uni +∑j uni*(β12jipi +β13jppi +β14jambi) + vi, 
 
where “vote” is a dichotomous indicator, either the vote intention or vote at time t, “ip” is the 
respondent’s issue-specific predisposition, “pp” his or her partisan predisposition, “amb” 
stands for ambivalence, “fc” the respondent’s position on the contra frames (one or two 
frames), “fp” the respondent’s position on the pro frames (two frames), and “un” for unde-
cided. The index j refers to later time points in the campaign – the midpoint (only in the case 
of the asylum law) and the end of the campaign and accounts for additional effects to the 
overall effect. The index i refers to respondent i. 
 
Results 
Strength of Frames in Communication 
The first part of the analysis examines the strength of frames in communication in the three 
campaigns. It is presented in Table 8.1. As this measure shows, in the asylum law campaign, 
the “humanitarian tradition” frame, which was the most important frame of the contra camp, 
turns out to have been more or less equally strong as the core frame of the pro camp – the 
“abuse” frame. Both frames were counter-attacked in one in six arguments. The other frames 
                                                 
26
 The most common measures used for ambivalence are the multiplicative measure used here (see Keele and 
Wolak 2008: 680), and Griffin’s ambivalence index (or a modified version of this index) (see Steenbergen and 
Brewer 2004: 103f.). 
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of the two camps, i.e. “rule-of-law” and “efficacy”, still provoked a defensive reaction in the 
opponent’s camp, but to a much more limited extent. In the naturalization campaign, the 
“rule-of-law” frame proved to be more or less equally strong as the “people final say” frame, 
which was the main frame of the pro camp. It is important to note that the “people final say” 
frame was stronger than the “mass naturalization”. This finding indicates that a strategic fram-
ing change of the pro camp was ineffective. In the political advertisements, the pro camp 
changed the strategy (chapter 5). Instead of the “people-final-say” frame, they relied on the 
“mass naturalization” frame towards the end of the campaign because the campaigners re-
ceived feedback from their activists indicating that the “people final say” frame was not con-
vincing.  
Table 8.1: Strength of the Frames in Communication 
  Asylum  Naturalization   Corporation Tax  
contra core frame human. trad. 16.5 rule-of-law 19.1 tax equity  11.4 
 2nd frame rule-of-law 6.9     tax loss 8.3 
pro core frame abuse 16.9 people final say 20.2 SME 7.7 
 2nd frame efficacy 5.8 mass naturalization 14.1 competitiveness 13.0 
Note: Strength of frames in communication is operationalized by the opponents’ defensive reactions with respect 
to a given frame, i.e. by the shares of the opponents’ counter-frames, averaged over the frames in the media 
input and the frames in the news media. 
In the corporate tax reform, the competitiveness frame was the strongest frame, despite the 
fact that it was only the second most important frame of the pro camp. Surprisingly, the main 
frame of the pro camp, the “SME” (small and medium enterprises) frame is found to be the 
weakest frame of the whole campaign. This most likely is a result of the fact that it remained 
without controversy during the debate. The second strongest frame was the core frame of the 
contra camp (“tax equity”) which more often came under attack in the media. Comparing the 
three cases, we generally see that the frames in the naturalization campaign were strongest, 
while the frames in the corporation tax reform campaign were weakest. This is in line with 
my idea that both the number of main frames of an issue and the complexity reduce the 
strength of a frame: In the asylum law and in the corporation tax reform, there were four main 
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frames, whereas in the other case, I found three main frames (chapter 4). The corporation tax 
reform was the most complex issue.  
 
Strength of Frames in Thought 
To assess the strength of frames in thought, I will begin by exploring whether the frames in 
communication were accessible to the citizens. This is a precondition for frames to become 
strong in thought. In the interviews, participants were asked whether they had heard of the 
different arguments.27 It might be argued that these questions make the frames accessible for 
the respondents. While this criticism cannot be completely denied, as ninety percent of the 
Swiss electorate considers direct-democratic campaigns as important or very important (Krie-
si and Trechsel 2008: 66), the results do not seem implausible. Figure 8.1 shows the propor-
tion of respondents who had heard of the respective frames. There are two graphs for each 
campaign. On the left hand side, the graphs show the proportion of the contra voters who had 
access to the frame. On the right hand side of the figure, the graphs illustrate the share of the 
pro voters who were exposed to it. The graphs show that, first of all, over 80 percent of the 
respondents in the asylum law and in the naturalization campaigns had heard of the frames at 
the end of the campaign (panel wave =3), whereas in the corporation tax reform, only a little 
more than 70 percent had heard of them by the end of the campaign. The graphs also show 
that in the asylum campaign, around 85 percent of the respondents had already heard the ar-
guments at the beginning of the campaign (panel wave = 1), whereas the campaign effect is 
stronger in the other two campaigns. It is important to note that access to the arguments does 
not seem to be influenced by the position of the voter. The same arguments are most accessi-
                                                 
27
 The exact question was (example for the humanitarian tradition frame): “There have been different opinions 
with regard to the asylum law. In the following, I will read loudly some arguments. Could you please indicate 
with ‘yes’, ‘no’, or ‘don’t know’ whether you have ever heard of them in the current debate: ‘The humanitarian 
tradition must be maintained’?”  
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ble for contra and pro voters in all three campaigns, followed by the other core argument. The 
graph shows that the precondition of accessibility is fulfilled.  
Figure 8.1: Accessibility of Frames in Thought 
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For those voters who did not have access to the core arguments, it can already be stated that 
the framing effects, which I will discuss in the following, are insignificant (not shown). This 
lends support to Nelson et al.’s (1997a) and Druckman’s (2009) idea that accessibility is a 
precondition for applicability. As I do not have data for the availability of the frames, I will 
turn to applicability next. 
Table 8.2 presents the model investigating the strength of frames in thought. For the 
asylum law, the model is estimated without the coefficient for the initially undecided voters, 
since in this familiar case, indecision did not influence the vote. Only 14.3 percent of the vot-
ers were undecided and all of the effects for the undecided voters turned out to be insignifi-
cant. The upper part of the table contains the fixed effects, which are the important effects for 
the frame strength. In the lower part of the table, information is presented relating to the ran-
dom effects28. Let us first look at the overall effects of the frame coefficients: In line with the 
measure for the strength of frames in communication, the results show the following: With 
one exception, the effects of all of the arguments are significant at the 5 percent level. The 
coefficients show the effect of the respondents’ position on the vote intention. The relation-
ship is as expected: The more a voter holds a contra position, the more he or she is inclined to 
vote “no”, whereas the opposite is true for the pro arguments. Second, in the two immigration 
campaigns, the coefficients of the core frames tend to be larger than the coefficients of the 
second frames. However, the difference is not significant. In the corporation tax reform cam-
paign, the opposite is the case: the second arguments are stronger than the core arguments. 
Again, however, the difference is not significant. For the pro camp, the SME (core pro) fram-
                                                 
28
 Sigma_u is the variance of the individual error component. Rho is the proportion of variance that is attribut-
able to differences between respondents. It increases when the variance between respondents increases compared 
to the variance within respondents. The Chibar2 values at the bottom of the table refer to a particular likelihood 
ratio test, which checks whether or not rho is zero. Since the P-values for these tests are large, the null hypothesis 
has to be rejected in each case. For purposes of comparison, I have also provided the rho-value for the null mod-
els, i.e. the models without any covariates. The difference between the rho-value for the null model and the cor-
responding value for the substantive model gives an indication of the explanatory power of the model. Thus, for 
the asylum case, this difference (78-46) is 32. In other words, in this case, the proportion of variance attributable 
to inter-individual differences has been reduced by 41 percent (32/78=.41).  
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ing effect was – although insignificantly – smaller than the competitiveness (second pro) 
framing effect. This corresponds to the measure of strength of frames in communication. 
Even though it is also not significant, it is nevertheless surprising that the same is true for the 
contra camp: the coefficient of the second frame (tax loss) is also larger than the coefficient of 
the main frame (tax equity). This might be explained by the fact that the tax loss frame was 
easy to understand (availability) because everybody understands that a tax reduction reduces 
the tax income. By contrast, the equity frame was more difficult because one needs to under-
stand that the tax reduction is offered only for those who hold stocks of 10 percent or more. I 
will return to this aspect below and argue that the strength of the tax equity frame is underes-
timated. Furthermore, the pro frame coefficients are larger than the contra frames. This also 
contrasts with the measure of strength in communication, but is again insignificant.  
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Table 8.2: Applicability (=Strength) of the Frames in Thought – Estimates from the Random In-
tercept Probit Models of the Vote Choice for the Three Campaigns, Unstandardized Regression 
Coefficients, Standard Errors and Levels of Significance 
  Asylum     Naturalization   Corporation Tax 
  coef. s.e. P>z coef. s.e. P>z coef. s.e. P>z 
fixed part                   
overall effects 
issue pref  0.422 0.067 ***  0.253 0.067 ***  0.090 0.067 ns 
partisan pref  0.408 0.063 ***  0.118 0.061 ns  0.184 0.067 ** 
ambivalence  0.318 0.060 ***  0.127 0.053 **  0.083 0.062 ns 
core argument contra -0.034 0.053 ns -0.185 0.051 *** -0.111 0.049 * 
2nd argument contra -0.269 0.057 ***   
 
  -0.235 0.053 *** 
core argument pro  0.231 0.059 ***  0.264 0.053 ***  0.275 0.055 *** 
2nd argument pro  0.155 0.055 **  0.220 0.057 ***  0.382 0.061 *** 
undecided       -1.431 0.147 *** -1.175 0.119 *** 
additional effects at t2 
t2    0.001 0.174 ns             
issue pref t2  0.125 0.091 ns         
partisan pref t2  0.405 0.090 ***         
ambivalence t2 -0.086 0.092 ns         
core argument contra t2 -0.297 0.092 **   
 
    
 
  
2nd argument contra t2  0.130 0.092 ns   
 
    
 
  
core argument pro t2  0.166 0.094 ns   
 
    
 
  
2nd argument pro t2  0.212 0.089 *             
additional effects at t3 
t3  0.431 0.193 * -0.515 0.106 ***  0.360 0.132 ** 
issue pref t3 -0.009 0.111 ns  0.035 0.106 ns  0.039 0.108 ns 
partisan pref t3  0.342 0.109 **  0.425 0.106 ***  0.102 0.106 ns 
ambivalence t3 -0.021 0.108 ns -0.134 0.091 ns  0.302 0.105 ** 
core argument contra t3 -0.417 0.112 *** -0.048 0.083 ns -0.118 0.074 ns 
2nd argument contra t3 -0.084 0.116 ns   
 
  -0.097 0.076 ns 
core argument pro t3  0.290 0.110 **  0.087 0.084 ns  0.191 0.083 * 
2nd argument pro t3  0.356 0.107 **  0.013 0.088 ns  0.125 0.089 ns 
un_issue pref t3      0.686 0.209 *** -0.177 0.152 ns 
un_party pref t3      0.955 0.207 ***  0.031 0.142 ns 
un_ambivalence t3        0.579 0.196 ** -0.616 0.147 *** 
contstant  0.284 0.115 * -0.321 0.067 ***  0.028 0.094   
random part               
/lnsig2u -0.144 0.168   -1.743 0.671   -1.364 0.486   
sigma_u  0.930 0.078    0.418 0.140    0.506 0.123   
rho  0.464 0.042    0.149 0.085    0.204 0.079   
Chibar2 113.39   *** 2.97   * 6.35   ** 
rho-Nullmodel  0.78 0.02    0.51 0.04    0.56 0.040   
*p<.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Asylum: n observations = 3262, respondents = 1323 
Naturalization: n observations = 1859, respondents = 997 
Corporation Tax: n observations = 1669, respondents = 853 
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Thus, the results support the idea that the same frames are strong in both communication and 
in thought. The significant frame coefficients confirm Kriesi’s general finding: The frames are 
important in direct-democratic campaigns and the voters are “largely capable of handling the 
task of direct-democratic voting. It may be that they do not use the best arguments one could 
use for the task at hand; they still make systematic use of the most important arguments pro-
vided by the political elites for their voting choice” (Kriesi 2005: 223). Overall, the core 
frames in communication tend to also be stronger frames in thought. However, the differences 
between core and second frames are insignificant. This might indicate that different voters re-
ly on different frames for the vote choice and as such, both become strong and significant. 
 
Framing effects 
In Table 8.2, it can be seen that the frame coefficients grow over time (additional effects), es-
pecially in the asylum law and the corporation tax reform. This increase of the frame strength 
is addressed next in Figure 8.2.29 The predicted vote is shown in dependence of the framing 
position and controlling for partisan preference, issue preference and ambivalence. There is 
one graph for each frame. In the asylum law, the effects become stronger over time. With the 
exception of the rule-of-law (2nd frame contra) frame, the difference in frame strength be-
tween wave one and wave two/three is significant.30 This means that the frames in communi-
cation caused the frames in thought to become stronger. We see a framing effect between the 
first and the second/third wave. Furthermore, it also shows that the framing effect did not in-
crease between the second and the third wave.  
In the naturalization initiative, the frame strength does not significantly grow over 
time. In this campaign, we cannot speak of a framing effect. It is possible that the conflict 
                                                 
29
 These illustrations are based on the model used for Table 8.3. I used the overall effects and the variables rele-
vant for the specific time point and set the other variables at their means. 
30
 See additional effects of arguments in Table 8.3. 
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about the new justice minister (Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf) distracted the voters from the sub-
stance of the debate. Additionally, Kriesi (2010c) argues that in this initiative the frames were 
less linked to the issue-specific preferences of the voters. Nevertheless, voters in favor of the 
pro frame were still more inclined to vote “yes”, whereas voters who were in favor of the con-
tra frame rather rejected the vote. Undecided voters were uninfluenced by the frames. Even 
though there is no framing effect, we can see a campaign effect in the graphs of the core 
frame contra and the second frame pro. We see that the curves for the decided voters drop 
from t1 to t3. At the beginning, the respondents were more inclined to vote “yes” than at the 
end; this is a campaign effect and can be explained through the late start of the campaign. At 
the beginning, a third of voters were unfamiliar with the issue and the partisan preferences 
were unknown. In addition, the initiative was called “for democratic naturalizations”, which 
was probably also misleading.  
Figure 8.2: Framing Effects: Graphical Representation of the Impact of Frame Position on the 
Voting Choice and Its Variation Over Time 
Asylum 
 
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
o
ba
bi
lity
 
to
 
vo
te
 
YE
S
strongly against against neither nor for strongly for
position on humanitarian tradition argument
t1 t2
t3
core frame contra
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
o
ba
bi
lity
 
to
 
vo
te
 
YE
S
strongly against against neither nor for strongly for
position on abuse argument
t1 t2
t3
core frame pro
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
o
ba
bi
lit
y 
to
 
vo
te
 
YE
S
strongly against against neither nor for strongly for
position on rule-of-law argument
t1 t2
t3
2nd frame contra
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
Pr
o
ba
bi
lity
 
to
 
vo
te
 
YE
S
strongly against against neither nor for strongly for
position on efficacy argument
t1 t2
t3
2nd frame pro
Chapter 8 
 
192
Naturalization 
 
Corporation Tax       
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In the corporation tax, the strength of frames again increases over time. However, the framing 
effect is only significant for the SME frame (core pro). The effect at t3 of the tax equity frame 
(core contra) is underestimated because of the undecided voters. This can be demonstrated by 
another model (shown in the Appendix: Table A4) that includes interaction terms between 
undecided voters and the framing positions. Figure 8.3 shows the results graphically. First, we 
can see that the tax equity frame becomes much stronger in t3 than it was previously. The re-
spective coefficient in t3 in this model is -0.405. This additional effect is very significant. 
Thus, with the interaction term, the framing effect of the tax equity frame is very strong and 
very significant. Indeed, it is now stronger than the second frame. This result confirms the no-
tion that the external events associated with the involvement of the UBS in the subprime cris-
es were relevant. In chapter 5, I argue that these external events lent support to the “tax equi-
ty” frame, which claims that the tax cuts were an unfair privilege for the well-off and went 
against the principle of fair taxation. Second, the originally undecided voters who were in fa-
vor of the tax equity frame turned out to be more inclined to vote “yes”. The coefficient is 
positive (0.994) and very significant. Possibly, these voters preferred tax cuts for all, not only 
for the well-off. The result is in line with the findings by Kriesi (2010b). In the corporation 
tax, he found a strong ambivalence effect for the undecided voters.  
Figure 8.3: Corporation Tax: Impact of Core Contra Frame (Tax Equity) on the Vote Decision, in 
Consideration of the Interaction Effect between Undecided Voters and Frame Position 
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In terms of framing effects, there is a difference between core and second main frames. In two 
campaigns31, the core frames in communication caused the frames in thought to become 
stronger over time, whereas only once (second main frame of the pro camp in the asylum law) 
did the strength of a second main frame grow over time. This gives rise to the assumption that 
there is a difference between core and second main frame and that the core frames are, in fact, 
stronger than the second main frames. 
Next, I explore the importance of the frame-based path in comparison to the partisan-
based path. Let us first look at the effects of the partisan preference in Table 8.2. In order to 
understand the table, it should be noted that the partisan preferences t2 and t3 are additional 
effects to the overall effects. In the asylum law campaign, the voters used the heuristic path 
for their vote choice during the whole campaign, and its importance grows over time (partisan 
pref. t2 and t3 are significant and have a positive sign), probably because a part of the voters 
learned about their preferred party’s position during the campaign. The voting preferences 
from political parties from the center (in particular from the CVP) were not obvious at the be-
ginning. In the naturalization initiative, the campaign started late and the voters did not use 
the partisan path at the beginning. At this point in time, they did not know the party’s position 
because the campaign had not yet started. Nevertheless, partisan preference is significant at 
the end. In the corporation tax reform, the heuristic path was again important during the 
whole campaign. It probably did not gain in importance because it is a “typical” left-right is-
sue with well-known party positions from the beginning. In comparison to the same model 
without the arguments (not shown here, see Kriesi 2010b), the partisan parameters have the 
same signs, but their sizes are smaller. As Kriesi (2005: 171) suggests, this is related to the 
fact that the partisan effects can partly be attributed to the effects of the arguments. This 
                                                 
31
 If one takes the interaction effect between undecided voters and frame position in the tax reform campaign in-
to consideration. 
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works indirectly through learning (Lenz 2009). The voters subscribe to the frames favored by 
their preferred party.  
Figure 8.4 presents the voting choice for different partisan preferences and positions 
on the frames. For the sake of simplicity, all frames were combined into one factor on each 
side: a pro frames factor and a contra frames factor32. This figure allows us to gauge the im-
portance of the frame-based path in comparison to the partisan path: The slope of a curve 
shows the importance of the frame-based path, whereas the width at which the three curves 
are apart from each other is relevant for the importance of the partisan path33. The general im-
pression provided by this figure is that both frames and partisan heuristics are important in de-
termining the voting choice (the curves are neither flat, nor do they converge on one curve). 
The third hypothesis cannot be rejected: The frame-based path is important in direct-
democratic votes, even when controlling for and in comparison to the partisan-based path. 
The relative importance varies between pro and contra frame and between the campaigns.  
In the asylum law campaign, for the supporters of the contra frames, the partisan logic 
was more important than the frames. For instance, a voter attached to right-wing parties who 
strongly agreed on the contra frames is inclined to vote “yes” with a probability of 0.6334. 
This finding may be attributable to the successful strategy of the pro camp, which made use of 
a double-edged argument by endorsing the concern advanced by their adversaries. In a first 
step, they pointed out that they were strongly in favor of the humanitarian tradition of Swit-
zerland. In a second step, they maintained that the revised law would strengthen this claim 
because it would help fight against abuse, thereby helping those asylum-seekers who really 
deserved protection. 
                                                 
32
 All campaign arguments were jointly included in one factor analysis. Details including a factor analysis can be 
given upon request. 
33
 Based on the partisan predisposition scores, I coded left as including Green and Social Democrat voters, mod-
erate right as in-between voters favoring Christian Democrats and Liberals, and conservative right as including 
voters favoring the People’s Party. 
34
 The predicted probabilities are calculated for decided voters at the end of the campaign with mean values on 
remaining variables. 
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Figure 8.4: The Combined Impact of Frame-Based and Partisan-Based Paths: Vote Choice (t=3) 
for Different Political Preferences for Decided Voters 
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We see a different pattern on the other side. The supporters of the pro frames voted yes inde-
pendently of their partisan preferences. For this group of voters, the frame-based path was 
clearly more important than the heuristic path- in such a way that even a voter from the left, 
favoring the pro frames, has a predicted probability of voting yes of 0.99. This result derives 
from the strength of the abuse frame. Moreover, issue familiarity and intensity might also 
have increased the relevance of the frame-based path.  
In the naturalization campaign, the frame-based choice was more important than the 
partisan path for voters who were strongly in favor of the contra frames or strongly against the 
pro frames. In the other cases, the partisan preference was also important. For instance, a left 
voter who was strongly in favor of the pro frames was inclined to vote “yes” with a probabili-
ty of 0.71. If he or she did not strongly favor the pro frames, but still favored them neverthe-
less, the probability decreased to 39. If he or she was a right-wing voter who strongly favored 
the pro frames, the probability increased to 0.95.  
In the corporation tax reform, the pro frames were almost as strong as in the asylum 
law. Surprisingly, however, the heuristic path was not important. This is unexpected because 
one could think that the heuristic path is more important in complex issues than it is in easier 
issues since the arguments in complex issues are usually more difficult to understand. The in-
fluence of the emotion-based path in the opinion formation process might explain this finding. 
Wirth et al. (2010) showed that positive emotions were particularly important in the corpora-
tion tax reform. In the case of the contra frames, the partisan-based path was more important. 
For instance, a voter who was strongly in favor of the contra frames and close to a conserva-
tive right party voted yes with a probability of 0.69. If he or she was only in favor of the 
frames, he or she voted yes with a probability of 0.80. If he or she was close to the left and 
strongly favored the contra frames, the probability decreased to 0.45. The probability in-
creased to 0.73 if he or she was additionally an undecided voter. This shows that undecided 
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voters who held a strongly favoring position on the contra frames ignored not only their fram-
ing position but also their partisan predisposition! It supports the result by Kriesi (2010c: 23) 
that the undecided voters voted inconsistently in this campaign and that ambivalent voters on 
the left ended up voting in favor of the law.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have first explored the measures of strength of frames in communication and 
strength of frames in thought. Both concepts of frame strength allow the identification of the 
relevant frames. In the case of frames in communication, the campaigners’ counterattacks are 
a measure for the relevancy of a frame. In the case of frames in thought, the importance of a 
frame in the individuals’ opinion formation process measures its relevance. Ultimately, frame 
building is only important when frames evolving from the construction, promotion and med-
iation-processes have an effect on opinion formation. The overall result of this chapter is that, 
frame building is very important. 
The results clearly suggest that the main frames on either side were strong frames in 
communication, since both could not be ignored, but rather elicited strong defensive reactions 
from the opponent’s side in the media input and the news media. However, in two cases the 
framing strategies of the political actors were not fully successful. First, the pro camps’ stra-
tegic change from the “people-final-say” frame to the “mass naturalization” frame in the natu-
ralization initiative happened too late in order to have an impact on the strength of a frame. 
Second, in the corporation tax reform, the core frame of the pro camp (SME) was relatively 
weak in communication because it remained without controversy. It still became a strong 
frame in thought even though the “competitiveness” frame was slightly but insignificantly 
stronger. The evaluation by the campaigners supports the manner in which I measure the 
strength of a frame in communication, because with one exception, the campaigners evaluate 
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the same adversaries’ frames as strong as are identified by the measure of strong frames in 
communication. In order to identify strong frames in communication, it is thus crucial to rely 
on the defensive reaction by the opponents and not to rely, for instance, on the evaluation of 
the importance of one’s own arguments. Depending on the research interest, the measure for 
the strength of frames in communication can also be extended by including frames from opi-
nion leaders or friends, or in more general terms, by including other channels relevant for the 
overall flow of communication. 
Without exception, the measure of strength of frames in communication identifies 
(when controlling for the undecided voters in the case of the corporation tax reform) the same 
frames as relevant and as core frames as the commonly used measure, the strength of frames 
in thought. Thus, the first hypothesis is confirmed: In direct-democratic campaigns, strong 
frames in communication are also strong frames in thought. The precondition of accessibility 
was also fulfilled. The strong frames in communication might help “to anticipate which 
frames are likely to emerge as being the most applicable on an issue” (Chong and Druckman 
2007c: 117). There are differences between the two measures with regard to the size of the 
strength. For the strength of the frames in communication, the difference between core and 
second important frame and the issue characteristic (complexity, intensity, and familiarity) 
seem to be relevant. For the strength of frames in thought, partisan and issue-specific prefe-
rence are influential. In addition, the pro frames might be generally, albeit insignificantly, 
stronger in thought. 
This chapter also shows that there is a framing effect from the frames in communica-
tion on the frames in thought in two of the three direct-democratic campaigns. Hypothesis 2 is 
confirmed: In two campaigns, there is a causal link from the frames in communication on the 
frames in thought. The strongest framing effect was discovered in the asylum law. Three of 
four main frames in thought became significantly stronger over time. In the corporation tax 
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reform, both core frames in communication caused the frames in thought to become signifi-
cantly stronger (when the behavior of the undecided voter was taken into consideration). 
These results demonstrate that the core frames in communication have a stronger effect than 
the second main frames. They are indeed stronger frames. In the naturalization initiative, the 
strength of frames in thought did not become stronger over time. Thus, there was no framing 
effect in this campaign. The conflict about the new justice minister (Eveline Widmer-
Schlumpf) potentially distracted the voters from the substance of the debate. Additionally, 
Kriesi (2010c) argues that in this initiative the frames were less linked to the issue-specific 
preferences of the voters. The difficulties to link the frames with the issue-specific prefe-
rences are also reflected in the change of the core frame towards the end of the campaign. Fi-
nally, the frames remain important for the vote decision, also controlling for and in compari-
son to partisan heuristic. Hypothesis three is also confirmed. 
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9 Conclusion 
 
I have analyzed frame building and framing effects in three direct-democratic campaigns in 
Switzerland. In line with Rohrschneider, I can conclude that “campaign decisions are an area 
too important for political scientists to ignore” (2002:308). This is in particular true for the 
framing decisions in campaigns. Framing is the process by which political actors define the 
issue for the public (e.g., Nelson et al. 1997a, 1997b). Since, in our diverse society, the media 
plays a vital role in conveying frames from the political actors to the public (Lippmann 
1947(1922)), I first investigated which processes and factors influence the creation or changes 
of frames applied by journalists (frames in news media or media frames), i.e. “frame build-
ing” (Scheufele 1999). Second, I investigated framing effects. Framing effects have been de-
fined as effects from frames in communication on frames in thought (Druckman 2001). The 
evidence of framing effects found in this study does indeed render the framing decisions in a 
campaign relevant.  
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Frame Building 
As far as frame building is concerned, in the first chapter, I proposed a distinction between the 
frame construction, frame promotion and frame mediation process. In the construction of 
frames, political actors decide about the three strategic framing choices: First, the political ac-
tors have to choose one or several substantive frames capable of attracting the attention of the 
media and the public to their own cause and steering it away from the cause of their oppo-
nents (“Substantive Emphasis Choice”). In the “Oppositional Emphasis Choice”, the political 
actors determine how much attention to devote to their opponents’ substantive frame(s) as 
compared to their own frames, as well as whether they want to use their opponents’ frames of-
fensively (=trespassing) or defensively (=counter-framing). The third strategic question con-
cerns the decision of whether to focus on the contest (=personal attacks and conflicts) or the 
substantive content of the debate – on politics or on policy (“Contest Emphasis Choice”). In 
the frame promotion process, they decide about how to vary these choices in the different 
communication channels and over time. I have distinguished between mediated (media input 
and letters to the editor), unmediated (political advertisements and direct mails) and internal 
(information for members) channels. Both mediated and unmediated channels target the gen-
eral public, while the internal channel is aimed at the members. In the frame mediation 
process, the contribution by the journalists is analyzed.  
 
The Three Strategic Framing Choices  
With regard to the “Substantive Emphasis Choice”, we find that political actors emphasize 
one or two strong frames in the media input (Chapter 4). They generally also use these main 
frames in channels other than the media input and stay on their frames (Chapter 5). In the un-
mediated channels, the political actors focus most on their core frame, i.e. in around half of all 
arguments. By contrast, they focus least on the internal communication, in which the core 
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frame is used in every fourth argument. With regard to variation over time, it can be con-
cluded that the political actors stay on their frame, except for the pro camp in the naturaliza-
tion initiative. In this case, the pro camp changed their strategy and switched – in particular in 
their ads – from the “people final say” frame to the “mass naturalization” frame toward the 
end of the campaign because the “people final say” frame was not convincing. In order to 
garner media attention during the whole campaign, the political actors mainly rely on routine 
staged events for media input such as media conferences and media releases. By comparing 
media input with news media, we find that the percentage shares of the frames in the news 
media are generally similar to the shares found in the media input. The news media tended to 
respect frame ownership and reported accordingly. The framing input of the political actors 
was decisive (Chapter 7). 
Second (“Oppositional Emphasis Choice”), political actors do not exclusively revert to 
their own main frames, but rather also discuss their opponents’ frames. The extent to which 
they enter into discussion has been called campaign dialogue. We found that the political ac-
tors pay more attention to their opponents’ frames in the mediated channels than in the unme-
diated and internal channels (Chapter 5). Mediation obviously motivates the political actors to 
enter into dialogue with each other. Unmediated channels should primarily mobilize citizens 
to vote, whereas the internal channels should inform the members. With regard to variation 
over time, we can state that campaign dialogue does not disappear over the course of the cam-
paign. Furthermore, issue complexity and inequality of financial resources reduce dialogue. It 
has been shown that the frames owned by the opponents are largely addressed defensively ra-
ther than offensively, that is, by means of counter-framing rather than trespassing. Trespass-
ing was virtually absent, also in the different communication channels and over time. The 
journalists also reported on both camps with their adversaries’ frames, and attributed a 
slightly more offensive stance to both camps (Chapter 7).  
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 As far as the third strategic question “Contest Emphasis Choice” is concerned, we 
showed that the political actors mainly rely on substantive framing. We found that actors with 
more extreme partisan positions use more contest frames and that the dispute between Chris-
toph Blocher, the SVP, and Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf caused the quarrelling political actors 
to rely significantly more on contest frames in the naturalization campaign (Chapter 4). Con-
cerning the different communication channels, we find that in direct-democratic campaigns, 
the political actors often refrain from using contest frames in their ads and in direct mail. By 
contrast, they use more contest frames in the letters to the editor and in the communication 
with the members than in the media input. Towards the end of the campaign, we find more 
contest frames only in the media input and in the news media. In the other channels, the use of 
contest frames is not increased. The substantive frames also dominated in the media. Howev-
er, the journalists gave slightly more emphasis to contest frames than the political actors 
(Chapter 7). 
 
Contribution of the Journalists (Frame Mediation)  
Direct democracy is not only the well-institutionalized interaction among government, par-
liament, parties and the public (Linder et al. 2008: 214). It also requires the contribution of the 
media, and I was able to show (Chapter 6) that the interaction with the media is also well in-
stitutionalized. Journalists and the political actors are dancing the tango well together, as they 
are familiar with both their dance partners and the music. Their mediating function was most 
important in the corporation tax reform. In this complex issue, the journalists also gave stand-
ing to experts, which additionally contributed to the media frames (“Standing Choice”) and 
increased the low level of campaign dialogue provided by the political actors (“Dialogue 
Choice”). The media also introduced their own accents in the campaign by conducting public 
opinion polls. In addition, in the naturalization initiative, the TV debate show “Arena” intensi-
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fied the debate (“Timing Choice”). Free newspapers fulfill the mediating function less well 
than the other media types because they make the least effort (“Effort Choice”) and offer less 
campaign dialogue. 
 
Key Factors in Frame Building 
My analysis shows that the political actors are the ones who introduce the most important 
frames into the public discourse in direct-democratic campaigns. With regard to the daily 
frame absence / presence, the campaign-specific power of a political actor is important, whe-
reas the number of promoted frames and the minister play an influential role for the daily 
frame frequency. Power was not important in the case of the familiar issue (asylum law), but 
further research is needed to determine the relative importance of power in complex issues. 
The minister’s influence is highest in the case of the complex issue (corporate tax) and is 
probably lower in campaigns dealing initiatives. Finally, external events can moderate the in-
fluence of frame building. 
 
Framing Effects 
The analysis of framing effects complements the analyses of frame building. Frame building 
is important because the media frames have an impact in different ways. First of all, the re-
sults clearly suggest that the main frames on either side were strong frames in communication, 
since both could not be ignored, but rather elicited strong defensive reactions from the oppo-
nent’s side in the media input and the news media. Second, the strong frames in communica-
tion were also strong frames in thought because they were important for the vote decision. 
Furthermore, the frames remain important for the vote decision, also when controlling for and 
in comparison to partisan heuristic. These results support previous work by Kriesi (2005), 
who showed that arguments have a very strong impact on the outcome of the vote, also when 
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controlling for the voters’ ideological predisposition. Finally, the results also show that there 
is a framing effect. This means that the frames in communication had an effect on the frames 
in thought.  
 
Contributions and Implications for Further Research 
This research theoretically contributes to studies on political communication by identifying 
processes and key factors in frame building. Among other factors, power has been identified 
as important in frame building. It has been operationalized based on a reputational indicator 
measuring the overall influence of an organization in a campaign and is relevant for frame ab-
sence/presence. However, not all powerful actors were also highly present in the media: Eco-
nomiesuisse, the most powerful actor and leading house of the pro camp in the corporation tax 
reform, did not aim at being present in the media. Instead, the allied large party was in the 
public eye. The model for media framing (Table 7.3) does not account for such indirect im-
pact of power. Thus, the influence of power in frame building is underestimated. This prob-
lem occurs because the power measure combines both issue-specific and general power. 
Large parties are key players in direct democracy as it is practiced in Switzerland (Linder et 
al. 2008: 213). They have general power and they are the institutionalized information source 
of journalists and often the mouthpiece of coalitions. However, they are not the only actors 
involved. Policies are made in domain-specific subsystems, which, in addition to political par-
ties, include a large number of actors whose composition varies from one policy domain to 
the other. Some of the organizations active only in specific domains prefer to stay in the 
background. For further research, I suggest using two different power measures, one for gen-
eral and one for issue-specific power. It is possible that general power has a direct effect on 
frame absence/presence, whereas issue-specific power perhaps works indirectly by reinforc-
ing the general power of allied actors (interaction between issue-specific and general power).  
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The second theoretical contribution of this research is the discussion and empirical 
measurement of the three strategic framing choices taken by the political actors. With regard 
to the “Oppositional Emphasis Choice”, I was able to show that political actors enter into di-
alogue and discuss each others’ frames in the mediated channels. The results support the find-
ings by Jerit (2008), who concludes that engagement (= dialogue) is common in election 
campaigns. We found that, by discussing each others’ frames, the political actors mainly use 
counter-frames (=defensive use of opponents’ frames). Trespassing (=offensive use of oppo-
nents’ frames) is mainly absent. As a consequence, we should look at defense in greater detail 
and identify different types of counter-framing and their impact. In Jerit’s terms, this would 
mean that we should identify different uses of direct rebuttals (Jerit 2009) and engagement 
(2008). Nelson (2004) provided a basis for such a typology. In an endeavor to do so, framing 
research should also be combined with research on deliberation. I suggest thinking about 
whether counter-framing makes the discussion deliberative, or which counter-frames are deli-
berative for which reasons. In addition, this study opens up the question of how many frames 
a public debate should ideally carry. Are four main frames good in terms of discourse quality? 
My next contribution suggests distinguishing between contest and substantive frames 
(“Contest Emphasis Choice”), which is important because it allows us to measure the degree 
of substance in a debate. For further research, it is important to refine coding instruments. 
Contest frames consist of personal attacks and conflicts. Personal attacks were coded directly, 
whereas conflicts were coded as non-arguments which contain a conflict. This coding is sub-
optimal because it measured conflicts only indirectly. By coding conflicts directly, we might 
also consider other types of contest frames such as, for example, contradiction, prejudices, 
stereotypes, and criticism. Even though the coding of conflicts was suboptimal, it does not 
mean that the results are unreliable. I am confident in stating that if we had coded the contest 
frames directly, the overall impression and the results would stay the same: Direct-democratic 
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campaigns are mainly substantive. The refinement of instruments is essential in particular for 
election campaigns, in which we might find more contest. 
In methodological terms, I have introduced a tool for measuring the strength of frames 
in communication. A strong frame in communication has been defined as a frame that pro-
vokes a defensive reaction by the opponents and/or that resonates in the media. It is operatio-
nalized by the opponents’ defensive reactions with respect to a given frame, i.e. by the shares 
of the opponents’ counter-frames, averaged over the frames in the media input and the news 
media frames. However, it remains an open question why the campaigners feel compelled to 
react to an opponent’s frame or what ultimately makes a frame strong in communication or in 
thoughts. As mentioned in chapter 8, the speaker’s credibility and congruence with central 
cultural themes might strengthen a frame in communication. I addressed neither of these fac-
tors because they did not vary, and as preconditions they seemed to be fulfilled. It appears that 
these two factors are more important when frames are evolving. Direct-democratic campaigns 
come at the end of a political process, after the debate in parliament, and after the procedures 
for qualifying a proposition for ballot. Thus, the frames used in direct-democratic campaigns 
are not new. 
From the analysis, I can suggest other factors which might make a frame strong in 
communication or/and in thought. First, as we know from the interviews with the campaign-
ers, almost all people were against abuse and in favor of small and medium enterprises. These 
two frames (abuse and SME) were valence frames, because similar to valence issues 
(Schneider 1972), voters take one side on them. I suggest that valence frames potentially be-
come very strong in communication and in thought, as was the case in terms of the abuse 
frame. At the same time, however, valence frames bear the risk of being less debated in the 
campaign because they are uncontroversial. This was the case in the SME frame. Those va-
lence frames that connect to a negative emotion (e.g. fear) might become controversial, whe-
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reas valence frames that connect to a positive emotion (e.g. proud) might be less debated. In 
any case, the question for further research is whether a valence frame is stronger than other 
frames, and under which circumstances it becomes highly debated by the opponent or in the 
media.  
Second, the pro camp in the asylum law succeeded in linking their abuse frame with 
the humanitarian tradition frame by arguing that the new law is needed in order to fight abuse 
and to protect the Swiss humanitarian tradition. Hence, linking one’s own frame with the op-
ponents’ frames might also make one’s own frame stronger. The code book can also be im-
proved in this regard. So far, links between the frames have not been coded. Linking seems to 
require the offensive use of the opponents’ frame. Third, the strength of a frame in thought 
might be dependent on how closely the frame is linked to emotions, and issue-specific predis-
positions.  
In order to learn more about what makes a frame strong in thought, I suggest addition-
ally interviewing selected respondents of the panel in an open manner and in more depth 
about the reasons for their voting choice and the importance of the different frames. It would 
also help to validate the influence of external events. In addition, I suggest complementing the 
research design with experiments. It appears to me to be unrealistic to expect to observe expo-
sure effects in a panel. I agree with Kriesi (2010c) that the multiplicity of channels to which a 
voter is exposed makes it difficult to attribute an exposure effect to one particular channel. In 
addition to the channels examined here, inter-personal communication is also important, and 
cannot be controlled in a panel. In order to gauge exposure effects, experiments are much 
more suitable. Finally, the strength of the frames should be measured by asking individuals of 
the panel to rate the persuasiveness of various frames in communication, on a particular issue.  
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Generalizability of the Study 
First of all, the generalizability of the findings is restricted because of the small number of 
cases. However, since frame building in Swiss direct-democratic campaigns is routine action 
which usually follows the same pattern, the three cases still provide an insight into the typical 
frame building process. According to this, the theoretical framework provided in this study 
and the main findings should be representative for Swiss direct-democratic campaigns in gen-
eral. With regard to the differences between direct-democratic campaigns, the results vary 
above all depending on issue complexity and familiarity and whether the direct-democratic 
campaign is an initiative or a referendum. Further research is needed in order to appraise the 
generalizability of the issue-specific and instrument-specific findings.  
 
Second, the campaign specificity limits the generalizability of my findings. In order to streng-
then their generalizability, I end this conclusion by presenting three types of campaigns and 
outlining in which regard the theoretical framework and my results might depend on the type 
of campaign. As introduced in chapter 2, direct-democratic campaigns imply two camps in-
volved, which guarantees a contest of substantive framing. Secondly, direct-democratic cam-
paigns are of limited duration, with a clear beginning and a clear ending. They imply thirdly 
an issue-specific choice. Based on these three criteria, direct-democratic campaigns can be 
distinguished from election campaigns and public debates (Table 9.1). Similar to direct-
democratic campaigns, election campaigns35 are also characterized by frame contestation. In 
majoritarian electoral systems, election campaigns typically give rise to the confrontation be-
tween two opposing camps, whereas in proportional electoral systems, more camps are in-
volved. The presence of two or more camps guarantees competing information flows. In addi-
tion, election campaigns also include a close end, as direct-democratic campaigns do. In con-
                                                 
35
 More precisely, I am thinking of national election campaigns. 
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trast to direct-democratic debates, they do not have an issue-specific focus. Public debates 
share the advantage of direct-democratic campaigns that they are issues-specific. They are 
“the sum of all public communications related to a particular issue” (Helbling, Höglinger and 
Wüest 2009: 5). In contrast to direct-democratic campaigns, however, public debates are not 
necessarily prestructured into a binary logic and no final vote is taking place.  
Table 9.1: Different Types of Campaigns 
 campaign type 
 direct-democratic 
campaigns 
 
election campaigns 
 
public debates 
degree of frame contestation  frame contest: 
2 opposing camps 
frame contest:  
2 or more opposing 
candidates 
frame dominance  
is possible 
deadline close end  
by final vote 
close end  
by final vote 
open end 
focus issue-specific no given focus issue-specific 
 
Third, we studied frame building and framing effects only in one single country. With regard 
to differences between countries, I suggest that at least three aspects are relevant. First, the 
degree of control exercised by the elites (Smith 1976, Bowler and Donovan 2006: 665, Budge 
1996: 90) is important. Swiss direct-democratic campaigns are organized and tightly con-
trolled by the political elites. Both the executive branch and parliament have an important role 
to play in the preparation of the proposals submitted to the voters. The control of the whole 
process by the government and the parliamentary majority implies the formation of two spe-
cific coalitions, the government camp versus the issue-specific opposition. Political cam-
paigns in most other European countries also are organized by the elites (de Vreese 2004: 50, 
Bowler and Donovan 2006). By contrast, in the U.S., the government has less control over the 
direct-democratic process. The U.S. populist and progressive reformers of the late 19th cen-
tury introduced direct-democratic procedures in order, above all, to restrict the power of polit-
ical parties and their political machines, which were in control of the state parliaments at the 
time (Cronin 1989: 50-57; Smith and Tolbert 2001: 740, 2004: 112ff.; Bowler and Donovan 
2006). Even today, in the U.S., the popular initiative is primarily used by social movements 
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and interest groups to circumvent the state parliaments controlled by the parties. This is possi-
ble because the popular initiatives are submitted to popular vote without the intervention of 
the state governments and their parliaments. Second, the scope and frequency of votes matter 
(Gallagher and Uleri 1996: 9, Budge 1996: 85 f.). Referendums are generally held on two 
types of subject: on constitutional changes and on questions of territorial adjustment. Initia-
tives have a greater scope: The call by a non-official body allows for a greater range of vot-
ing. In most countries, the government calls a referendum, whereas only in a small number of 
countries (Switzerland, Italy, half of the American states) can a group of the electorate call an 
initiative. In Switzerland, California, and a few other American states, referendums and initia-
tives take place frequently, whereas in all other countries, they are held infrequently. Third, 
the political communication culture is relevant. Pfetsch (2003) suggests that the communica-
tion culture is characterized by two dimensions: the distance between journalists and political 
actors and the orientation of political communication. Distance is related to different profes-
sional and social norms. For instance, in the U.S., journalists refer more to professional norms 
such as vocational professionalism, objectivity and impartiality of information, balanced con-
tent and diversity, and transparency, whereas German actors give priority to social norms such 
as ethically correct behavior, openness and honesty. As a consequence, we find a greater dis-
tance between journalists and political actors in the United States than in Germany. The orien-
tation of political communication is dependent on the relative importance of media and politi-
cal logic. If the media logic (Mazzoleni 1987) prevails, then journalists are relatively inde-
pendent. The media can set the agenda of an election debate. News values, selection criteria 
and media attention are important in the news production. The actors try to garner as much 
media attention as possible and to reach positive news coverage. If the political logic domi-
nates, power-political aspects are at the fore. The political actors aim at strengthening their 
organization, at legitimizing their position, or at increasing support and trust for their own 
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policy positions. Based on the two dimensions, we arrive at four different types of political 
communication culture (Table 9.2).  
Table 9.2: Political Communication Culture and its Two Dimensions 
Distance between political ac-
tors and journalists 
Orientation of Political Communication 
dominant media logic dominant political logic 
strong / great distance media-oriented political com-
munication culture 
example: US 
strategic political communica-
tion culture 
example: Germany, Switzer-
land, Denmark 
weak / small distance PR-oriented political communi-
cation culture 
example: Italy 
party-political communication 
culture 
example: France 
 
The media-oriented political communication culture is characterized by distance between po-
litical and media actors and dominance of media logic (example: US). In the PR-oriented po-
litical communication culture, political and media actors are close but the production of news 
is media-oriented (example: Italy). When we find a great distance between politicians and 
journalists and the political logic is dominant, we call it strategic political communication cul-
ture (examples: Germany, Switzerland and Denmark). The party-political communication cul-
ture is identified by a weak distance and the dominance of the party logic (example: France).  
 
Interaction between Context (Campaign Type, Country) and Frame Construction  
The “Substantive Emphasis Choice” – the choice of a strong substantive frame – is the most 
important choice and quite independent of the campaign type. To win political power, the po-
litical actors “must compete, and a central aspect of this competition is their effort to define 
the terms of political choice” (Sniderman 2000: 75). However, the campaign type does matter 
with regard to the second and the third choices. The “Oppositional Emphasis Choice” (how 
much priority the political actors give to the opponents’ substantive frame(s) compared to 
their own frames) might become more complicated in proportional election campaigns be-
cause more sides are involved and an actor has to take care of more than one opponent. In 
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public debates, it is possible for there to be no competition about issue framing and for only 
one camp to be involved. If only one side is campaigning, its position could become very in-
fluential. This is a very different situation than we have in direct-democratic campaigns, 
which might be characterized by less campaign dialogue. It will render the second choice 
more relevant in public debates in general. Hence, it is not surprising that Entman’s (2003) 
cascading model addresses the very question of whether frame contestation arises in public 
debates. From my point of view, it appears that public debates on foreign policy bear the 
highest risk of a dominant frame situation because government monopolizes information, 
which impedes opposition. Such one-sided situations seem to be rare in terms of everyday 
politics. This is why I consider the typical research object of indexing approaches as rather 
atypical cases. The “Contest Emphasis Choice” (the priority of the substantive frames com-
pared to the campaign contest) might be more important in electoral campaigns, where candi-
dates might analyze the rationale and strategy underlying the rhetoric and positions of their 
opponents or emphasize and attack some of their personal characteristics.  
I expect the “Substantive Emphasis Choice” and the “Oppositional Emphasis Choice” to also 
be quite independent of the differences between countries. For instance, in Denmark, the yes 
camp was also campaigning with one main message (de Vreese and Semetko 2004: 172). By 
contrast, we might find more contest frames (“Contest Emphasis Choice”) in countries with 
less control by elites, because extreme and non-government actors rely more on contest 
frames. The same expectation holds for countries with a media-oriented political communica-
tion culture.36 Media orientation increases the use of news values. For instance, in US presi-
dential election campaigns, contest frames are more important due to commercialization of 
the media, the important role of TV in general and the involvement of political advertise-
ments on TV in particular, and because of the majoritarian democratic system. By contrast, 
                                                 
36
 When comparing the results with those of de Vreese and Semetko (2004: 101, 174), we find less substance (measured as issue frames) in 
the Danish referendum campaigns. Since Denmark is classified as a similar country to Switzerland, we would not expect large differences. 
The differences are probably caused by different coding procedures. In my analysis, the argument was the unit of analysis, whereas De 
Vreese and Semetko’s study is based on the topic of the story. In order to attract the attention of the reader, the media might use strategic 
frames in their headlines or leads, but still might use substance in the article. 
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Hardmeier (2003: 251) reached the conclusion that only seven percent of articles used an 
emotional or personalized style of coverage in Swiss parliamentary election campaigns. 
 
Interaction between Context (Campaign Type, Country) and Frame Promotion 
In election campaigns, the frame promotion process is probably more important than in di-
rect-democratic campaigns. This is related to the fact that election campaigns are not re-
stricted to the issue and have more the character of a race. In addition, election campaigns 
generally involve more resources than direct-democratic campaigns. The budget of the three 
investigated direct-democratic campaigns can be roughly estimated based on the interviews 
with the campaigners. In the naturalization initiative, around 0.8 million Swiss francs were 
spent. In the asylum law, there were 2.8 million Swiss francs involved, whereas in the corpo-
ration tax reform, the budget rose to around 7.0 million Swiss francs. In the 1995 elections for 
the Swiss Parliament, the parties in the three largest Swiss cantons (=sub-national-level units 
similar to states in the US context) alone spent around 7.8 million (Kriesi 1998: 3). We also 
know that at the cantonal level, parties use 12 percent of their budget for direct-democratic 
campaigns, whereas they spend 30 percent for elections (Brändle 2001: 163). Thus, I can 
conclude that in election campaigns, parties spend more money, which will increase the im-
portance of the frame promotion process.  
Regarding variations between countries, I expect the frame promotion process to be more im-
portant in countries with a media-oriented political communication culture because the media 
logic increases the willingness to spend money. This expectation is supported by the fact that 
more resources are involved in American campaigns. For the general election, Obama’s cam-
paign committee had raised more than $650 million in 200837. However, these election cam-
paigns are considered as being an outlier, because nowhere else is such a high amount of the 
                                                 
37
 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Barack_Obama_presidential_campaign,_2008>, December 2009. 
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budget used for election campaigns (Nassmacher 2002: 9). As a consequence, I expect the 
promotion process to be more important in US presidential election campaigns than anywhere 
else. Besides this difference, I expect similar patterns in the frame promotion process of dif-
ferent countries as found in this study. In particular, I expect that also elsewhere, the actors 
will try to stay on message and will increase the use of the contest frames towards the end of 
a campaign. In Denmark, for instance, de Vreese and Semetko (2004: 172) report that the po-
litical actors did, in fact, stay on message (although they ultimately failed with this strategy 
because the message was discredited). In addition, the Danish campaigners also increased the 
use of contest frames towards the end of the campaign (2004: 99). Similar to Switzerland, 
they also rely on a traditional or routinized mode of campaigning (de Vreese and Semetko 
2004: 172), which means that their campaign communication was not particularly sophisti-
cated or targeted. 
 
Interaction between Context (Campaign Type, Country) and Frame Mediation 
The first journalistic choice (“Effort Choice”) seems to be influenced by the type of cam-
paign. In election campaigns, the effort of journalists might be higher than in direct-
democratic campaigns because the former only take place every four years. The effort in pub-
lic debates might depend on the specific case and vary more depending on whether the issue 
is at the top of the media agenda. The second and third journalistic choice (“Balancing 
Choice” and “Standing Choice”) are less dependent on the campaign type. The fourth choice 
(“Timing Choice”) depends again on the type of campaign. In election campaigns, the critical 
period might begin earlier and last longer than in direct-democratic campaigns. Again, the 
longest campaign will be found in the U.S. presidential election campaigns. In public debates, 
it is unclear whether a debate includes a critical period at all, or when the campaign or the 
critical period starts or ends. External events taking place might be particularly relevant be-
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cause they can set the issue at the top of the agenda. For instance, Baumgartner et al. (2008) 
showed that unexpected and scandalous events in and around the death penalty debate have 
triggered a new public debate. The fifth choice (“Dialogue Choice”) probably depends also on 
the type of campaign. Particularly in public debates, the media sometimes also step in and 
lead a campaign. If the media lead a public debate, the journalists might act as a major speak-
er themselves and advocate an opinion or they might sharpen the message of the one camp 
without being stopped or confronted by a campaign calling for another point of view. In Swit-
zerland, the campaign against pitbulls and other fighting breeds can be considered as an ex-
ample of a public debate which was led by the media. The issue arose because several child-
ren were attacked or even killed by such dogs. Since 2000, the major Swiss tabloid paper 
“Blick” has set the issue at the top of its agenda several times and supported the claim that 
these dogs should be banned. Another example is the media campaign against former Federal 
Councillor Samuel Schmid because of scandals and accidents in the Swiss military in summer 
2008. In this case, a Sunday newspaper “Sonntags Zeitung” started the campaign. Samuel 
Schmid made the mistake of not counter-arguing during the summer silly season, preferring to 
sit the problem out. Furthermore, he was under intense political pressure from his former par-
ty, the Swiss People's Party, because he had accepted re-election when Blocher was replaced 
by Eveline Widmer-Schlumpf (at the end of 2007). Since Blocher was not re-elected, the 
Swiss People’s Party wanted to go into opposition and wanted Samuel Schmid to resign from 
office as well. There was no party which counter-argued. As a consequence, the media cam-
paign had a large impact and Samuel Schmid had resigned from the Federal Council by the 
end of 2008. 
Country characteristics seem to influence the frame mediation process as well. I expect the 
first (“Effort Choice”) and the fifth (“Dialogue Choice”) journalistic choice to be dependent 
on the control of the elites. Based on the indexing hypothesis, we know that the media report 
on the frames the government uses. Furthermore, the first (“Effort Choice”) and the fourth 
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(“Timing Choice”) journalistic choice are expected to be dependent on the communication 
culture. When the political logic dominates, the media follow the institutional routine of the 
political authorities and actors: They make an effort in accordance with the importance and 
timing of the issue on the political agenda. This expectation is supported by Danish results, 
where the media devotes a large amount of news to the referendum campaign (de Vreese and 
Semetko 2004: 174). The second and third journalistic choice (“Balancing Choice” and 
“Standing Choice”) are likely to be dependent on distance between media and political actors. 
Less distant journalists might balance the news less and might rely more on powerful actors. 
In Western European democracies, journalistic norms include elite domination, proportionali-
ty, detachment, civility, and closure, whereas in the USA, norms such as endorsement of narr-
ative and empowerment are prevalent (Ferree et al. 2002: 284). 
 
Interaction between Context (Campaign Type, Country) and Framing Effects 
The campaign type does matter with regard to framing effects. In election campaigns, the ef-
fects of contest frames might be important. For instance, the image of a candidate plays a role 
which is influenced by contest frames. In public debates, the situation might be much more 
open. There is no vote or election taking place. The public is possibly less involved, less in-
formed, or less aware that an opinion formation process is taking place. There might be no 
clear question to be answered.  
The differences between countries can be relevant as well. First, in countries with less control 
by the elite, such as the U.S. version of direct democracy, voters are less able to orient them-
selves to partisan cues and they cannot rely on a pamphlet sent by government in all states 
(Cronin 1989: 83). This makes the vote decision more difficult and increases the possibility of 
frame manipulation. Second, the frequency with which direct-democratic campaigns take 
place possibly matters. If direct-democratic instruments are used only rarely, citizens and 
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elites rely less on routine and are less used to these procedures. They need more effort to be-
come informed and to cast a ballot. The number of initiatives on the same ballot is relevant 
too: If citizens have to vote on a large number of proposals at the same time, the chances of 
framing effects might decrease because citizens rely on heuristic rather than on systematic 
voting (for instance, see Swiss ballot from 18 May, 2003, when Swiss citizens voted on nine 
different proposals). By contrast, a long ballot does not seem to cause a consistent pattern of 
negative voting, as Zisk (1987) showed. Finally, the political communication culture is ex-
pected to be relevant as well. If the media logic prevails, the risk of frame manipulation might 
be higher because the campaign instruments are more sophisticated, and more money is in-
volved.  
 
What do the results mean for the quality of democracy? 
Overall, I am optimistic about what my results imply for the quality of direct-democratic de-
cisions. From my point of view, direct-democratic campaigns are likely to function according 
to the “responsive leadership” model. As introduced at the beginning, this model acknowl-
edges that political leaders use rhetoric to sway public opinion, but they “use it in a way 
which facilitates public discussion”, and the leaders are held in check by a public that is capa-
ble of assessing the validity of their discourse. In this model, the chance that the democratic 
process will produce “largely not a genuine but a manufactured will”, as Schumpeter (1976 
(1942)) suggested, is small. Since the chances of a manufactured will are small, I conceive it 
as normatively desirable to strive for such a democracy model. Kriesi (2011) suggests that 
such a model requires the combination of three preconditions. First, it depends on the compe-
titiveness of the political process, which implies the presence of competing frames. Second, it 
requires an attentive public. Third, the news media needs to be independent, resourceful and 
pluralistic. 
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The first precondition (competitiveness of the political process) is likely to be met because of 
the characteristics of direct-democratic campaigns: Direct-democratic campaigns imply two 
camps which compete against each other. An indicator for this competitiveness is frame con-
testation. We saw in chapter 4 that the political actors in our three campaigns addressed their 
opponents’ frames. On average, campaign dialogue in the three direct-democratic campaigns 
(60.2) is much higher than the average (44.1) found in the study by Kaplan et al. (2006) re-
garding American candidate television advertising aired in the U.S. Senate campaigns from 
1998 to 2002. By contrast, it is lower than the mean (75.3) of dialogue in U.S. presidential 
campaigns from 1960–2000. However, the two immigration campaigns reach a level which is 
as high as that observed in U.S. presidential campaigns. If only one side is involved, there is 
no opponents’ frame to address.  
 
The second precondition for the “responsive leadership” model is an attentive public. The 
chances that the public will be attentive are relatively good. First, the institutionalization of 
direct-democratic campaigns reduces information costs, which increases the chance that citi-
zens will be attentive: The government produces an official information pamphlet and sends it 
to all citizens. Additionally, the political actors prepare the information well and the issue is at 
the top of the news agenda. The easy access to information helps the average citizen to grasp 
the main arguments. This expectation is supported by the results presented in chapter 9. The 
citizens typically get the most important arguments. This impression is also confirmed for the 
American context. “Experience in the states suggest that on most issues, especially well-
publicized ones, voters do grasp the meaning of the issue on which they are asked to vote, and 
that they act competently” (Cronin 1989: 87). Second, the institutionalization helps people to 
become attentive at critical moments: All parties announce their slogans. If a party section at 
the sub-national (=cantonal) level disagrees with the national party, it declares their different 
slogan. In such a way, the slogans from the parties at the cantonal level are an indicator for 
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the level of agreement among the political elite. Disagreement can increase the attention of 
the public. If agreement is prevalent among the elite, citizens can rely on the partisan heuristic 
and do not necessarily need to get to know the proposal in detail. This signal helps them to 
choose the level of attention needed for an informed choice. They know how to vote efficient-
ly. The amount of advertisements and/or posters serves as another signal. If there are many 
advertisements and/or posters, the citizens probably increase their attention.   
The third precondition for the “responsive leadership” model is independent, resourceful and 
pluralistic news media. The journalists generally make an effort in direct-democratic cam-
paigns (“Effort Choice”), tend to balance the news (“Balancing Choice”), and provide cam-
paign dialogue (“Dialogue Choice”). Additionally, as the corporation tax reform initiative 
showed, other frames enter the debate in the form of experts’ views.  
 
Direct-democratic campaigns in Switzerland constitute contests of framing between political 
actors, which are disseminated and supported by the media and taken into consideration by 
the public. These characteristics of direct-democratic campaigns increase the chances that the 
preconditions are met. The chances of a genuine will seem high in direct-democratic cam-
paigns. Thus, I am optimistic about the democratic quality of direct-democratic campaigns. 
However, there are also some reasons to be pessimistic. The competitiveness of the political 
process (first precondition) is reduced by the fact that powerful actors more easily garner me-
dia attention. Power is necessary for media attention and direct-democratic campaigns foster 
the reproduction of power. The attentive public also has its limits (second precondition). We 
saw that in the complex issue (corporation tax reform), the public is less informed about the 
frames, which increases the danger of manipulation. The effect of the contra frames on the 
voters’ choice in this campaign was relatively weak. Furthermore, we also observed that in 
the naturalization campaign, people can become distorted by a scandal. The contest was less 
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substantive and influenced by the conflict between Widmer-Schlumpf and Blocher. Finally, 
the independence, resourcefulness and pluralism of the news media (third precondition) can 
also be questioned. We saw in chapter 6 that journalists rely on the messages by the political 
actors and give higher standing to powerful actors and large parties (“Standing Choice”). In 
addition, they generally follow the institutional routine of the political actors in the timing of 
the news coverage (“Timing Choice”), even though they sometimes introduce accents into a 
campaign by using a public opinion poll or a TV debate show (“Arena”). Overall, the media 
are not totally independent of powerful actors. They rather conform to the actor-centered po-
litical process model (Wolfsfeld 1997), which assumes that the political actors are the first 
source of influence in frame building. Furthermore, the media do not guarantee that we read 
about the most urgent, the most relevant or the most difficult problems, nor are the media 
committed to a long-term perspective. The front-page news are influenced by real-world 
events, prior attention, agenda congestion, scope of discussion, journalistic obligations and 
norms, entrepreneurial activity, public opinion, and political context (Boydstun 2012). In ad-
dition, it should be asked to what extent the journalists are able to discover untrue messages, 
or to point to other relevant aspects not emphasized by powerful political actors. Similarly, 
the mediated views are limited in their pluralism. Two non-state actors (Attac and Declaration 
of Berne) remarked that they abstained from providing a global world view. In order to garner 
media attention, they were forced to adapt their framing to the national focus of the debate. In 
other words, the framing has a national imprint even though our problems might be global.  
 
Despite these concerns, I evaluate the quality of direct-democratic campaigns as positive be-
cause the preconditions of the “responsive leadership” model overall are more likely to be 
met. If one examines the quality based on the results of direct-democratic choices, I also come 
to an optimistic conclusion. Few legislators or political analysts can cite any negative results 
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of popular democratic procedures (Cronin 1989: 89), but acknowledge “that the legislative 
processes in their states leave much to be desired and […] that even with staffs, hearings, bi-
cameralism, and the other features of representative democracy, mistakes are made and defec-
tive bills are enacted into law by legislature” (Cronin 1989: 89). 
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Table A1: Codebook of Substantive and Contest Frames (in German) (Chapter 3) 
a) Substantive Frames 
Asylum 
cod
e
 
pro arguments 
fra
m
e
 
cod
e
 
contra arguments 
fra
m
e
 
100 Humanitäre Tradition allgemein 
h
u
m
a
n
.
 trad
.:
 d
efe
n
sive
 u
se
 
200 Humanitäre Tradition allgemein 
h
u
m
a
n
.
 trad
.:
 offe
n
sive
 u
se
 
101 Menschenwürde, Konformität mit 
Menschenrechten, keine Menschen-
rechtsverletzung 
201 Menschenwürde/Menschenrechte/ 
Grundsatz der Menschlichkeit in Ge-
fahr 
102 Gesetz entspricht Schweizerischen 
Tradition 
202 Gesetz ist unschweizerisch / wider-
spricht Schweizer Tradition 
103 Konformität mit Kinderrechtskonven-
tion 
203 Kinderrechte in Gefahr/UNO-
Kinderrechtskonvention (auch Tren-
nung von Kindern und Eltern Auss-
chaffungshaft) 
104 Verbesserung der sozialen und kultu-
rellen Qualität 
204 Verbesserung der sozialen und kultu-
rellen Qualität 
105 Konformität mit religiösen Normen 205 Religiöse Normen in Gefahr 
   206 Die Grundrechte der Asylbewerber 
müssen geschützt werden 
109 Sonstiges spezifisches ethisches / 
humanitäres Pro-Argument 
209 Sonstiges spezifisches ethisches / 
humanitäres Argument 
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110 Anwendung/Umsetzungs- Pro-
Argumente allgemein 
effica
cy:
 offe
n
sive
 u
se
 
210 Anwendung/Umsetzung-Argument 
allgemein 
effica
cy:
 d
efe
n
sive
 u
se
 
111 Vollzug effizienter, besser, verbessert, 
effektiver gestalten 
211 Gesetz nur schwierig umzusetzen 
(allgemein) 
112 Gesetz kann Ausschaffung besser 
gewährleisten 
212 Hohe Kosten der Umsetzung / büro-
kratischer Aufwand / Vollzug wird er-
schwert 
113 Höhere Flexibilität der Kantone (posi-
tiv: können Ausschaffungshaft bzw. 
Durchsetzungshaft verhängen, aber 
auch Aufenthaltsbewilligung erteilen) 
213 Kantonale Unterschiede in der An-
wendung des Gesetzes 
119 Sonstiges spezifisches Pro-Argument 
zur Anwendung / Umsetzung 
219 Sonstiges spezifisches Umsetzung-
sargument 
120 Wirkung/Effizienz/Erfordernis des Ge-
setzes allgemein 
ab
u
se
:
 offe
n
sive
 u
se
 
220 Wirkung/Effizienz allgemein: Gesetz 
ist wirkungslos 
ab
u
se
:
 d
efe
n
sive
 u
se
 
121 Schweiz zu attraktiv für Asylbewerber 221 Verschärfung hat keine Abschre-
ckungswirkung auf Asylsuchende 
122 zu viele (falsche) Ausländer in der 
Schweiz 
222 Verschärfung trifft die Falschen/die 
wirklich Verfolgten 
123 Ähnlich wie Code 122, aber auf Zu-
kunft gerichtet: Ausländer abschre-
cken 
223 Missbrauch wird nicht verhindert 
124 zu viele (falsche) (Schein)-Asylanten 
in der Schweiz  
224 Gesetz überflüssig, da Anzahl der 
Asylgesuche ohnehin niedrig / rück-
läufig 
125 Ähnlich wie Code 124, aber auf Zu-
kunft gerichtet: Asylanten abschrecken 
 
  
126 (aktuellen) Missbrauch bekämpfen  
  
127 Ähnlich wie Code 126, aber auf Zu-
kunft gerichtet: Missbrauch vorbeugen 
 
  
129 Sonstiges spezifisches Pro-Argument 
zur Anwendung / Umsetzung 
229 Sonstiges spezifisches Argument zur 
Wirkungslosigkeit 
130 Kriminalität allgemein 
oth
e
rs
 (crim
in
ality)
 
230 Kriminalität allgemein 
oth
e
rs
 (crim
in
ality)
 
131 Gesetz verhindert Ausländerkriminali-
tät und Drogenhandel 
231 Verschärfung fördert Ausländerkrimi-
nalität und Drogenhandel 
132 Gesetz hat Abschreckungswirkung 
(auf Schlepper ) 
232 Verschärfung hat keine Abschre-
ckungswirkung (auf Schlepper ) 
133 Gesetz verhindert Abtauchen in Illega-
lität 
233 Verschärfung fördert Abtauchen in Il-
legalität 
139 Sonstiges spezifisches Pro-Argument 
zur Kriminalität 
239 Sonstiges spezifisches Argument zur 
Kriminalität 
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140 Arbeitsmarkt/Schutz des einheimi-
schen Arbeitsmarktes allgemein 
oth
e
rs
 (lab
.
 m
a
rket)
 
240 Arbeitsmarkt allgemein 
oth
e
rs
 (lab
.
 m
a
rket)
 
141 Ausländer besetzen Schweizer Ar-
beitsstellen 
241 Schweizerischer Arbeitsmarkt auf 
Asylanten angewiesen 
149 Sonstiges spezifisches Pro-Argument 
zum Arbeitsmarkt 
249 Sonstiges spezifisches Argument 
zum Arbeitsmarkt 
150 Sozial- und Wirtschaftsfaktoren all-
gemein oth
e
rs
 (so
c
.
 a
nd
 e
c
.
 fa
cto
rs)
 
250 Sozial- und Wirtschaftsfaktoren all-
gemein oth
e
rs
 (so
c
.
 a
nd
 e
c
.
 fa
cto
rs)
 
151 Die Schulen werden, das Schulsystem 
wird zu stark belastet. 
251 Die Schulen werden, das Schulsys-
tem werden nicht belastet. 
152 Das Gesundheitssystem wird zu stark 
belastet. 
252 Das Gesundheitssystem wird nicht 
belastet. 
153 Der Strafvollzug wird zu stark belastet. 253 Der Strafvollzug wird nicht belastet. 
159 Sonstiges spezifisches Pro-Argument 
zu Sozial- und Wirtschaftsfaktoren 
259 Sonstiges spezifisches Contra-
Argument zu Sozial- und Wirtschafts-
faktoren 
160 Recht allgemein 
rule
-of
-la
w
:
 d
efe
n
sive
 u
se
 
260 Rechtliche Argumente allgemein 
rule
-of
-la
w
:
 offe
n
sive
 u
se
 
161 Harmonisierung der Gesetzgebung mit 
Gesetzgebung anderer Länder (z.B. 
andere Länder haben Asylgesetzt 
auch verschärft) 
261 Aushöhlung des Rechtsstaates 
162 Schaffung von Rechtssicherheit auch 
für Asylanten (bislang z.T. Behörden-
willkür) 
262 Verstoss gegen Völkerrecht (z.B. 
Genfer Konvention) 
   263 Rechtssicherheitsproblem für Betrof-
fene/Mit mehr Nichteintretensent-
scheiden wächst Risiko von Fehlent-
scheiden 
   264 Bei Verschärfung (insbesondere 
Ausschaffungshaft von 24 Monaten) 
Verhältnismässigkeitsprinzip des 
Rechtssystems in Frage gestellt 
169 Sonstiges spezifisches rechtliches 
Pro-Argument 
269 Sonstiges spezifisches rechtliches 
Argument 
170 Gesetz senkt Integrati-
on/Diskriminierung/Misstrauen/Fremde
nangst allgemein 
oth
e
rs
 (integ
ratio
n)
 
270 Gesetz fördert Diskriminie-
rung/Misstrauen/Fremdenangst all-
gemein 
oth
e
rs
 (integ
ratio
n)
 
171 Gesetz bietet (bessere) Möglichkeiten 
der Integration 
271 Gesetz bietet keine Ideen zur Integ-
ration 
179 Sonstiges spezifisches Argument zur 
Integrationsproblematik 
279 Sonstiges spezifisches Argument zur 
Integrationsproblematik 
180 Die Verlagerung der Kosten im Asyl-
wesen auf die Städte muss verhindert 
werden 
oth
e
rs
 (co
sts)
 
280 Verschärfungen allein sind falscher 
Ansatzpunkt 
oth
e
rs
 (co
sts)
 
   281 Die Verlagerung der Kosten im Asyl-
wesen auf die Städte muss verhin-
dert werden 
199 Sonstige Pro-Argumente, die nicht in 
eine der Haupt- oder Unterkategorien 
passen 
oth
e
rs
 
299 Sonstiges Argument, die nicht in eine 
der Haupt- oder Unterkategorien 
passen 
oth
e
rs
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Naturalization 
cod
e
 
pro arguments 
fra
m
e
 
cod
e
 
contra arguments 
fra
m
e
 
100 Migrationspolitische Argumente all-
gemein 
m
a
ss
 n
atu
ralizatio
n
:
 offe
n
sive
 u
se
 
200 Migrationspolitische Argumente all-
gemein 
m
a
ss
 n
atu
ralizatio
n
:
 d
efe
n
sive
 u
se
 
101 Zu hoher Ausländeranteil 201 Ausländeranteil ist angemessen 
102 Quantität von Einbürgerungen reduzie-
ren 
202 Quantität von Einbürgerungen ist an-
gemessen 
103 Einbürgerung von Kriminellen oder 
Sozialhilfebezügern verhindern 
203 Bereits heute werden keine Kriminel-
len oder Sozialhilfebezüger einge-
bürgert 
104 Einbürgerungen von nicht integrierten 
Ausländern verhindern 
204 Einbürgerungswillige Ausländer sind 
gut integriert 
   205 Heutiges Verfahren ist gut und sorg-
fältig 
110 Zuständigkeitsargumente allgemein 
p
e
ople
 fin
al
 say:
 offe
n
sive
 u
se
 
210 Zuständigkeitsargumente allgemein 
p
e
ople
 fin
al
 say:
 d
efe
n
sive
 u
se
 
111 Einbürgerung ist ein politischer Akt, 
bei dem die demokratischen Mitwir-
kungsrechte gestärkt werden sollen 
211 Rechtsstaatlichkeit: Einbürgerung soll 
ein rechtsstaatliches Verfahren sein 
112 Volk kann bei Einbürgerungen besser 
urteilen und als Richter und Beamte 
212 Einbürgerungen sind Verwaltung-
sakte 
113  Heutige Einbürgerungspraxis wider-
spricht föderativem System der 
Schweiz 
214 Initiative widerspricht dem föderati-
ven System der Schweiz 
   215 Gemeindezuständigkeit führt zu 
Chaos und reduziert Chance auf 
Gleichbehandlung 
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120 Rechtliche Argumente allgemein 
rule
-of
-la
w
:
 d
efe
n
sive
 u
se
 
220 Rechtliche Argumente allgemein 
rule
-of
-la
w
:
 offe
n
sive
 u
se
 
121 Rechtssicherheit wiederherstellen 221 Fairness, Verfahrensgerechtigkeit 
122 Rekurse und Beschwerden gegen ne-
gative Entscheidungen von direktde-
mokratischen Abstimmungen sollen 
nicht erlaubt sein 
222 Diskriminierung, Willkür und Sorglo-
sigkeit vermeiden 
123 Gegen internationale Fremdbestim-
mung 
223 Grundrechte und Beschwerdemög-
lichkeit garantieren (Verfassungskon-
formität) 
124 Schweizer Pass ist kein Grundrecht 224 Für die Einhaltung von internationa-
len Rechtsabkommen 
125 Hohe Machbarkeit 225 Fehlende Machbarkeit 
131 Wirtschaftliche Argumente 
oth
e
rs
 
231 Wirtschaftliche Argumente 
oth
e
rs
 
141 Kulturelle und soziale Argumente 241 Kulturelle und soziale Argumente 
151 Image-Gewinn im Ausland 251 Image-Schaden im Ausland vermei-
den 
161 Bewährte Tradition weiterführen 261 Tradition kennt kaum direktdemokra-
tische Einbürgerungen 
199 sonstiges Pro-Argument 299 sonstiges Contra-Argument 
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Corporation Tax 
cod
e
 
pro arguments 
fra
m
e
 
cod
e
 
contra arguments 
fra
m
e
 
100 Wirtschaftsförderung allgemein 
co
m
p
etitive
n
e
ss:
 offe
n
sive
 u
se
 
200 Wirtschaftsförderung allgemein 
co
m
p
etitive
n
e
ss:
 d
efe
n
sive
 u
se
 
101 „Die Reform fördert die Wettbewerbs-
fähigkeit des Wirtschaftsstandortes 
Schweiz.“ 
201 „Der Steuerwettbewerb ist schädlich 
für die Schweiz.“ 
102 „Diese Reform fördert Investitionen 
und schafft Arbeitsplätze.“ 
202 Diese Reform gefährdet Ar-
beitsplätze. 
103 Diese Reform setzt am richten Punkt 
an, nämlich bei der Reduktion der 
Steuern für Aktionäre. 
203 Diese Reform setzt am falschen 
Punkt an: Nicht die Aktionäre, son-
dern die Unternehmen sollten von 
Steuern entlastet werden. 
109 Andere, spezifische Argumente mit 
Bezug zu Wirtschaftsförderung 
209 Andere, spezifische Argumente mit 
Bezug zu Wirtschaftsförderung 
110 KMU-Förderung allgemein  
SM
E
:
 offe
n
sive
 u
se
 
210 Keine KMU-Förderung (allgemein) SM
E
:
 d
efe
n
sive
 u
se
 
111 KMU und Gewerbe entlasten von 
übermässigen Steuerbelastungen 
  
112 (Spezifische) „Steuerliche Hindernisse 
abbauen“  
  
119 Andere, spezifische Argumente mit 
Bezug zu KMU-Förderung 
219 Andere, spezifische Argumente mit 
Bezug zu KMU-Förderung 
120 Ethische und rechtliche Argumente 
allgemein 
ta
x
 eq
uity:
 d
efe
n
sive
 u
se
 
220 Ethische und rechtliche Argumente 
allgemein 
ta
x
 eq
uity:
 offe
n
sive
 u
se
 
121 Die Doppelbesteuerung (als Gewinn 
beim Unternehmen und als Dividen-
deneinkommen beim Aktionär) ist un-
gerecht / soll gemildert werden. 
221 Die Vorlage führt zu Ungleichbehand-
lung von Steuerpflichtigen und fördert 
die Steuerungerechtigkeit. 
122 Unternehmer sind keine Abzocker, 
sondern tragen Verantwortung. 
222 Alle Einkommensarten (Löhne, Divi-
denden, Renten) sollen (gemäss 
Bundesverfassung) gleich besteuert 
werden. 
126 Die Vorlage steht im Einklang mit der 
Schweizer Verfassung.  
223 „Steuerrabatte sollten grundsätzlich 
allen Aktionären gewährt werden.“ 
  224 „Es muss ein Zeichen gegen über-
höhte Managerlöhne gesetzt wer-
den.“ 
  225 Alle KMUs sollten gleichbehandelt 
werden (hier werden aber gewisse 
bevorzugt). 
  226 Die Vorlage verletzt die Schweizer 
Verfassung. 
129 Andere, spezifische Argumente mit 
Bezug zu Ethik und Recht 
229 Andere, spezifische Argumente mit 
Bezug zu Ethik und Recht 
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130 Ausgabenbereiche 
ta
x
 lo
ss:
 d
efe
n
sive
 u
se
 
230 Ausgabenbereiche 
ta
x
 lo
ss:
 offe
n
sive
 u
se
 
131 Die Mindereinnnahmen sind klein / 
nicht gravierend. 
231 „Diese Reform bringt inakzeptable 
Steuerausfälle für Bund oder Kanto-
ne.“ 
132 Diese Reform sichert Steuereinkom-
men für die AHV. 
232 „Diese Reform schadet der AHV.“ 
133 Diese Reform sichert Steuereinkom-
men für Bund oder Kantone. 
   
139 Andere, spezifische Argumente mit 
Bezug zu Wirkungen auf Ausgabenbe-
reiche 
239 Andere, spezifische Argumente mit 
Bezug zu Ausgabenbereichen 
140 Breite Unterstützung für Reform (all-
gemein) 
oth
e
rs
 (supp
o
rt)
 
240 Breiter Widerstand gegen Reform 
(allgemein) 
oth
e
rs
 (supp
o
rt)
 
141 Bundesrat und Parlament unterstützen 
die Reform klar 
241 Widerstand von Kantonen 
142 Viele Kantone stehen hinter Vorlage. 242 Widerstand von Parteien 
143 Viele Parteien unterstützen die Vorla-
ge 
243 Widerstand von einzelnen Unter-
nehmer und Wirtschaftskreise 
144 Viele Unternehmer und Wirtschafts-
kreise unterstützen die Vorlage 
244 Widerstand von Gewerkschaften 
   245 Widerstand von anderen Organisa-
tionen 
150 „Durch diese Reform wird das Steuer-
system einfacher“  oth
e
rs
 
250 „Durch diese Reform wird das Steu-
ersystem noch komplizierter“  oth
e
rs
 
199 Andere Pro-Argumente 299 Andere Contra-Argumente 
 
 
b) Contest Frames (in All Campaigns) 
190 Angriff auf Personen der Contra-Seite 
(Bsp. “Ruth Dreifuss sollte sich als 
ehemalige Bundesrätin nicht mehr in 
die Politik einmischen”). 
atta
ck
 
290 Angriff auf Person der Pro-Seite 
(Bsp. “Blocher darf sich als Bundes-
rat nicht in eine laufende Abstim-
mung einmischen”). 
atta
ck
 
995 conflict (no argument but a conflict) co
nflict
 
995 conflict (no argument but a conflict) co
nflict
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Table A2: News Media Analyzed (Chapter 3) 
Type Media Language 
Elite Le Temps French 
  Neue Zürcher Zeitung German 
  NZZ am Sonntag   
  Sonntagszeitung   
Free 20 Minutes French 
  20 Minuten German 
Regional 24 heures French 
  Tribune de Genève   
  Aargauer Zeitung German 
  Basler Zeitung   
  Berner Zeitung   
  Die Südostschweiz   
  Neue Luzerner Zeitung   
  St. Galler Tagblatt   
  Tagesanzeiger   
Tabloid Le Matin French 
  Blick German 
  Sonntagsblick   
TV le journal French 
  Tagesschau German 
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Table A3: Sensitivity Analyses (Chapter 7) 
Asylum 
model s1  robust  model s2    
ratio s.e. p ratio s.e. p 
count model      count model      
media (t-1) 1.062 0.031 0.038 media (t-1) 1.019 0.010 0.067 
media (t-1)2 0.999 0.001 0.015 contra input (t-1) 1.033 0.014 0.016 
contra input (t-1) 1.031 0.013 0.017 pro input (t-1) 1.010 0.062 0.869 
pro input (t-1) 0.976 0.066 0.716 minister (t-1) 2.043 0.689 0.034 
minister (t-1) 2.432 1.211 0.074 human. trad. 0.956 0.186 0.815 
human. trad. 0.963 0.139 0.797 rule-of-law 0.401 0.088 0.000 
rule-of-law 0.397 0.043 0.000 abuse 0.931 0.184 0.719 
abuse 0.912 0.119 0.483 efficacy 0.477 0.097 0.000 
efficacy 0.483 0.061 0.000 inflation model       
inflation model       media (t-1) 0.308 0.433 0.006 
media (t-1) 0.302 1.252 0.339 power contra (t-1) 0.851 0.107 0.132 
media (t-1)2 1.018 0.019 0.365 power pro (t-1) 0.953 0.061 0.423 
power contra (t-1) 0.773 0.271 0.341 constant 0.749 0.192 0.000 
power pro (t-1) 0.834 0.070 0.010 n total: 560, n zero obs.: 262 
constant 0.774 0.394 0.049 vuong: z=5.70, Pr>z=0.000 
n total: 560, n zero obs.: 262     
vuong: z=5.56, Pr>z=0.000     
 
model s3  robust  model s4  robust  
ratio s.e. p ratio s.e. p 
count model      count model      
media (t-1) 1.020 0.017 0.248 media (t-1) 1.019 0.017 0.263 
contra input (t-1) 1.034 0.014 0.015 contra input (t-1) 1.034 0.014 0.015 
pro input (t-1) 1.030 0.050 0.542 pro input (t-1) 1.042 0.050 0.389 
minister (t-1) 1.846 0.793 0.154 minister (t-1) 1.803 0.759 0.162 
human. trad. 0.942 0.124 0.652 human. trad. 0.947 0.126 0.684 
rule-of-law 0.390 0.046 0.000 rule-of-law 0.391 0.045 0.000 
abuse 0.904 0.111 0.411 abuse 0.910 0.113 0.446 
efficacy 0.477 0.065 0.000 efficacy 0.480 0.065 0.000 
inflation model       inflation model       
media (t-1) 0.273 0.918 0.157 media (t-1) 0.276 0.910 0.157 
power contra (t-1) 0.862 0.192 0.439 power contra (t-1) 0.849 0.200 0.414 
power pro (t-1) 0.590 0.226 0.020 power pro (t-1) 0.643 0.120 0.000 
contra input (t-1) 0.485 1.408 0.608 contra input (t-1) 85.514 2.591 0.086 
pro input (t-1) 3.880 0.530 0.011 pro input (t-1) 2.343 0.329 0.010 
constant 0.833 0.376 0.027 
i_power*contra input 
(t-1) 0.396 0.542 0.088 
n total: 560, n zero obs.: 262 
i_power*pro input (t-
1) 1.028 0.008 0.000 
vuong: z=6.12, Pr>z=0.000 constant 0.850 0.373 0.023 
    n total: 560, n zero obs.: 262 
    vuong: z=6.04, Pr>z=0.000 
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Naturalization 
 
    robust           
model s1 Ratio s.e. p model s2 Ratio s.e. p 
Count Model      Count Model      
media (t-1) 1.017 0.021 0.429 media (t-1) 1.008 0.009 0.336 
media (t-1)2 1.000 0.000 0.372 contra (t-1) 1.032 0.009 0.000 
contra (t-1) 1.033 0.006 0.000 pro (t-1) 1.059 0.041 0.143 
pro (t-1) 1.063 0.035 0.065 minister (t-1) 3.038 1.208 0.005 
minister (t-1) 3.036 1.291 0.009 rule-of-law 3.572 0.919 0.000 
rule-of-law 3.454 0.706 0.000 people-final-say 2.928 0.708 0.000 
people-final-say 2.820 0.503 0.000 mass naturalization 2.421 0.595 0.000 
mass naturalization 2.351 0.411 0.000 Inflation Model       
Inflation Model       media (t-1) 0.106 0.799 0.005 
media (t-1) 0.104 1.103 0.040 power contra (t-1) 0.000 6877 0.998 
media (t-1)2 1.001 0.000 0.055 power pro  (t-1) 0.944 0.027 0.031 
power contra (t-1) 0.000 0.832 0.000 constant 1.971 0.262 0.000 
power pro  (t-1) 0.943 0.015 0.000 n total: 364, n zero obs.: 203 
constant 1.685 0.337 0.893 Vuong: z = 6.14, Pr>z=0.000 
n total: 364, n zero obs.: 203     
Vuong: z = 5.78, Pr>z=0.000     
    robust       robust   
model s3 Ratio s.e. p model s4 Ratio s.e. p 
Count Model      Count Model      
media (t-1) 1.007 0.013 0.548 media (t-1) 1.007 0.013 0.545 
contra (t-1) 1.032 0.006 0.000 contra (t-1) 1.032 0.006 0.000 
pro (t-1) 1.057 0.033 0.077 pro (t-1) 1.057 0.033 0.077 
minister (t-1) 2.980 1.180 0.006 minister (t-1) 2.980 1.180 0.006 
rule-of-law 3.436 0.670 0.000 rule-of-law 3.436 0.670 0.000 
people-final-say 2.817 0.487 0.000 people-final-say 2.817 0.487 0.000 
mass naturalization 2.395 0.424 0.000 mass naturalization 2.395 0.424 0.000 
Inflation Model       Inflation Model       
media (t-1) 0.108 0.984 0.024 media (t-1) 0.103 1.110 0.041 
power contra (t-1) 0.853 0.240 0.509 power contra (t-1) 0.853 0.247 0.518 
power pro  (t-1) 1.002 0.017 0.897 power pro  (t-1) 1.015 0.023 0.492 
contra (t-1) 0.000 1.183 0.000 contra (t-1) 0.000 1.323 0.000 
pro (t-1) 0.222  0.872 0.084 pro (t-1) 0.283 0.905 0.163 
constant 1.874 0.333 0.000 i_power*contra (t-1) 0.810 0.268 0.432 
n total: 364, n zero obs.: 203 i_power*pro (t-1) 0.969 0.020 0.119 
Vuong: z = 6.69, Pr>z=0.000 constant 1.871 0.322 0.000 
    n total: 364, n zero obs.: 203 
    Vuong: z = 6.69, Pr>z=0.000 
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Corporation Tax 
model s1   robust  model s2      
ratio s.e. p ratio s.e. p 
count model      count model      
media (t-1) 1.009 0.020 0.666 media (t-1) 1.007 0.007 0.303 
media (t-1)2 1.000 0.000 0.908 contra input (t-1) 1.082 0.025 0.001 
contra input (t-1) 1.082 0.016 0.000 pro input (t-1) 1.059 0.022 0.006 
pro input (t-1) 1.059 0.025 0.015 minister (t-1) 4.290 1.927 0.001 
minister (t-1) 4.275 1.353 0.000 tax equity  5.102 1.363 0.000 
tax equity  5.083 1.068 0.000 tax-loss 2.802 0.785 0.000 
tax-loss 2.792 0.536 0.000 SME 3.780 1.002 0.000 
SME 3.762 0.657 0.000 competitiveness 3.875 1.027 0.000 
competitiveness 3.861 0.588 0.000 inflation model       
inflation model       media (t-1) 0.183 0.532 0.001 
media (t-1) 0.180 0.626 0.006 power contra (t-1) 0.863 0.095 0.122 
media (t-1)2 1.019 0.007 0.008 power pro (t-1) 0.980 0.010 0.037 
power contra (t-1) 0.863 0.088 0.092 constant 1.272 0.198 0.000 
power pro (t-1) 0.980 0.013 0.120 n total: 445, n zero obs.: 246 
constant 1.270 0.310 0.000 vuong: z=6.49, Pr>z=0.000 
n total: 445, n zero obs.: 246     
vuong: z=6.40, Pr>z=0.000     
 
model s3  robust  model s4  robust  
ratio s.e. p ratio s.e. p 
count model      count model      
media (t-1) 1.007 0.008 0.381 media (t-1) 1.007 0.008 0.372 
contra input (t-1) 1.082 0.017 0.000 contra input (t-1) 1.083 0.017 0.000 
pro input (t-1) 1.059 0.025 0.015 pro input (t-1) 1.058 0.025 0.014 
minister (t-1) 4.296 1.342 0.000 minister (t-1) 4.356 1.328 0.000 
tax equity  5.121 1.020 0.000 tax equity  5.188 1.050 0.000 
tax-loss 2.813 0.564 0.000 tax-loss 2.837 0.570 0.000 
SME 3.786 0.640 0.000 SME 3.835 0.655 0.000 
competitiveness 3.883 0.596 0.000 competitiveness 3.924 0.609 0.000 
inflation model       inflation model       
media (t-1) 0.183 0.605 0.005 media (t-1) 0.163 0.723 0.012 
power contra (t-1) 0.771 0.301 0.386 power contra (t-1) 0.766 0.306 0.384 
power pro (t-1) 0.983 0.019 0.354 power pro (t-1) 0.984 0.017 0.331 
contra input (t-1) 1.232 0.345 0.546 contra input (t-1) 1.698 0.409 0.196 
pro input (t-1) 0.980 0.056 0.720 pro input (t-1) 1.150 0.217 0.518 
constant 1.280 0.312 0.000 
i_power*contra input 
(t-1) 0.981 0.021 0.348 
n total: 445, n zero obs.: 246 
i_power*pro input (t-
1) 0.997 0.005 0.468 
vuong: z=6.53, Pr>z=0.000 constant 1.251 0.315 0.000 
    n total: 445, n zero obs.: 246 
    vuong: z=6.61, Pr>z=0.000 
 
Note:  
model s1: with media (t-1)2 in inflation and count model 
model s2: non-clustered standard errors 
model s3: with contra input (t-1) and pro input (t-1) in inflation model 
model s4: with contra input (t-1), pro input (t-1), interaction between power contra (t-1) * contra input (t-
1), and interaction between power pro input (t-1) * pro input (t-1) in inflation model 
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Table A4: Applicability (=Strength) of the Frames in Thought – Estimates from the Random In-
tercept Probit Models of the Vote Choice for the Corporation Tax Campaign, Unstandardized 
Regression Coefficients, Standard Errors and Levels of Significance. Model with Interaction 
Terms between Undecided Voters and Frame Positions on t2 (Chapter 8) 
 Corporation Tax coef. s.e. P>z 
fixed part       
issue pref 0.119 0.079 ns 
partisan pref 0.205 0.080 ** 
ambivalence -0.112 0.073 ns 
core frame contra -0.137 0.059 * 
2nd frame contra -0.264 0.061 *** 
core frame pro 0.319 0.064 *** 
2nd frame pro 0.431 0.072 *** 
t2       
issue pref t2     
partisan pref t2     
ambivalence t2     
core frame contra t2     
2nd frame contra t2     
core frame pro t2     
2nd frame pro t2       
t3 0.427 0.149 ** 
issue pref t3 0.014 0.118 ns 
partisan pref t3 0.127 0.116 ns 
ambivalence t3 0.243 0.114 * 
core frame contra t3 -0.405 0.093 *** 
2nd frame contra t3 -0.083 0.093   
core frame pro t3 0.086 0.105   
2nd frame pro t3 0.052 0.112   
undecided -2.115 0.204 *** 
un_issue pref t3 -0.398 0.180 * 
un_party pref t3 0.174 0.163   
un_ambivalence t3 0.402 0.162 * 
i_undec. core frame contra t3 0.994 0.130 *** 
i_undec. 2nd frame contra t3 -0.178 0.140   
i_undec. core frame pro t3 0.294 0.152   
i_undec. 2nd frame pro t3 0.347 0.170 * 
contstant 0.202 0.111   
random part       
/lnsig2u -0.535 0.329   
sigma_u 0.765 0.126   
rho 0.369 0.077   
Chibar2 19.430   *** 
rho-Nullmodel 0.560 0.040   
*p<.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Corporation Tax: n observations=1669, respondents=853 
Note: Figure 8.3 is based on this model 
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